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I. INTRODUCTION
The shock waves that originated from the burst of the US house price bubble in 2007
have put an end to the “Great Moderation”, a period of economic calm in advanced
economies. This is especially true for Europe, where recent developments have brought
current account imbalances and sovereign risk back on the agenda of investors, policy
makers and economists alike. Up to now, the so called “euro crisis” centered on five
member countries of the common currency union – Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain – which experienced a reversal of private capital flows as well as a substantial
increase in sovereign borrowing costs. Europe even witnessed the first non-war-related
sovereign default by an advanced economy since 1945 when Greece restructured its debt
in March 2012. These events were accompanied by a wide range of policy responses that
include a general shift towards fiscal austerity and the establishment of a new European
bailout fund.
Against the background of these experiences, the recent revival of research on the deter-
minants of international capital flows and sovereign risk comes as no surprise. The euro
crisis has also sparked a renewed academic debate about the economic costs of sovereign
debt crises and on the appropriate policy response. The four papers that constitute this
thesis contribute to each of these topics. All of them are empirical in nature and draw
on large cross-sectional time-series data sets. Hence, rather than focusing exclusively on
the recent European experience, they use the fact that both, the ebb and flow of foreign
capital flows and sovereign debt crises have been a recurring phenomenon in emerging
market economies.
The first paper “The Dynamics of International Capital Flows: Results from a Dynamic
Hierarchical Factor Model” coauthored with Marcel Förster and Peter Tillmann inves-
tigates the relative importance of global developments as drivers of cross-border capital
flows. The analysis is motivated by the popular notion that such “push factors” have
been responsible for the boom-bust cycles of capital flows characterizing many emerg-
ing market economies. In these episodes massive capital inflows have been followed by
“sudden stops” which in turn were often associated with deep recessions and financial
crises. To the extent that these events have indeed been caused by developments out
of the realm of domestic politics, restricting international capital mobility might be an
appropriate policy response. The degree to which capital flows to different countries are
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linked, i.e. the degree of comovement of capital flows, is thus a key question for policy
makers.
Our study addresses this issue and disentangles the determinants behind international
capital inflows into driving forces attributable to different levels of aggregation. In par-
ticular, we use a purely data-driven approach to decompose capital flows in a large panel
of countries into (i) a global factor common to all types of inflows and all recipient coun-
tries, (ii) a factor specific to a given type of capital inflows, i.e. either foreign direct
investment (FDI), portfolio investment or other kinds of investment, (iii) a regional fac-
tor driving economies in geographical proximity and (iv) a country-specific component.
Using this four level structure we thus acknowledge that some push factors are likely to
have a differentiated effect on the financial account of specific country groups. Techni-
cally, the decomposition rests on the estimation of a dynamic hierarchical factor model.
This econometric approach, recently developed by Moench et al. (2011) and Moench
and Ng (2011) is ideally suited for our purpose. Its block structure separately identifies
regional and global determinants of capital inflows in a logical coherent way, i.e. it allows
for the possibility that the global factor affects regional and other subordinated factors
but not vice versa.
Based on a quarterly data set of 47 countries and three different types of gross capital
inflows, we find that the country-specific component explains by far the largest fraction
of fluctuations in capital inflows. This “pull” factor alone is responsible for around 80% of
the observed volatility. The regional factor explains between 5% and 20% of fluctuations
and is particularly important for emerging markets’ FDI and portfolio inflows as well
as bank lending to emerging Europe. The global factor, however, explains only a small
share of overall variation.
The predominance of pull factors revealed by our results implies that most foreign in-
vestors carefully discriminate between different target countries. Hence, domestic policy
has considerable room to affect capital inflows and, if this is deemed appropriate, also
to limit their potential undesirable consequences. However, the results also suggest that
most of the blame for past episodes of sudden stops has to be attributed to country-
specific circumstances.
The three remaining papers of this thesis are devoted to the study of sovereign debt
crises and defaults. Since these events are costly for the affected countries (see paper
three) and potentially contagious, preventing them has always been a major policy
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objective. Although it lacks an explicitly stated mandate to fight sovereign debt crises
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has seemingly assumed this task as it intervened
in many crisis-stricken countries. Its participation in the – eventually failed – efforts to
rescue Greece is perhaps the best known recent example. My second paper “The Effect
of IMF Lending on the Probability of Sovereign Debt Crises” investigates whether the
IMF has been more successful in the past.
The paper starts with a review of the theoretical literature on the relationship between
IMF interventions and sovereign risk. This literature identifies four channels through
which the IMF’s presence alters the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults. These
channels focus (i) on the direct effects of liquidity provision, (ii) its influence on the
governments’ adjustment effort and on the role of (iii) conditionality and (iv) seniority
respectively. The analysis, however, does not provide a clear-cut answer to the question
whether we should expect default probabilities to rise or to decrease in the aftermath of
IMF programs. Rather, the sign of the effect is disputed even at the level of the individual
channels. Given this heterogeneity of theoretically plausible effects the success of IMF
programs has to be assessed empirically.
The identification of the causal effects of IMF programs is complicated by the fact that
their implementation is not exogenous. On the contrary, programs are often specifically
targeted to countries which are already on the brink of crisis. To the degree that these
common determinants of IMF interventions and sovereign debt crises are not modeled
adequately any indicator of IMF actions becomes endogenous. Neglecting this endo-
geneity would result in biased estimates that understate the potential positive impact
of the IMF’s presence. To address these concerns I investigate the IMF-default nexus
empirically using univariate and bivariate probit methods. Both model variants include
a large set of macroeconomic and political control variables that influence the proba-
bility of sovereign debt crises and are probably correlated with the incidence of IMF
interventions. The bivariate probit model further explicitly accounts for the possibility
that unobserved factors affect the likelihood of crises and IMF programs simultaneously.
The results of the empirical exercises indicate that the adoption of an IMF program
increases sovereign risk over the medium term. More concretely, I estimate that the
probability of a sovereign default increases by approximately 1.5 to 2 percentage points
in the aftermath of IMF interventions. These results can be interpreted causally as
they are robust across univariate and bivariate specifications. Further analysis shows
that the increase in sovereign risk cannot be attributed to a lack of compliance with
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conditionality but seems to reflect the effects of IMF programs per se. Furthermore, I find
that the IMF’s presence is especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when Fund resources
are targeted to countries with already weak fundamentals. Overall, the evidence is
therefore consistent with the idea that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these
situations as predicted by the theoretical work on the catalytic finance hypothesis. Other
theoretical explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of
IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible.
The final two paper of my thesis are concerned with the costs of sovereign defaults. Their
analysis is interesting from both a political and a theoretical point of view. Politically,
estimates of the likely consequence of a default decision provide valuable information
to governments considering this step. Enhancing the understanding of the trade-off
between a reduced burden of debt repayment and incurred default costs should thus
lead to more deliberate policy choices. The theoretical interest in default costs is related
to this argument as it already implies that sovereigns can freely decide to repudiate
their debts. This is a realistic assumption since lending to sovereign entities is not
enforced by any international bankruptcy law. Economic theory then predicts that
optimizing governments should always repudiate if defaults were costless. It also follows
that investors should rationally decline lending causing the market for sovereign debt to
break down. Since we observe high quantities of sovereign debt in many countries which
are generally repaid we know by contradiction that defaults cannot be costless if the
theory is correct. Identifying default costs thus facilitates our theoretical understanding
of the market for sovereign debt.
My third paper “The Heterogeneity of Default Costs: Evidence from Recent Sovereign
Debt Crises” analyzes different dimensions of default costs that have recently attracted
much research interest. Costs are quantified in terms of forgone GDP growth, reduced
foreign trade and deterred inflows of private capital. However, I depart from the pre-
vious literature by acknowledging that past sovereign defaults have been far from ho-
mogeneous. On the contrary, country and time-specific default experiences differed in
many respects from the length of restructuring process to the way creditors were treated.
Different economic theories imply that these differences should affect the costs of debt
crises. Unfortunately, standard panel methods – the workhorses of most empirical con-
tributions in the field – are ill-suited to address this kind of heterogeneity. I therefore
opt for a novel econometric technique based on comparative case studies that allows for
a case-by-case estimation of default costs.
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The method, originally developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and refined by
Abadie et al. (2010) builds on the idea that counterfactual outcomes for a unit subject
to some binary treatment can be estimated as a weighted average of outcomes for similar
units that have not received the treatment under study. The weights are optimally
chosen in a way that minimizes selection bias and mitigates endogeneity as they ensure
close affinity between the treated unit and its synthetically created counterpart. The
treatment effect can then be estimated as the difference between actual and hypothetical
outcomes. In my application a sovereign’s decision to default is defined as the relevant
treatment and the associated economic costs as the outcome variables of interest. Using
these definitions the paper then offers an in-depth analysis of five recent episodes of
sovereign debt crises. The sample contains both the spectacular unilateral default of
Argentina in 2001 and the much more cooperative restructuring of Uruguay’s debt in
2003 that has been praised as role-model for future debt renegotiations.
My results support the general notion of costly sovereign defaults and the hypothesis of
heterogeneity in default costs. Country-specific estimates of cumulated output losses,
e.g., range between 8.5% and 23%. Further differences emerge in the medium run when
the default costs either turn out to be transitory or permanent. Taken together, these
two observations imply that the welfare consequences of a specific default decision might
differ markedly from those of the “average default”. In fact, achieving the most favorable
outcome after a default might be of similar importance to a sovereign as the decision to
enter or circumvent the default status in the first place.
The results also point to differences in the relative importance of the different channels
through which a default might impair economic activity. Neither of the two most popu-
lar explanations for default costs, resting either on trade sanctions or on capital market
exclusion fits all of the debt crises in our sample. Considered together with the observa-
tion that harmful effects of defaults on GDP growth have been found for all sovereign
debt crises in my sample this finding suggests that not only the level but also the type
of costs incurred after a default depend on country-specific circumstances. However, a
competing explanation would be that all defaults are costly in a dimension that has not
yet been analyzed. My final paper addresses this possibility.
The type of default costs that is analyzed in this fourth paper “Aid Withdrawal as
Punishment for Defaulting Sovereigns? An Empirical Analysis”, coauthored with Jana
Brandt, is related to the disbursement of foreign aid. More specifically, we empirically
investigate whether donor countries react to sovereign defaults by reducing foreign aid
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flows to delinquent debtors. The assumed existence of this kind of punishment mecha-
nism has been a cornerstone of two recent contributions to the theory of sovereign debt
by Asiedu and Villamil (2002) and Asiedu et al. (2009). However, up to now, the validity
of this assumption has not been tested. Our paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature.
Using bilateral data on foreign flows and sovereign defaults we are able to distinguish
between two different versions of the punishment hypothesis. A strong version states that
international donors as a group sanction defaults by reducing foreign aid to misbehaving
sovereign debtors. The collective withdrawal of foreign aid thus represents an additional
cost to the affected country that may influence its decision to default in the first place.
Hence, foreign aid would serve as an enforcement mechanism as modeled by Asiedu and
Villamil (2002) and Asiedu et al. (2009). However, it seems reasonable to assume that
coordination among donors is too weak to ensure collective sanctioning. A reduction
in aid disbursements might thus only be observed for those creditor countries to which
the recipient defaulted. This is the prediction of the weaker version of the punishment
hypothesis which is silent about the theoretically ambiguous reaction of the remaining
donors.
Our findings – obtained by standard panel techniques – indicate that foreign aid flows are
not reduced after a default. This result holds not only for the aggregate amount of foreign
aid received by the delinquent country but also for the amount granted by aggrieved
creditor countries. Hence, both versions of the punishment hypothesis are rejected by
the data. Moreover, we even find an economically and statistically significant positive
effect of defaults on aggregate aid inflows. This finding reflects additional aid flows
given by non affected creditor countries which possibly react to the increased need of the
recipient country in times of crises. All of these findings are robust to different empirical
model specifications and several robustness checks. Foreign aid therefore seems not to
work as an enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt repayment. We also conclude that
the damage inflicted by a hypothetical withdrawal of foreign aid is not the explanation
for the reduction in GDP growth observed in the aftermath of sovereign defaults.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter II contains the dynamic
factor analysis of international capital inflows. Section III provides my paper on the re-
lationship between IMF programs and sovereign debt crises. Chapter IV and Chapter V
are devoted to the empirical analysis of sovereign default costs. The papers in these
four chapters constitute separate contributions to the literature and are thus presented
as such. Chapter VI concludes.
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Abstract
The present paper examines the degree of comovement of gross capital in-
flows, which is a highly sensitive issue for policy makers. We estimate a
dynamic hierarchical factor model that is able to decompose inflows in a
sample of 47 economies into (i) a global factor common to all types of flows
and all recipient countries, (ii) a factor specific to a given type of capital
inflows, (iii) a regional factor and (iv) a country-specific component. We
find that the latter explains by far the largest fraction of fluctuations in
capital inflows followed by regional factors, which are particularly important
for emerging markets’ FDI and portfolio inflows as well as bank lending to
emerging Europe. The global factor, however, explains only a small share
of overall variation. The exposure to global drivers of capital flows, i.e. the
global factor and the factor specific to each type of capital inflows, is partic-
ularly pronounced for countries with a more developed financial system. A
fixed exchange rate regime does not shield countries from the ebb and flow
of global capital flow cycles.
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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, swings in international capital flows have been a salient feature
of the world economy. Both mature economies and emerging markets experienced the
ebb and flow of foreign investment in domestic financial assets. Some countries, notably
emerging market economies, even suffered from boom-bust cycles in capital flows, where
a massive inflow is followed by a “sudden stop” and an eventual sharp reversal of cross-
border flows.
The recent financial crisis in 2008/09 is only the latest incident in a series of swings in
global capital flows. At the peak of the crisis following the Lehman collapse in September
2008, investors in almost all countries repatriated foreign investments. The result was
a massive retrenchment of capital flows. In 2009, when many central banks around the
globe started to flood financial markets with liquidity, international capital flows quickly
resumed.1
Swings in capital inflows often appear synchronized across countries, what encouraged
many observers to speculate whether global factors rather than conditions in the recipient
countries dominate investors’ decisions to invest abroad. For example, The Economist
(2011) recently argued that flows “may have less to do with [the receiving countries’]
long-term prospects than with temporary factors such as unusually loose rich-world
monetary policy, over which they have no control.”
The discussion of the determinants of capital flows often distinguishes between pull and
push factors. If investors carefully discriminate between countries, thus sending funds as
a response to the recipient countries’ fundamentals such as growth prospects or return
differentials with respect to advanced economies, capital is said to be driven by pull
factors. If, however, investors treat emerging countries similarly irrespective of domestic
fundamentals, thus responding mostly to global developments such as abundant liquidity
in advanced economies, financial stress or weak growth prospects in mature economies,
capital flows are said to be driven by push factors.
The extent to which capital flows to different countries are linked, i.e. the degree of
comovement of capital flows, is a key question for policy makers. The reason is that
the appropriate policy response to capital inflows depends on the driving forces behind
1See International Monetary Fund (2011b) for a detailed account of these recent episodes and a thor-
ough analysis of international capital flows.
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capital flows. Naturally, domestic economic policies may influence pull factors but have
by definition no impact on the nature and the strength of push factors. Therefore, it is
important to gauge the extent to which flows are correlated on a global level. Standard
static or dynamic factor analysis offers valuable tools to accomplish this end.
Unfortunately, empirically distinguishing between global and local determinants of cap-
ital flows does not necessarily lead to a clear-cut categorization of push and pull factors.
The reason is that such a decomposition would only identify those push factors that
affect all countries simultaneously and in a similar way. A general increase in investors’
home bias that causes a synchronized retrenchment of global capital flows might be an
event that fits this description. Other push factors, however, are more likely to have a
differentiated effect on the current account of specific country groups. The sensitivity of
capital flows to interest rates in advanced economies, e.g., implies that a tightening of
monetary policy in these countries risks triggering a sharp reversal of capital flows which
can have large effects on emerging economies. Hence, we would observe an increased
comovement of capital flows at the regional level, i.e. among industrial and emerging
economies, but heterogeneous outcomes at the global level. Similarly, contagious crisis
in one emerging economy may lead to “sudden stops” of capital inflows or withdrawals in
neighboring or even remote countries but are less likely to affect industrialized economies.
In this paper we address this issue and disentangle the determinants behind interna-
tional capital flows into driving forces attributable to different levels of aggregation. In
particular, we estimate a dynamic hierarchical factor model that is able to decompose
capital flows in a large panel of countries into (i) a global factor common to all types
of inflows and all recipient countries, (ii) a factor specific to a given type of capital in-
flows, i.e. either foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment or other kinds of
investment, (iii) a regional factor driving economies in geographical proximity and (iv) a
country-specific component. To our knowledge this paper is the first to shed light on the
relative importance of these four determinants for global capital flows. The empirical
approach draws on a recently developed dynamic hierarchical factor model (see Moench
et al. (2011)). With its pyramidal structure, the model allows for the possibility that
the global factor affects regional and other subordinated factors but not vice versa.
Based on a quarterly data set of 47 countries and three different types of gross capital
inflows, we find that the country-specific component explains by far the largest fraction
of fluctuations in capital inflows. This factor alone is responsible for around 80% of the
observed volatility. The regional factor explains between 5% and 20% of fluctuations
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and is particularly important for emerging markets’ FDI and portfolio inflows as well
as bank lending to emerging Europe. The global factor, however, explains only a small
share of overall variation.
We also relate the exposure of the economies in our sample to the global drivers of
capital flows, i.e. the global factor and the factor specific to each type of capital inflows,
to a set of explanatory variables which are often used to describe a country’s openness
to trade and financial flows as well as its financial system. It turns out that the exposure
to global driving forces is particularly pronounced for countries with a large financial
system. A fixed exchange rate regime does not shield countries from the ebb and flow
of global capital flow cycles.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature and our contribution to this field of research in some detail. The data set
we construct for this research project is presented in Section 3. Section 4 introduces
our dynamic hierarchical factor model. The core results are discussed in Section 5. In
Section 6 we relate the exposure of countries to the global factor and the flow type-
specific factor to structural characteristics of the economies in our sample. Robustness
analyses are carried out in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. Related Literature
The present paper is related to three different branches of the literature: First, a number
of papers use factor analysis to study the degree of international business cycle synchro-
nization. Kose et al. (2003) pioneered this field and estimate a Bayesian dynamic factor
model for macroeconomic aggregates from 60 countries. Their results suggest that a
common global factor, i.e. a world business cycle, explains a large fraction of variation
across countries. Kose et al. (2008) decompose output, investment and consumption
series of more than 100 countries into a global factor, group-specific factors that drive
fluctuations in industrial, emerging and developing economies as well as country-specific
factors and idiosyncratic factors. They are interested in whether business cycles became
more synchronized during the post-1985 period of increasing globalization. Interest-
ingly, they find a convergence of business cycles within each group, but divergence, i.e.
a decoupling of business cycles, between different country groups. Inspired by these
contributions, Eickmeier et al. (2011), Helbling et al. (2011) and others examine how
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financial shocks originating in the U.S. affect the common component of fluctuations
in the G7 economies. All these contributions model macroeconomic aggregates but are
silent about capital inflows.
A second branch of the literature studies the comovement of bond spreads across emerg-
ing financial markets. McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) and Bunda et al. (2010) employ
factor models to extract a global factor from bond spreads. González-Rozada and Yeyati
(2008) argue that a global factor, which they attribute to investors’ risk appetite, global
liquidity and contagion, can explain a large fraction of movements in bond spreads. Their
results thus stress the role of exogenous determinants driving emerging economies’ bor-
rowing costs. Neither of these papers, however, takes account of a regional dimension
of comovement that is arguably most relevant for developing and emerging economies
susceptible to contagious financial stress in neighboring countries.
A third and most relevant strand addresses the role of global determinants for interna-
tional capital flows.2 Here we briefly survey some recent studies, which were all written
against the backdrop of the retrenchment and the subsequent rebound of flows observed
after 2008. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) document this unprecedented collapse in
international capital flows during the financial crisis. They show that the main driving
force has been a risk shock that made investors more cautious about future investment
prospects. The size of the capital flow reversal that precedes the current wave of inflows
was tightly linked to the extent of international financial integration as well as domestic
macroeconomic conditions. A second observation is that the retrenchment was highly
heterogeneous across time, across types of flows and across geographic regions.3 Forbes
and Warnock (2011) study the determinants of extreme movements of capital across
borders. They identify “waves” of capital flows, i.e. prolonged phases of capital flows
referred to as surge, stop, flight and retrenchment periods.4 Interestingly, they also focus
on gross flows rather than net flows as capital flows initiated by foreigners are likely to
be driven by other considerations than flows brought about by domestic investors. Both
types of investors could also react differently to political and economic circumstances,
and potentially respond by adjusting different types of capital flows. Their findings at-
tribute a crucial role to global factors, a somewhat less important role to contagion and
2Early, and by now classic, contributions include Calvo et al. (1996), Chuhan et al. (1998) and
Fernandez-Arias (1996).
3In a study prepared for the World Economic Outlook, the International Monetary Fund (2011b) also
addresses the role of global factors. Estimates of time dummies and regional dummies in a simple
panel of capital flows suggest that a common factor plays a minor role for capital flows.
4A similar classification of capital flow surges is presented by Reinhart and Reinhart (2009).
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an even less prominent role to domestic pull factors. Among these global factors, global
risk has the largest explanatory power. Global growth predicts surges of capital flows
and sudden stops while contagion through financial linkages is a significant predictor of
stops and retrenchments. In contrast to other studies, Forbes and Warnock (2011) find
that liquidity conditions and global interest rates are insignificant explanatory variables.
Among the pull factors domestic growth has the strongest impact on surges and stops.
Finally, Zalduendo et al. (2012) identify “surges” of net capital inflows and assess the
role of push and pull factors in causing these surges. They find that global push factors
explain the occurrence of a surge in inflows. The size of the surge, once it occurs, is
dependent on domestic pull factors.
While most of the existing studies focus on capital flows at a quarterly or even annual
frequency, the recent study by Fratzscher (2011) is based on portfolio flow data at daily,
weekly and monthly frequency. This is particularly interesting in the current crisis
and the subsequent recovery as quarterly data wash out many of the high frequency
movements of volatile portfolio inflows. He finds that common factors driving flows
across countries have a highly heterogeneous impact on the 50 countries included in the
study. This impact is associated with a country’s strength of domestic institutions, its
country risk assessment and domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. A second finding is
related to the current surge in capital inflows. The author shows that idiosyncratic pull
factors originating in emerging market economies dominated the driving forces during
the recovery from the global crisis.
In this paper we borrow from each of these strands. We use a dynamic hierarchical
factor model developed by Moench and Ng (2011) and Moench et al. (2011) that is
able to decompose a country’s capital inflows into three different explanatory factors.
Thus, instead of looking at refinancing conditions measured in terms of bond spreads
as in González-Rozada and Yeyati (2008), we use actual flow data to study the degree
of comovement. Finally, rather than relating capital flows to structural determinants
such as shocks to investors’ risk aversion, financial conditions in advanced economies
or growth prospects in emerging economies, our approach is purely data-driven in the
sense that the factors we identify do not lend themselves to a straightforward economic
identification. The advantage, however, is that this approach does not require us to
restrict capital flows to respond to a prespecified set of explanatory variables only.
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3. The Data Set
Following recent research by Forbes and Warnock (2011) and Broner et al. (2011), our
focus is on gross inflows measured in percent of GDP. Gross capital inflows are more
informative for our purpose as capital flows brought about by foreigners are likely to be
driven by other considerations than flows initiated by domestic investors. Both types
of investors could also be affected differently by policy measures and economic shocks,
and potentially respond by adjusting different types of capital flows. We differenti-
ate between portfolio, FDI and “other” flows where the last category contains residual
transactions that are predominately related to bank lending activities. To this end, we
augment quarterly data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics with addi-
tional information from a few national sources listed in Appendix A. After excluding
major financial centres which could otherwise bias our estimation results we end up
with a sample of 47 countries with data from 1994Q1 to 2010Q4. Our sample period
thus covers the Asian crisis, the debt crises in Latin America and Russia and the recent
global financial crisis.
For each country in our sample, we use data on portfolio, FDI and other capital inflows.5
These three categories of capital flows constitute distinctive blocks in our hierarchical
dynamic factor model. This specification choice allows for, e.g., FDI and portfolio in-
flows to react differently to changing global macroeconomic and financial conditions. To
isolate the effects of regional developments we further arrange the block-specific data into
geographical subblocks. Building upon the World Bank’s classification we differentiate
between four country groups: Asia, emerging Europe, Industrial and Latin America.6
Appendix B describes our sample and the regional classification.
Prior to estimation, all series are transformed in order to meet the assumptions of the
dynamic factor analysis. We seasonally adjust the capital flow series using the Census
X12 method. The resulting series are then standardized by the recipient country’s GDP
to guarantee that large economies do not dominate the estimated global factors simply
5The exceptions are Bolivia and Nicaragua for which data on portfolio inflows are not available.
Smaller gaps in two further series have been filled using data from the balance of payments’ errors
and omissions category. See Appendix A for details.
6The World Bank’s geographical classification is simplified by merging the “South Asia” and “East
Asia & Pacific” block into one block (Asia). Furthermore, Israel and South Africa are allocated to
the emerging Europe and Asia block, respectively.
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because of their size.7 Standard unit root tests clearly reject the hypothesis that the
capital flow to GDP series are integrated. Based on these results – summarized in
Appendix C – we decide to estimate our factor model in levels. As a last step, all series
are normalized to have a mean of zero and a variance of one.
Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics for the original capital flow to GDP se-
ries. Several aspects are noteworthy. First, some regions and income groups attract
significantly more inflows relative to domestic economic activity than others. Inflows to
industrial economies, e.g., averaged to 4.2% of their respective GDP across all types of
flows whereas the number is only 1.65% for the typical Latin American country. Sec-
ond, the geographical groups differ in the type of flow their members predominantly
depend on. While portfolio inflows are the major source of finance for industrial and
Asian economies, other inflows and FDI inflows are more important for countries falling
into the emerging Europe and Latin America group, respectively. Third, industrialized
(5 cases) as well as emerging European economies (1 case) account for all of the most
extreme observations in our sample. This mainly reflects their dominant role in the
run-up to and the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis. Finally, we also find
some support for the notion that FDI is a more resilient source of finance than other
types of capital inflows (Stiglitz, 2000). Across all regions, the FDI to GDP series have
the smallest standard deviation (5.7%). Somewhat surprisingly, however, those of the
portfolio inflows to GDP series are only slightly larger (5.8%).
 insert Table 1 here 
The descriptive statistics discussed so far are silent about the degree of comovement
between international capital flows which is central to our analysis. A first impression
of this aspect can be gauged from Table 2 which shows the average group-specific corre-
lation coefficients of our capital flows to GDP series along with Pesaran’s CD-statistic
(Pesaran, 2004). This statistic – displayed in parenthesis – is based on all estimated
individual correlation coefficients and offers a test of the null hypothesis of no cross sec-
tion dependence.8 Using these concepts, we find evidence for an economically weak but
7We use annual GDP divided by four for this exercise. Qualitative similar results can be obtained
using data on quarterly GDP for reporting countries. These results are available from the authors
upon request.
8For balanced panels the CD-statistic is calculated as CD =
√
2T
N(N−1)
(∑N−1
i=1
∑N
j=i+1 ρˆij
)
, where
N and T denote the number of series and time periods, respectively. The ρˆij are the estimated
correlation coefficients between the series i and j. Under the null hypothesis, CD follows a standard
normal distribution.
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statistically significant degree of comovement between capital inflows. Contrary to the
notion that all capital flows tend to move together, the average correlation coefficient
across all types and recipients is just 0.05. A single common factor obtained from a
standard dynamic factor model is thus likely to have only limited explanatory power for
the individual series of capital inflows. The average correlation coefficients are some-
what larger among specific flow types and country groups. Encouragingly, the degree
of comovement is even higher for region-specific FDI, portfolio and other inflows. The
average correlation between FDI flows to emerging Europe, e.g., is 0.17 compared to a
value of just 0.08 for all FDI inflows. Similar tendencies can be found for other regions
and types of capital flows. This observation is consistent with the hypothesis that im-
portant developments are common to groups of countries and capital flows but not to
all series in our data set. The dynamic hierarchical factor model is thus an ideal tool to
disentangle the relative importance of these factors.
 insert Table 2 here 
4. A Dynamic Hierarchical Factor Model for Gross Capital
Flows
The econometric framework we rely on is the dynamic hierarchical factor model as pre-
sented in Moench et al. (2011). It is a four level model allowing us to split the causes of
dynamics in our data into four categories, namely idiosyncratic, regional, flow-specific
and global disturbances.9,The model’s hierarchical structure implies that subblock fac-
tors, i.e. factors on the most disaggregated level, hinge on superordinated factors. These
interdependencies are taken into account during estimation.
Our four level factor model is build as follows. Let b and s respectively denote the
specific block and subblock the observed variable n is assigned to. In our case, block
b corresponds to a specific type of capital inflows whereas subblock s classifies a geo-
graphical region. Each subblock consists of Nbs time series different among subblocks.
9In another application, Moench and Ng (2011) use the dynamic hierarchical factor model downsized
to three levels to analyze the U.S. housing market after the Bretton-Woods era.
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For the observation Zbsnt in period t, we assume the following relation between the data
point and the factors:
Zbsnt = ΛZbsnHbst + uZbsnt (1)
Hbst = ΛHbsGbt + uHbst (2)
Gbt = ΛGbFt + uGbt (3)
Here, ΛZbsn, ΛHbs and ΛGb denote the time-invariant factor loadings. The factor Hbst
captures common movements between all the variables in subblock s of block b. All
subblock factors of block b are related to the factor Gbt which explains joint fluctuations
on the block level. In turn, Gbt depends on the global factor Ft collecting the part of
the variance that is common to all time t observations. Thus, innovations to one factor
will have an effect on all subordinated levels but not the other way round, e.g. global
factors are independent of local incidents.
To address the persistence in our data set we make the assumption of autoregressive
processes. This is the case for the global factor Ft:
Ft = ρFFt−1 + Ft (4)
where the matrix ρF would contain the autocorrelation parameters. For estimation, we
consider only one global factor so that ρF is a scalar. Moreover, we assume that:
uZbsnt = ρZbsnuZbsn(t−1) + Zbsnt (5)
uHbst = ρHbsuHbs(t−1) + Hbst (6)
uGbt = ρGbuGb(t−1) + Gbt (7)
with jt ∼ N(0, σ2j ), j = Zbsn,Hbs,Gb, F . All jt are uncorrelated across j and t.
Since we are interested in only one factor on each stage described by equations (1), (2),
(3), restrictions necessary to ensure identification are reduced to a minimum. The first
elements of Λi, i = Zbs,Hbs,Gb, take a value of unity. Moreover, as in Moench et al.
(2011), the variances σ2Hbs, σ2Gb and σ2F are set to 0.1.
Estimation of the dynamic hierarchical factor model requires the consideration of the
vertical connection between the factors as constituted in equations (1), (2), and (3).
We do so by applying Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. Iteratively, it first draws
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each factor given the parameters, the other factors and, for the subblocks, the data. In
a second step, parameters are drawn based upon the obtained factors.10 Overall, we
perform 100,000 draws from which we retain every 50th of the last 50,000 draws for our
analysis.
The dynamic hierarchical factor model is ideally suited for our analysis of capital inflows.
Its level structure allows to separately identify regional and global factors. Furthermore,
all factors are influenced by superordinated factors while subordinated effects do not
spill over to global factors. A conventional non-hierarchical factor model would not take
account of this one-directional relationship. Moreover, with our hierarchical model we
are able to investigate how important fluctuations on different stages are for a specific
time series, a feature not on hand in a simple factor analysis.
5. Results
The rich set of results of the factor decomposition is presented in two parts. In a first
part, we provide a graphical analysis of the evolution of the global, the type-specific and
the regional factors separately for each type of flows and for each region. These results
can be found in Figures 1 to 3. In a second part, we decompose the variance of each
capital inflows series into the shares attributable to either of our three factors and the
idiosyncratic component. This variance decomposition is presented in Table 3.
Our estimated global factor extracted from the large set of countries closely reflects the
well-known capital flow cycles of the past two decades. While the Mexican crisis of 1994,
the Asian crisis of 1997 and the crises hitting Russia, Brazil and Argentina thereafter are
indicated by relatively small declines in the global factor, its overall evolution is clearly
dominated by the most recent financial crisis in 2008/09. At the peak of the crisis the
connection between all factors intensifies suggesting that the pattern of comovement
changes substantially during severe global crises.11
The flow-specific factors follow a similar pattern, although the similarity with the global
factor differs remarkably across types of capital inflows. Whereas the portfolio and
10See Moench et al. (2011) for a detailed description of the specific Markov Chain Monte Carlo pro-
cedure applied in this setup. We use the MATLAB codes available on Serena Ng’s website.
11In a companion paper (Förster et al., 2012) we show that actual capital inflows are also more closely
tracked by the global factor during the recent crisis period.
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other flow factors track the global factor quite closely, see Figure 2 and Figure 3, the
FDI factor is considerably more independent from the global factor, see Figure 1. Flows
to emerging Asia or Latin America, as characterized by their regional factors, in turn,
appear only loosely connected to conditions reflected by the global factor. Likewise, the
regional factors evolve differently from each other over time and sometimes even exhibit
divergent dynamics. In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, for example, the
regional factors for FDI inflows to Asia reflect the regained momentum of FDI flows into
this region, while FDI flows to Latin America and emerging Europe remained subdued.
 insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 here 
While the graphical analysis of the factors is interesting, it cannot reveal the extent
to which capital inflows in a given region or within a given asset class are affected by
different factors. To address this issue, the factors have to be discussed together with
estimated factor loadings. To facilitate the interpretation, Table 3 reports a decom-
position of the variance of capital inflows into the shares attributable to our different
factors. This decomposition has been constructed using the mean within each subblock
for every draw, from which the median and the 33% as well as the 66% percentiles over
all retained draws are reported.
 insert Table 3 here 
The results show that the idiosyncratic component is by far the most important deter-
minant of capital inflows. It explains about 80% of fluctuations in capital inflows. The
regional factor is responsible for between 5% and 36% of overall variation and is more
relevant for emerging economies than for capital flows to industrial countries. Flows
to Latin America are particularly prone to fluctuations in the regional factor, which
accounts for 17% of the variation in FDI inflows to Latin America and 18% of portfolio
inflows to this region. For Asia and emerging Europe, the regional factor matters most
for FDI inflows and other types of inflows, but less so for portfolio inflows. The regional
factor is very important for flows other than FDI or portfolio flows to emerging European
economies. This may reflect the strong dependence of those economies on bank lending
from advanced European economies.
The flow type-specific factor plays an important role for FDI inflows into industrial
economies. For those economies 13% of fluctuations can be traced back to fluctuations
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in the global FDI factor. Surprisingly, the global portfolio factor plays a small role with
a share of about 5% only.
Finally, the global factor, i.e. the factor potentially affecting all countries and all types
of capital inflows, has a small impact on portfolio inflows to the Asian and the industrial
countries in our sample but almost no impact on FDI inflows or portfolio inflows to
Latin America. The global factor seems to matter most for inflows other than FDI
and portfolio inflows to industrial economies. This probably again reflects the strong
impact of cross-border bank lending among global financial intermediaries in advanced
economies as these lending activities might be reduced disproportionally after a global
financial shock.
The sum of the variance shares explained by global and flow type-specific factors, re-
spectively, indicates the extent to which a country is affected by forces common to all
countries. The results suggest that this measure is substantially larger for portfolio flows
to Asia than for FDI flows into this region. This confirms the popular view that portfolio
investors are particularly affected by global conditions, whereas FDI investment is not.
In Latin America, however, this measure is stronger for FDI than for portfolio flows.
Taken together, we do not see a clear-cut pattern as to which type of capital flows is less
affected by global forces.12 However, the global factor explains less than 1% of variations
in FDI inflows across all regions, whereas it explains a sizeable fraction of fluctuations
in portfolio and other types of inflows.
In sum, our findings are consistent with the view that the bulk of swings in capital inflows
is driven by country-specific components followed by the regional factors.13 Thus, we
cannot lend support to the view put forward by the The Economist (2011) arguing that
capital inflows are driven by factors beyond the control of domestic policy. However,
the results do also illustrate that the recent financial crisis was characterized by an
extraordinarily large comovement of capital flows across regions and flow types. We
address this issue again in section 7. Prior to this, the next section examines the variables
that determine the extent to which a country is exposed to global drivers of capital flows.
12This also implies that, if a high dependency on global forces is considered detrimental to financial
stability, it is not straightforward to classify one of these types of capital inflows along the lines of
either “good” or “bad” or “cold” or “hot” types of inflows. This supports the results presented by,
among others, Claessens et al. (1995) and Sarno and Taylor (1999).
13Our results are notably different from those presented by Broto et al. (2011), who argue that based
on a panel of capital flows series up to 2006 global factors became increasingly more important
relative to country-specific drivers after 2000.
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6. Explaining the Exposure to Global Drivers of Capital Flows
The previous section revealed that the exposure to the estimated factors differs across
countries and across different types of capital inflows. This leaves the question as to what
structural characteristics determine whether inflows to a given country are particularly
prone to global determinants. To answer this question, we proceed in two steps. In a first
step, we add the variance shares accounted for by the global and the flow type-specific
factor for each country. This gives us each country’s exposure to factors that are global
in nature in the sense that these factors potentially affect all countries in the sample.
In a second step, we relate these accumulated variance shares to structural features of
small open economies in a cross-sectional regression.
Four different explanatory variables are taken into account. The first is an index of
capital controls (Capital Controls), for which we use the indicator for financial integration
developed in Schindler (2009). A high value of this index indicates tighter controls on
capital inflows. The degree of trade openness (Trade), our second explanatory variable,
is measured by the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP. The data for this
measure comes from the World Bank (2011). Since trade linkages are often thought of as
transmitting contagious financial crises, a larger trade-to-GDP ratio possibly increases
the sensitivity to global forces. As the third variable we use the degree of flexibility
of the exchange rate regime (Exchange Rate Flexibility), which we measure using the
Iltzeki et al. (2008) de facto classification of exchange rate regimes ranging from one
(completely fix) to six (completely flexible). Finally, we use the ratio of liquid liabilities
to GDP (Liquid Liabilities) as a measure of financial depth. We take this measure
from Beck et al. (2009), who constructed it as the interest-bearing liabilities of banks
and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. For each of these four explanatory
variables we use the mean over the sample period, i.e. 1994 to 2010.14
Figures 4 to 7 depict scatter plots of the exposure to global factors against each ex-
planatory variable for each type of capital inflows. As expected, we find that a higher
degree of capital account restrictions reduces the variance share explained by global fac-
tors. Surprisingly, an economy more open to exports of goods and services experiences
a smaller exposure to global determinants of capital inflows, although the strength of
this relationship is weak. Interestingly, fixed exchange rates are associated with a larger
share of FDI fluctuations explained by global factors. For portfolio inflows the exchange
14See Appendix A for further details on data sources and definitions.
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rate regime seems to be irrelevant. Thus, fixing the exchange rate does not shield the
economy from global drivers of capital flows. This is probably the most striking finding
of this analysis. The strongest connection can be seen between the development of the
financial system and the exposure to global factors. A larger financial sector relative to
GDP increases the fraction of volatility explained by global factors.
 insert Figures 4 to 7 here 
Table 4 reports the results from a simple cross-sectional regression of the variance shares
on all four explanatory variables and a constant. For portfolio flows the size of the
financial sector is by far the most important determinant. A higher financial devel-
opment leads to an increased exposure to global factors. For FDI and other types of
capital inflows the tightness of capital controls plays the largest role. Capital controls
thus significantly dampen the impact of global dynamics on a country’s capital inflows.
With an R2 of more than 20% the explanatory power of this parsimonious regression is
surprisingly large.
 insert Table 4 here 
These results are consistent with the “pecking order” hypothesis of cross-border invest-
ment evaluated empirically by Daude and Fratzscher (2008). These authors find evidence
for some asset classes being more relevant for advancing financial integration than oth-
ers. They also find that portfolio investment is more sensitive to the development of
the financial system than FDI. In the present paper we show that the global and the
portfolio factor translate into larger capital inflow fluctuations for a better developed
domestic financial system.
7. Robustness
In this section we check the robustness of our results with respect to changes in the
econometric model, the treatment of outliers and the sample period. As a first step,
we want to investigate whether our results are dependent on the hierarchical modeling
approach. So far, we revealed that country-specific properties to a large extent explain
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variations in capital inflows. One aspect to be considered is that the limited influence of
the global factor may hinge on the pyramidal structure of our econometric model. Fur-
thermore, the transmission channel depends on the pass-through of the superordinated
factors to the data via subordinated factors.
To examine these concerns, we confront our data set with an alternative factor model.
For that purpose we choose the latent dynamic factor approach of Kose et al. (2003) and
Neely and Rapach (2011).15 The main difference between these two approaches is the
absence of the hierarchical structure in the Neely-Rapach model. Instead, the authors
estimate the factors via a set of dummy variables for which no explicit interdependence
is assumed.16 The outcome of this exercise is presented in Table 5.17 While the idiosyn-
cratic component explains on average 80.2% of the variance of our observables in the
hierarchical factor model, Neely and Rapach’s (2011) method yields a value of 79.6%
which is only slightly smaller than ours. Remarkably, around half of the estimated indi-
vidual variance shares are identical, i.e. deviations are smaller than 1 percentage point.
Furthermore, within the groups of FDI inflows and other inflows their ranking coincides
with our results. Altogether, our outcomes regarding the role of the idiosyncratic com-
ponents are robust since we observe only minor differences between both methodologies.
 insert Table 5 here 
Returning to our original dynamic hierarchical factor framework, we next analyze whether
our results are robust with respect to the treatment of outliers. In principle, extreme
values of capital inflows could be the consequence of rare economic events like balance of
payments crises that are in turn caused by global, regional or country-specific develop-
ments. Hence, our previous approach would be correct and the original data should be
used in the econometric analysis. However, extreme observations could also reflect mea-
surement errors in which case an outlier adjustment would be more appropriate. Since it
is a priori unclear which interpretation is more accurate, we assess the importance of the
outlier treatment by reestimating our model using transformed data. Here we follow the
procedure of Stock and Watson (2005) and identify outliers as those observations where
15We use the MATLAB code accompanying the publication of Neely and Rapach (2011) on the journal’s
web site for our robustness exercise.
16Another, third approach to estimate latent variables on different levels of aggregation is made by
Beck et al. (2011) in their analysis of sectoral prices in the European Monetary Union.
17Since we are interested in whether idiosyncratic effects remain important, we refrain from enhancing
the Neely and Rapach (2011) model with a flow-type specific factor.
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the absolute median deviation exceeds the series-specific inter quartile range by a factor
larger than six. These values are than replaced by the median value of the preceding
five observations.
Table 6 contains the variance decomposition for the estimated dynamic hierarchical
factor model with outlier correction. The results are generally close to those obtained
for the unadjusted series. Most striking is the absence of any significant change in the
variance share of the idiosyncratic factors. Here, one would have expected to find lower
values if the eliminated outliers were the consequence of series-specific measurement
errors. Using the unadjusted series thus seems to be the appropriate choice.
 insert Table 6 here 
As a final robustness exercise we investigate whether our results are subject to structural
change. Unfortunately, a full-fledged subsample analysis is precluded by our relatively
short sample size. However, we are able to isolate the effects of the recent global financial
crisis by restricting our sample to the period 1994Q1 to 2008Q2 which ends before the
Lehman collapse. Conjecturing that the degree of comovement between capital flows
has been exceptionally high during the latest downturn, we expect to find a reduced
importance of global factors in this subsample.
A look at Table 7 reveals that our time series are indeed less influenced by global forces
during the pre-crisis period. This holds true for all types of capital inflows. Instead,
regional determinants seem to be more important for foreign investors. As expected,
the comovement among capital inflows has been exceptionally large during and after
the global financial crisis. Thus excluding this period leads to a significant reduction in
the variance explained by global forces that is matched by an increased importance of
regional aspects. Furthermore, the variance share of the idiosyncratic component falls
only slightly by 3% on average and is still by far the most important driving force behind
capital inflows accounting for over three quarters of the observed variance.
 insert Table 7 here 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8. Conclusions
In this paper, we estimated a dynamic hierarchical factor model that is able to decompose
capital flows in a large panel of countries into (i) a global factor common to all types
of inflows and all recipient countries, (ii) a factor specific to a given type of capital
inflows, i.e. either foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment or other kinds
of investment, (iii) a regional factor driving economies in geographical proximity and
(iv) a country-specific component.
Our results demonstrate that the global factor tracks the overall capital flow cycles well,
but leaves a large degree of heterogeneity attributable to either regional or country-
specific determinants. In fact, the country-specific determinant explains by far the
largest fraction of fluctuations in capital inflows. This component alone accounts for
between 60% and 80% of the dynamics of international capital inflows. The regional
factor explains between 5% and 20% of the fluctuations. Finally, only a small share of
overall variation can be attributed to the global factor.
This suggests that domestic policy has considerable room to affect capital flows and, if
this is deemed appropriate, also to limit the consequences of capital inflows such as asset
price booms and a real appreciation of the domestic currency. Policymakers of small
open economies are often anxious about waves of global capital flows. Inflows unrelated
to country-specific economic fundamentals but instead driven by global driving forces,
the argument goes, pose a threat to domestic financial stability. Curbing capital inflows
by means of outright capital controls or other measures is often seen as the ultima
ratio in a situation in which a country receives massive capital inflows driven by global
determinants over which domestic policy has no control (see Ostry et al. (2011)). Our
results, however, suggest that this is less often the case than previously thought. Thus,
the primary responsibility for dealing with large and volatile capital flows remains with
domestic policymakers.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI inflows
Industrial 1156 0.0283 0.0589 -0.3473 0.9552
Asia 612 0.0131 0.0169 -0.0397 0.2228
Emerging Europe 816 0.0434 0.0803 -1.0698 0.9206
Latin America 612 0.0364 0.0333 -0.0863 0.3096
All 3196 0.0308 0.0572 -1.0698 0.9552
Portfolio inflows
Industrial 1156 0.0530 0.0736 -0.6166 0.5793
Asia 612 0.0143 0.0325 -0.1407 0.1992
Emerging Europe 816 0.0145 0.0459 -0.4151 0.3811
Latin America 476 0.0084 0.0310 -0.1038 0.3019
All 3060 0.0281 0.0579 -0.6166 0.5793
Other inflows
Industrial 1156 0.0445 0.1286 -1.3225 0.9356
Asia 612 0.0056 0.0426 -0.2816 0.1551
Emerging Europe 816 0.0443 0.0808 -0.2845 0.5132
Latin America 612 0.0030 0.0617 -0.7485 0.3105
All 3196 0.0290 0.0954 -1.3225 0.9356
Table 2: Average Correlation Coefficient and Pesaran CD-statistic
Industrial Asia Emerging Latin All
Europe America
FDI 0.11 0.06 0.17 0.09 0.08
(10.96***) (2.74***) (11.65***) (4.23***) (22.70***)
Portfolio 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.08
(12.98***) (6.24***) (3.40***) (3.94***) (19.56***)
Other 0.16 0.15 0.25 0.03 0.10
(15.08***) (7.52***) (17.04***) (1.57) (27.54***)
All 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05
(24.43***) (7.76**) (17.10***) (5.21***) (39.55***)
Pesaran CD-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels
of 1%, 5% , and 10%.
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition
global flow-specific regional idiosyncratic
FDI inflows
Industrial 0.6 13.3 6.2 79.2
[0.2, 1.1] [12.3, 14.6] [5.7, 6.8] [77.9, 80.4]
Asia 0.0 0.2 17.6 82.0
[0.0, 0.0] [0.1, 0.3] [16.3, 19.3] [80.4, 83.2]
Emerging Europe 0.0 0.1 20.9 78.8
[0.0, 0.0] [0.1, 0.3] [19.2, 22.6] [77.2, 80.4]
Latin America 0.0 1.3 17.2 81.2
[0.0, 0.1] [0.7, 2.0] [16.4, 17.9] [80.6, 81.8]
Portfolio inflows
Industrial 5.7 5.0 4.6 84.0
[4.0, 7.4] [4.3, 5.9] [4.1, 5.2] [82.9, 85.1]
Asia 4.9 4.6 10.6 77.3
[3.5, 6.4] [3.4, 6.9] [8.7, 13.0] [75.1, 79.1]
Emerging Europe 1.1 1.1 9.4 88.0
[0.8, 1.6] [0.7, 1.6] [8.0, 10.2] [87.3, 88.7]
Latin America 0.4 0.4 18.4 80.2
[0.2, 0.8] [0.2, 0.8] [17.6, 19.2] [79.4, 81.0]
Other inflows
Industrial 12.9 5.5 5.2 76.1
[11.9, 14.0] [5.1, 6.0] [4.9, 5.5] [74.8, 77.3]
Asia 3.2 1.4 12.6 82.7
[2.5, 4.1] [1.1, 1.7] [11.5, 13.7] [81.5, 83.4]
Emerging Europe 0.4 0.2 35.5 63.6
[0.2, 0.9] [0.1, 0.4] [33.2, 37.5] [61.8, 65.3]
Latin America 1.1 0.5 15.7 82.4
[0.7, 1.7] [0.3, 0.8] [14.8, 16.6] [81.6, 83.1]
Medians, 1/3 and 2/3 percentiles (in brackets) denoted in percentage terms.
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Table 4: Cross-sectional Regression, Variance Shares of Global Factors
(1) (2) (3)
FDI Portf. Other
Capital Controls -0.10** 0.03 -0.13**
(-2.68) (0.75) (-2.24)
Trade -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.60) (-0.92) (-0.25)
Exchange Rate Flexibility -0.04** 0.01 -0.03
(-2.11) (0.64) (-1.26)
Liquid Liabilities 0.08 0.15*** 0.10
(0.99) (5.80) (0.97)
Constant 0.17* 0.00 0.16
(1.89) (0.02) (1.39)
Obs 41 40 41
R2 0.27 0.22 0.21
t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 5: Variance Decomposition for Alternative Factor Model
global specific to flow/region idiosyncratic
FDI inflows
Industrial 3.3 14.7 82.0
[2.9, 3.6] [14.2, 15.2] [81.6, 82.4]
Asia 5.2 6.8 87.7
[4.6, 5.9] [4.9, 8.9] [85.6, 89.7]
Emerging Europe 8.4 13.3 78.0
[7.6, 9.3] [12.3, 14.4] [77.1, 79.0]
Latin America 2.0 16.8 81.2
[1.6, 2.4] [16.4, 17.2] [80.6, 81.2]
Portfolio inflows
Industrial 11.7 12.0 76.2
[10.9, 12.5] [11.5, 12.6] [75.6, 76.9]
Asia 8.7 16.1 75.0
[7.8, 9.8] [14.9, 17.2] [74.3, 75.9]
Emerging Europe 3.5 8.2 88.3
[3.2, 3.9] [7.6, 8.7] [87.7, 88.9]
Latin America 2.8 11.1 86.1
[2.3, 3.3] [9.7, 12.3] [84.8, 87.4]
Other inflows
Industrial 11.6 14.2 74.3
[10.7, 12.4] [13.7, 14.7] [73.7, 74.9]
Asia 7.8 12.5 79.3
[7.0, 8.7] [10.8, 14.0] [78.2, 80.7]
Emerging Europe 15.4 21.4 63.1
[14.2, 16.6] [20.1, 22.7] [62.7, 63.6]
Latin America 6.3 11.1 82.6
[6.0, 6.7] [10.2, 11.8] [81.8, 83.5]
Medians, 1/3 and 2/3 percentiles (in brackets) denoted in percentage terms.
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Table 6: Variance Decomposition with Corrected Outliers
global flow-specific regional idiosyncratic
FDI inflows
Industrial 0.5 14.5 4.9 79.5
[0.2, 0.9] [13.4, 16.0] [4.5, 5.3] [78.0, 80.8]
Asia 0.0 0.2 17.4 82.0
[0.0, 0.0] [0.1, 0.5] [15.9, 19.0] [80.6, 83.4]
Emerging Europe 0.0 0.2 22.0 77.3
[0.0, 0.0] [0.1, 0.5] [20.1, 23.7] [75.7, 79.3]
Latin America 0.0 0.2 20.7 78.6
[0.0, 0.0] [0.1, 0.5] [19.2, 22.6] [77.1, 80.1]
Portfolio inflows
Industrial 7.5 4.3 4.2 83.9
[6.1, 8.7] [3.9, 4.8] [3.8, 4.7] [82.7, 84.9]
Asia 5.8 3.5 13.6 76.1
[4.4, 7.3] [2.7, 4.5] [11.9, 15.4] [74.3, 77.9]
Emerging Europe 1.2 0.7 10.5 87.3
[0.9, 1.7] [0.5, 1.0] [9.8, 11.1] [86.8, 87.9]
Latin America 0.5 0.3 18.7 80.1
[0.2, 0.9] [0.2, 0.6] [17.8, 19.5] [79.2, 80.9]
Other inflows
Industrial 13.6 5.4 5.1 75.7
[12.5, 14.6] [5.0, 5.8] [4.8, 5.5] [74.4, 76.9]
Asia 3.3 1.3 12.5 82.5
[2.6, 4.2] [1.0, 1.7] [11.6, 13.6] [81.6, 83.4]
Emerging Europe 0.4 0.2 35.4 63.6
[0.2, 0.9] [0.1, 0.4] [33.0, 37.6] [61.8, 65.3]
Latin America 1.1 0.5 15.5 82.6
[0.7, 1.7] [0.3, 0.7] [14.7, 16.3] [81.7, 83.4]
Medians, 1/3 and 2/3 percentiles (in brackets) denoted in percentage terms.
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Table 7: Variance Decomposition without Financial Crisis
global flow-specific regional idiosyncratic
FDI inflows
Industrial 0.2 14.0 8.0 77.2
[0.1, 0.4] [13.0, 15.0] [7.4, 8.8] [75.9, 78.6]
Asia 0.0 0.0 31.8 68.0
[0.0, 0.0] [0.0, 0.1] [23.9, 41.3] [58.5, 75.9]
Emerging Europe 0.0 0.1 28.0 71.7
[0.0, 0.0] [0.0, 0.2] [25.2, 31.6] [68.1, 74.4]
Latin America 0.0 0.7 18.9 80.0
[0.0, 0.0] [0.3, 1.4] [18.1, 19.6] [79.3, 80.6]
Portfolio inflows
Industrial 0.1 18.4 3.6 77.7
[0.0, 0.1] [16.6, 20.6] [3.3, 4.0] [75.5, 79.4]
Asia 0.0 0.2 15.8 83.7
[0.0, 0.0] [0.1, 0.5] [15.0, 16.5] [82.9, 84.4]
Emerging Europe 0.0 0.4 13.8 85.6
[0.0, 0.0] [0.2, 0.7] [13.0, 14.6] [84.8, 86.3]
Latin America 0.0 1.1 17.4 81.1
[0.0, 0.0] [0.6, 1.8] [16.5, 18.3] [80.4, 81.9]
Other inflows
Industrial 5.4 5.1 5.0 84.3
[5.1, 5.9] [4.9, 5.4] [4.7, 5.3] [83.4, 85.0]
Asia 0.1 0.1 21.3 78.4
[0.0, 0.1] [0.0, 0.1] [20.2, 22.8] [76.9, 79.5]
Emerging Europe 0.2 0.2 44.3 55.1
[0.1, 0.3] [0.1, 0.3] [42.2, 46.7] [52.6, 57.1]
Latin America 0.4 0.4 16.6 82.3
[0.2, 0.7] [0.2, 0.7] [15.6, 17.4] [81.4, 83.1]
Medians, 1/3 and 2/3 percentiles (in brackets) denoted in percentage terms.
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Figure 1: Decomposition of FDI Inflows
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Notes: Depicted are median values of global, flow-specific and regional factors.
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Figure 2: Decomposition of Portfolio Inflows
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Figure 3: Decomposition of Other Inflows
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Figure 4: Variance explained by global factors vs. capital controls
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Figure 5: Variance explained by global factors vs. trade openness
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Figure 6: Variance explained by global factors vs. exchange rate flexibility
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Figure 7: Variance explained by global factors vs. liquid liabilities
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Appendix A. Data Sources and Definitions
Construction of the capital flow to GDP series
Data on Capital Flows:
• Primary source: IMF (2011b).
• Data on FDI, portfolio and other capital inflows measured in millions of U.S.
dollars.
• Augmented with data from Taiwan (CBS (2011)) and – for 2001q1-2001q4 – from
the Slovak Republic (NBS (2011)).
• Gaps in Latvia’s portfolio inflows (1994Q1-1994Q4) and Slovenia’s other inflows
series (1994Q1-1994Q4) have been filled using data from the balance of payments’
errors and omissions category as suggested by Forbes and Warnock (2011).
Data on GDP:
• Data on annual GDP expressed in national currency units from IMF (2011b).
• Augmented with data from Taiwan (using information from NSC (2011) for 1994-
1996 and CBS (2011) for 1997-2010) and Nicaragua (2010) (from World Bank
(2011)).
• Local currency GDP figures are converted into millions of U.S. dollars using in-
formation on exchange rates (annual period averages) from the same sources. For
Euro zone members, currency conversion further requires data on official Euro
conversion rates from ECB (2011).
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Control Variables for Cross-sectional Regression
Capital Control Index (Capital Controls):
• Index of restrictions on capital inflows
• Range: 0 (no restrictions) to 1 (fully restricted)
• Source: Schindler (2009)
Trade Openness (Trade):
• Total trade (exports + imports) in percent of GDP
• Source: World Bank (2011)
Index of Exchange Rate Flexibility (Exchange Rate Flexibility):
• Annual coarse classification of exchange rates
• Scale: 1 (completely fix) to 6 (most flexible)
• Source: Iltzeki et al. (2008)
Liquid-Liabilities-to-GDP Ratio (Liquid Liabilities):
• Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP
• Liquid liabilites = currency + demand deposits + interest bearing liabilities of all
financial institutions
• Source: Beck et al. (2009)
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Appendix B. Country Coverage and Regional Classification
Industrial countries (Industrial)
Australia Austria Canada Denmark
Finland France Germany Italy
Japan Netherlands New Zealand Norway
Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom
United States
Asia , Pacific Region & South Africa (Asia)
Bangladesh India Indonesia Korea, Republic of
South Africa Sri Lanka Taiwan Thailand
Eastern Europe & Israel (Emerging Europe)
Croatia Czech Republic Estonia Hungary
Israel Latvia Lithuania Romania
Russian Federation Slovak Republic Slovenia Turkey
Latin America & the Caribbean (Latin America)
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile
Guatemala Mexico Nicaragua Peru
Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
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Appendix C. Unit Root Tests
Stationarity of the capital flow to GDP series is assessed using the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF ) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests. Table C.1 shows for each test
how often the null hypothesis of instationarity is rejected at the 5 percent and 1 percent
level of significance. The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests do not indicate the presence of
unit roots in the majority of series irrespective of whether the regressions include only
a constant (columns 3-4) or a constant and a time trend (columns 5-6).18 The results
from the Phillips-Perron tests (columns 7-8) point to the same conclusion. We therefore
treat all capital flow to GDP series as I(0) and estimate the dynamic factor model in
levels.
Table C.1: Unit root tests: number of stationary series
Flow Type Number of ADFa ADFa (trend) PPb
variables (5%) (1%) (5%) (1%) (5%) (1%)
FDI 47 45 41 44 40 44 41
Portfolio 45 45 45 45 44 45 45
Other 47 47 45 45 42 45 44
Total 139 137 131 134 126 134 130
Notes: a,b ADF and PP denote the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests,
respectively.
18The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are based on a specification with only one lag of the dependent
variable. The fraction of series for which the null hypothesis is rejected decreases when a lag length
of four is considered instead. The depicted specification was selected on the basis of standard
information criteria.
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Abstract
This paper explores empirically how the adoption of IMF programs affects
sovereign risk over the medium term. We find that IMF programs signifi-
cantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approxi-
mately 1.5 to 2 percentage points. These results cannot be attributed to en-
dogeneity bias as they are supported by specifications that explain sovereign
defaults and program participation simultaneously. Furthermore, IMF pro-
grams turn out to be especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the Fund
distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are al-
ready weak. Our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that
debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances. Other
explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of
IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible.
JEL Classification: F33, F34, C25, C35
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tional Financial Architecture
This version: September 9, 2011 III–2
1. Introduction
When the banking panic of the years 2007/2008 endangered the stability of the world-
wide financial system governments stepped in by providing a mixture of generous public
guarantees and fiscal stimulus. Since then, the resulting large primary deficits and
swollen debt burdens of many countries have brought sovereign risk back on the agenda
of investors, policy makers and economists alike. Even among developed economies some
countries - most notably Greece - experienced a dramatic loss of market confidence and
saw the interest rates on their debt skyrocketing. In the search for a solution to the
problem of looming debt crises politicians of the European Union (EU) turned towards
the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund). Albeit its Articles of Agreement do
not provide the IMF with an explicitly stated mandate to fight sovereign debt crises1
the Fund’s Executive Board answered the calls by approving a € 30 billion Stand-By
Arrangement for Greece on May 09, 2010 which was supplemented by further EU loans.
Spreads on Greece’s ten year government bonds relative to Germany’s, however, did not
return to pre-crisis levels, a mere 0.5 percentage points in the average, measured from
the introduction of the Euro in 2001 to the end of 2009. Instead, in August 2010 the
spread averaged 8.5 percentage points, not far below its maximum of 10.4 recorded on
the last trading day before the announcement of the rescue package.2
What has gone wrong? Surely, markets did not fail to realize that the exceptional large
lending amount covers Greece’s estimated liquidity needs for an extended period. Are
there therefore other reasons to expect that IMF program participation is detrimental to
fiscal solvency over a longer horizon? Have previous IMF programs exerted a positive or a
negative influence on sovereign risk? Only few authors have addressed these important
questions explicitly, which is surprising in face of the vast literature on the economic
effects of IMF interventions.3 Consequently, our paper aims to fill this gap by providing
a first empirical study that relates program participation to actual default incidences.
Before turning to our empirical analysis it is useful to review the theoretical literature on
the relationship between IMF interventions and sovereign risk. This literature identifies
four channels through which the IMF’s presence alters the probability of subsequent
sovereign defaults. These channels focus on the direct effects of liquidity provision, its
1An indirect mandate may be deduced from the Fund’s mission to help member countries with balance
of payment needs since these often coincide with sovereign debt service problems.
2Data on spreads refers to Reuters’ Ecowin Government Benchmarks.
3Bird (2007) and Steinwand and Stone (2008) offer extensive surveys on this topic.
III–3
influence on the governments’ adjustment effort and on the role of conditionality and
seniority respectively. Our analysis, however, does not provide us with a clear-cut answer
to the question whether we should expect default probabilities to rise or to decrease in
the aftermath of IMF programs. Rather, the sign of the effect is disputed even at the
level of the individual channels. Liquidity provisions for example may as well prevent
(Fischer, 1999) as trigger a run on sovereign debt (Zettelmeyer, 2000). Furthermore, even
if emergency lending successfully fends off looming liquidity crises, it will also change the
incentives of local policy makers regarding their own adjustment effort. The strength
of economic fundamentals partly determines whether this results in a more prudent or
a laxer macroeconomic policy with corresponding consequences for long run sovereign
risk (Corsetti et al., 2006; Morris and Shin, 2006). The IMF therefore typically links
the disbursement of money to conditions which are designed to guarantee a sustainable
policy path, their impact, however, is often impaired by a lack of compliance. Finally,
its role as a de facto senior creditor enables the IMF to lend at lower interest rates which
clearly benefits the sovereign debtor and private creditors alike (Saravia, 2010). Large
additional amounts of official lending, however, also increase the risk of future solvency
crises in the same way private lending does. A default on more junior private debt may
therefore become more and not less likely (Boz, 2011).
While the specific characteristics of IMF lending programs affect sovereign risk in several
ambiguous ways even less is known on the aggregate effect of program participation on
the likelihood of sovereign debt crises. We therefore investigate the IMF-default relation-
ship empirically using univariate and bivariate probit methods. Summarizing our main
results, we find that IMF programs significantly increase the risk of subsequent sovereign
defaults by approximately 1.5 to 2 percentage points. This finding can not be attributed
to endogeneity bias since the results for a specification that explains sovereign defaults
and program participation simultaneously strengthen our conclusions. Neither can the
results be explained by a lack of compliance with IMF conditionality. Further empirical
exercises show that the magnitude of the effect depends on economic fundamentals in a
way consistent with economic theory. However, we do not find a default-risk reducing
effect of IMF interventions in any of our specifications. Hence, we conclude that the
adoption of an IMF program seems to be no good news at all for private long-term
creditors.
The present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical
literature on the relationship between IMF programs and sovereign debt crises. Our
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empirical framework and our data basis are laid out in Section 3. Section 4 presents the
results. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Review of the Literature
2.1. IMF Interventions and Sovereign Risk: Theory
A vast theoretical literature deals with the effects of international financial organiza-
tions’ actions on the probability and magnitude of sovereign debt crises. This research
highlights several channels through which the IMF might influence short and long-term
sovereign risk in either a positive or a negative way.
The first channel focuses on the direct consequences of liquidity provision in the context
of a debt run. Using models with multiple equilibria many researchers starting with
Sachs (1984) show that self-fulfilling runs could lead to a default of an otherwise sol-
vent sovereign debtor.4 Acting as an international lender of last resort whose liquidity
provision renders the search for inefficient sources of finance in the event of a run un-
necessary the IMF may prevent the occurrence of those crises in the first place (Fischer,
1999). Subsequent research focuses on the question whether this conclusion still holds in
a realistic setting with only limited IMF resources. As a result two starkly different po-
sitions have emerged. Zettelmeyer (2000) argues that rescue packages which cover only
a fraction of the potential liquidity needs might not only fail to eliminate the possibility
of a crisis but even have counterproductive effects. In the worst case, the provision of
the liquidity that is demanded by short term investors can be the trigger that leads to a
debt run. Contrary to this view Corsetti et al. (2006) offer a more positive assessment
of limited IMF crisis lending using the framework of a global game. In their model
official lending induces a greater fraction of lenders to rollover their debt which lowers
the incidence of crises.
Second, programs designed to provide short term liquidity also influence the incentives
of borrowing governments with regard to their policy stance. A moral hazard problem
may especially arise if the IMF fails to differentiate between liquidity and solvency crises.
In this case, sovereign debtors have the incentive to neglect necessary but painful policy
4Alesina et al. (1990) and Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000) provide other examples for open economy
debt run models.
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adjustments and rely on official emergency lending instead which is often characterized
by sizeable subsidy elements (Vaubel, 1983; Meltzer Commission, 2000). As a conse-
quence an ongoing IMF program may increase rather than decrease sovereign risk in
the medium and longer term if it is interpreted as a signal for further support. This
effect, however, is far from clear-cut as the recent work on global games by Corsetti et al.
(2006) and Morris and Shin (2006) has shown. In their models, liquidity provision can
as well induce debtor countries to undertake otherwise infeasible adjustment programs,
convincing short-term creditors to stay and thereby improving the fate of long-term
investors. This virtuous cycle, dubbed as ‘catalytic finance’, is most likely to work in
an environment of neither too bad nor too good fundamentals. In other circumstances
country leaders will see official funding as a substitute for their own adjustment effort
and moral hazard will prevail.
A third strand of the literature points to the importance of conditionality in IMF pro-
grams.5 Policy conditions that accompany lending programs may influence economic
outcomes either through their signaling function or by initiating policy improvements.
Regarding the first point Marchesi and Thomas (1999) develop a model in which only
productive countries choose to incur the short term costs associated with an IMF pro-
gram. The participation decision therefore delivers an important signal to private in-
vestors which may respond with a debt relief or - in more general terms - with improved
capital market access for the debtor country. According to this line of argument we
should thus expect a lower default probability of countries which participate in an IMF
program (program countries). Regarding the policy changes countries may be willing
to accept constraints on their sovereignty because it is in their own best interest6 or
because they are bribed and/or forced to do so. If the conditions imposed were justified
on economic grounds and enforcement is guaranteed crises should become less likely in
either case. However, both qualifications have been questioned in the literature. As the
argument between prominent economists on the merits of IMF induced policy changes
during the Asian crisis documented by Conway (2006) shows uncertainty still surrounds
optimal policy design in times of crises (Bird, 2007). Even if the medicine prescribed
by IMF conditionality is the right one its effectiveness is questionable when compliance
is a major problem. With official compliance rates of 54% (IEO, 2007) the effect of
conditionality on default probabilities is at least uncertain.
5See Dreher (2009) for a survey on the economic effects of IMF conditionality.
6The resolution of time inconsistency problems is the leading example, see Sachs (1989), Fafchamps
(1996) or Drazen (2002).
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Fourth, the perceived seniority of IMF debt7 has the potential to influence the Fund’s
lending decisions and the risk borne by private creditors. As Saravia (2010) points out,
seniority enables the IMF to provide larger amounts of new short-term debt at lower
interest rates to fill the liquidity gap of sovereign debtors without risking its shareholders’
money. IMF lending thus reduces both the probability of liquidity crises and - through
the effect of lower interest rates - subsequent solvency crises. Overall, this leads to
an improvement of the position of private creditors despite the dilution of their claims.
Policy implications differ, however, if the assumption of a fixed demand for new financial
resources is dropped. Boz (2011) analyzes the effects of senior IMF lending in these
circumstances invoking a ‘willingness to pay’ framework. Since liquidity considerations
are absent in her model the only effect of a new official lending program is an increase
in total debt that leads to higher debt service in the future making a subsequent default
relatively more beneficial from the debtor’s point of view.
To sum up, IMF lending surely affects sovereign risk through several channels. The sign
of the effect, however, is disputed even at the level of the individual channels. Much
less is known on the relative strength of these channels and their potential interactions.8
Whether an IMF involvement decreases or increases the probability of a subsequent
default is therefore ultimately an empirical question.
2.2. IMF Interventions and Sovereign Risk: Empirical Evidence
While an investigation of the effects of IMF interventions on sovereign default probabili-
ties has not yet been undertaken our research builds on the large empirical literature on
the economic consequences of IMF programs. Since most earlier studies do not control
for the problem of self-selection into IMF programs and a complete survey of this liter-
ature is beyond the scope of this paper we focus instead on some recent contributions
that are related to our own research agenda.9
7The perception of seniority can be justified empirically since according to Zettelmeyer and Joshi
(2005) ‘. . . the Fund has virtually always been repaid in the past’.
8A rare example of a quantitative assessment of the combined effect of more than one channel is
Boz (2011). Accounting for the effects of seniority and conditionality in a calibrated model of the
Argentinean economy she concludes that sovereign risk increases after the disbursement of IMF
loans.
9The survey articles written by Bird (2007) and Steinwand and Stone (2008) provide a more complete
overview of the research on causes and consequences of IMF programs.
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IMF interventions may influence sovereign risk through their impact on economic growth
and macroeconomic policy. The finding of a negative (Barro and Lee, 2005; Dreher, 2006)
or at best insignificant (Atoyan and Conway, 2006) causal effect of IMF programs on
economic growth is troublesome in this respect since most theoretical models of sovereign
debt point to a higher incidence of crises in times of economic hardship. The evidence is
somewhat more encouraging for other factors potentially influencing sovereign risk like
budget deficits and money growth (Dreher, 2005).
A similar objective like ours is pursued in two recent papers that analyze the success
of IMF interventions in terms of crises prevention, both reaching an overwhelmingly
positive conclusion. Eichengreen et al. (2008) show that countries are less likely to suffer
from sudden stops in the years following their participation in an IMF program. This
effect is less positive for countries with weak fundamentals which are already on the brink
of crisis. Dreher and Walter (2010) demonstrate that the IMF is also quite successful in
resolving currency crises. The existence of an IMF program in the previous five years
reduces the probability of a subsequent currency crises by 20 percentage points. Once
in a crisis, however, program countries are more likely to devalue after a shorter period
of defense.
Finally and more closely related to our study some authors provide evidence on the
theoretical predictions of the catalytic finance literature. Mody and Saravia (2006) and
Eichengreen et al. (2006) tackle this issue by studying the impact of IMF programs on
sovereign borrowing costs using data from the primary market.10 In accordance with the
theoretical literature their evidence indicates that IMF programs improve the borrowing
terms of countries whose debt burdens and foreign reserves are in an intermediate range.
Market conditions worsen under a program if these conditions are not met, fitting nicely
into the moral hazard view of IMF lending. Mody and Saravia (2006) further show
that a large part of the catalytic effects can be attributed to IMF programs that turned
precautionary, which means that the agreed lending lines have not been tapped. The
authors stress that this finding is in line with their preferred view that IMF interventions
act as a commitment device which does not rest on the actual disbursement of money.
However, a more critical interpretation that points to the omission of a relevant variable
influencing both the need for IMF resources and sovereign bond spreads is also possible
(Cottarelli and Giannini, 2006).
10Özler (1993) represents an earlier study on this subject. Ignoring the problem of self-selection into
Fund programs she finds that IMF interventions are associated with increased bond spreads.
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Jensen (2004), Edwards (2006) and Bird and Rowlands (2009) follow a different approach
by looking at capital flows instead of spreads. A quite robust result from this research
agenda is that IMF programs not only fail to encourage capital inflows but even lead
to capital flight. Since this may be the result of an increased perception of sovereign
risk and capital flight on its own renders successful future debt rollover less likely one
would expect higher default rates in the years following an IMF program. Interestingly
Van der Veer and de Jong (2010) find that catalysis seems to work for countries that do
not default in the years following an IMF intervention. In conjunction with the afore
mentioned results this implies that later defaulters suffer from massive capital outflows
while participating in an IMF program.
Our paper extends the literature by providing a direct investigation of the relationship
between IMF programs and sovereign defaults. Looking at actual default incidences
is warranted since - as the discussion on the IMF loan to Greece in 2010 has shown -
staving off default is a major policy objective. Information on the success of past IMF
programs is therefore valuable from a political point of view. While spreads on sovereign
bonds are surely informative in this dimension they always represent a mixture of the
perceived default probability and the repayment conditional on default. Since both
variables are likely to change after the start of a program our narrower focus on defaults
allows us to disentangle those effects. Furthermore, even interest rates on bonds with
longer maturities are partly driven by short term considerations. Our approach is thus
better suited to analyze the long run consequences of IMF interventions.
3. Empirical Framework and Data
3.1. Empirical Framework
The goal of this paper is to analyze the medium and long run effects of IMF programs
on sovereign risk. The literature on the determinants of sovereign defaults therefore
provides a natural starting point for our own investigation. We follow Kohlscheen (2010)
and Celasun and Harms (2011) in using a pooled probit framework for our baseline
estimations employing dummy variables to indicate IMF interventions. We do not opt
for a fixed effects estimation procedure since a consistent fixed effects probit estimator
does not exist and the alternative use of a logistic distributional assumption still suffers
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from the drawback of a dramatically reduced sample size. This reduction results from
the required exclusion of all countries without a default incidence in the sample period
since the fixed effect is a perfect predictor of no default for these countries (Kruger and
Messmacher, 2004).11 However we do present results for a random effects specification
as a robustness exercise.
We decide on the utilization of cluster robust covariance matrices on the basis of a
test for dynamic completeness offered by Wooldridge (2010). This test is based on an
artificial probit regression which includes the lagged residuum of the original estimation
equation as an additional regressor. The null hypothesis is that the coefficient on this
new variable takes the value zero. A rejection of the null hypothesis is equivalent to
a rejection of the assumption of dynamic completeness. Cluster robust standard errors
are required in this case.
An obvious objection against the simple univariate approach points to the long acknowl-
edged endogenous nature of IMF programs. Since IMF programs are partly designed to
avert various forms of macroeconomic crises the finding of a positive association between
IMF interventions and sovereign risk could reflect causality running from the latter to the
former. Although this problem should be mitigated by the adoption of a large number of
macroeconomic control variables and the use of lagged IMF intervention dummies these
variables may still be correlated with the error term. Given the binary nature of our
two variables of interest the preferred framework in this case is the recursive bivariate
probit model.12
The bivariate probit model explicitly specifies the endogenous nature of the binary re-
gressor of interest in a simultaneous equations context. In our case, let D and I denote
the dummy variables indicating a sovereign default and the adoption of an IMF program,
respectively. The model may then be written as
D∗it = x
′
itβ + γ Iit + εit Dit = 1 if D
∗
it > 0 (1)
I∗it = z
′
itδ + υit Iit = 1 if I
∗
it > 0 (2)
11The inclusion of institutional control variables with almost no time variation raises an additional
problem for every fixed effects estimator.
12See Marchesi (2003) for an application of this method to the interaction of IMF programs and debt
reschedulings.
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with the disturbances following a bivariate normal distribution(
εit
υit
)
= N
(
0 , 1 ρ
0 , ρ 1
)
.
Equation (1) describes the ability and the willingness of a sovereign borrower to honor his
debt as a function of his relationship with the IMF and other determinants summarized
in the vector x′it. Considered in isolation this equation corresponds to the univariate
probit model referred to in the first part of this paragraph with the coefficient γ as our
main object of interest. The desire of the sovereign borrower to participate in an IMF
program and the willingness of the IMF decision-making bodies to implement one is
modeled in equation (2).
Parameter identification in this type of model does not require the variables in x′it and z′it
to be different (Wilde, 2000). Specifications with instruments for IMF programs however
are preferable because of their better finite sample properties in terms of statistical
inference (Monfardini and Radice, 2008). We therefore use some additional political and
institutional variables in the second equation that have been proposed in the literature
on the determinants of IMF program participation. Finally, the endogenous nature of
IMF interventions is reflected in the correlation between the two error terms ε and υ.
We would expect the estimate of the correlation coefficient ρ to be positive if countries
with a higher probability of default attract more IMF interventions even after controlling
for the variables in x′it. We estimate all model parameters simultaneously by maximum
likelihood.
3.2. Data
Our empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of 57 developing and emerging
economies with annual data from 1975 to 2008. Although country coverage is dictated
by the availability of data on our main variables of interest the country list presented
in Appendix A seems to be quite representative for the population of emerging market
economies.13 We further restrict our sample by excluding the time span between the
first incidence and the resolution of a default since the duration of a debt restructuring
13Formerly central planned economies have been included with data from 1992 onwards.
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process may well be influenced by economic considerations other than the decision to
enter the default status in the first place (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2009).
We follow Van Rijckeghem andWeder (2009), Kohlscheen (2010) and Celasun and Harms
(2011) in using actual incidences of sovereign defaults on foreign currency debt as re-
ported by the rating agency Standard & Poor’s as our dependent variable. Standard
& Poor’s defines a sovereign default ‘. . . as the failure to meet a principal or interest
payment on the due date (or within the specified grace period) contained in the original
terms of a debt issue’ (Standard & Poor’s, 2006). This approach identifies 60 credit
events in our maximum sample. We decline the attempt to enrich the data by including
periods with high spreads on sovereign bonds (Pescatori and Sy, 2007), private defaults
(Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001) or large IMF drawings (Manasse and Roubini,
2009). While the decision on the last two alternatives is obvious with regard to our
research focus the utilization of a market based indicator of sovereign distress is refused
on the grounds of data limitations.14
Our main explanatory variable of interest – the existence of an IMF program – is mea-
sured in three different ways. Our broadest indicator is a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if an IMF program was agreed on in at least one of the five preceding years.
Since highly subsidized lending through the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) is targeted at low income countries
with little access to private capital markets it qualifies more as development assistance
than as intervention in terms of the theoretical arguments laid out above (Barro and
Lee, 2005). We therefore alternatively employ a more selective measure of IMF programs
which focuses on agreed Stand-by Arrangements (SBA) and on the Extended Fund Fa-
cility (EFF). Our third indicator finally marks new SBA and EFF programs with lending
lines in excess of the participating country’s quota. This explicit focus on large programs
can be justified in light of some of the theories discussed in Subsection 2.1. On the one
hand, large programs may be particularly successful in reducing sovereign risk as most
theories on liquidity crises agree that the effectiveness of IMF interventions increases
with their size. Additionally one can argue that exceptional access to IMF resources
renders further support in the nearby future less likely thereby reducing debtor moral
hazard and sovereign risk (Dreher and Vaubel, 2004). On the other hand, the accu-
14The EMBI Global which covers 41 countries is the broadest sovereign debt index available. Data
coverage, however, is often limited to less then 10 years.
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mulation of large liabilities to the IMF may as well increase the probability of a future
solvency crisis implying a default on more junior private debt.
We measure the adoption of an IMF program over a five year window because we want
to account for both the direct and arguably fast working effect of liquidity provision and
the more time consuming effects that influence default probabilities through changes in
incentives and policy conduct. In a robustness exercise, however, we will also investigate
whether our conclusions change if a different time horizon is considered.
A first impression on the relation between our different indicators of IMF interventions
and subsequent defaults can be gauged from Table 1. This table shows the frequency of
sovereign debt crises conditional upon the existence of an IMF program in the previous
five years. The striking result from this exercise is that default frequencies of countries
with an IMF involvement in the recent past exceed those without such treatment by a
factor larger than two. This difference gets bigger when shifting our attention exclusively
on SBA and EFF programs and especially on those where the agreed lending amount
is large as defined above. The χ2 statistics reject the null hypothesis of independence
between the frequency of sovereign debt crises and IMF programs in all cases implying
that the differences are statistically significant. Obviously, correlation does not neces-
sarily imply one-way causality. In the next section we will therefore investigate whether
this positive association still holds after explicitly taking other determinants of sovereign
debt crises and the endogeneity of IMF programs into account.
 insert Table 1 here 
Our choice of control variables in the single-equation framework and in the default equa-
tion (1) of the bivariate probit model has been guided by the literature on sovereign debt
crises and is especially close to the specification of Kohlscheen (2010). The set of covari-
ates consists of the GDP growth rate, the ratios of debt service to exports and reserves to
imports, the external debt to GDP ratio, the five year US Treasury Constant Maturity
(CMT) interest rate and a policy dummy variable indicating parliamentary democracies.
We also add regional dummies, an indicator of compliance with IMF programs proposed
by Dreher and Walter (2010) and interaction terms in some of the specifications. To
mitigate endogeneity concerns all variables except for the arguably exogenous policy
variable are lagged by one year.15 The same economic variables augmented by the short
15The results remain unchanged when the policy variable is also lagged by one year.
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term to total debt ratio (which turns out insignificant in the default equation) are also
considered as potential determinants of IMF interventions in equation (2) of our bivari-
ate probit specification. Following the empirical literature on IMF lending decisions we
further include the fraction of votes cast together with the United States in the UN
General Assembly as an additional variable. We use a higher lag order in this specifica-
tion to ensure that IMF programs are explained solely by already realized values of the
explanatory variables. Appendix B contains information on the construction and the
data sources for the included variables. The summary statistics are presented in table
Table 2.16
 insert Table 2 here 
GDP growth should influence the probability of a default through it’s impact on sovereign
borrowers’ willingness to pay (Arellano, 2008). We expect to find a negative relationship
since borrowing constraints often tighten in recessions and a reduction of the debt burden
through net repayment is a less attractive choice in times of economic hardship. The debt
service to exports and reserves to imports ratios are included as measures of a country’s
liquidity position. Liquidity features prominently in the literature on self-fulfilling debt
runs which points to a positive association between liquidity needs and the incidence of
rollover crises. A similar conclusion can also be reached in a willingness to pay framework
(Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2004). The external debt to GDP ratio is the most widely
used solvency indicator in the political and academic debate on debt sustainability. We
opt for a broad measure of external debt that includes both private and public liabilities.
This choice is motivated by data availability and the observation that private obligations
often turn public through government guarantees or direct assumptions during financial
and economic crises. Since variations in the risk free interest rate directly affect the
demand for more risky assets like emerging market government bonds we add the five
year US CMT interest rate rate as an additional regressor. Finally, political economy
16We also experimented with other variables proposed in the literature on debt crises and IMF inter-
ventions. In the default equation we tried indicators of real exchange rate overvaluation and banking
crises, the volatility of GDP growth, the deficit to GDP ratio, an indicator of the past repayment
performance and the ratio of private to total external debt. Potential explanatory variables for the
IMF equations incorporated each country’s share of IMF quotas, the ratio of bilateral trade with the
United States relative to GDP, the fraction of times countries voted in line with major Europe in
the UN General Assembly and dummy variables indicating United Nations Security Council mem-
bership. However, none of these variables turned out to be statistically significant when added to
our baseline specification.
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considerations surely influence the debt service decision. One particular aspect pointed
out by Kohlscheen (2010) is that even heads of government that are sympathetic to
a suspension of payments to international creditors may resist the temptation to do
so when the consent of a polarized legislature is required. We therefore expect the
coefficient on the parliamentary democracy dummy to be negative.
Countries seek the help of the IMF in times of looming crisis. Our priors on the co-
efficient signs for the economic variables in the IMF equation therefore coincide with
our expectations laid out in the context of the default equation. As another indicator
of liquidity needs we also anticipate the short term to total debt ratio to enter with a
positive sign. The additional UN voting variable can be seen as a indicator for the po-
litical proximity of a country’s government to the United States (Barro and Lee, 2005).
Since it is often assumed that the United States use their influence as the IMF’s major
shareholder to favor political allies with preferred access to Fund resources this variable
is expected to enter with a positive coefficient.
4. Results
4.1. Do IMF Programs Influence Sovereign Risk?
The basic results of our single equation analysis are summarized in Table 3. We present
marginal effects evaluated at the means of covariates in all columns to ease the economic
interpretation and the comparison between the different specifications. Since the null
hypothesis of dynamic completeness cannot be rejected for any of our model variants –
the p-values for the null hypothesis take the values 0.50, 0.47, 0.47 and 0.57 respectively
– standard inference procedures are valid. The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates
given in parenthesis are therefore based on usual Huber/White standard errors.17
Column (I) presents the estimates for our baseline specification that does not account
for the effects of IMF interventions. Our results closely resemble those of Kohlscheen
(2010) despite the larger time span covered in our analysis. Sovereign defaults become
more likely in recessions, when a high debt service to exports ratio indicates pressing
liquidity needs and when the debt burden is large relative to the economic size of the
17We use coefficient estimates instead of marginal effects for hypothesis testing as suggested by Greene
(2010).
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debtor country. Higher US interest rates also increase the probability of a sovereign
default which is less common in parliamentary democracies even after controlling for
the other covariates. Finally a large foreign reserves to import ratio is associated with a
lower probability of sovereign debt crisis. The sign of all coefficient estimates are in line
with our theoretical predictions. Regarding the goodness of fit our pseudo R2 takes a
value of roughly 17.5 percent. This estimate is in the range obtained in previous research
on the determinants of sovereign defaults.
 insert Table 3 here 
Turning to our main variables of interest the remaining columns show that sovereign
debt crises are more likely to occur in the five years following an IMF program. Im-
portantly, the sign of this effect does not depend on the concept used to identify IMF
interventions although its statistical and economic significance increases monotonically
from specification (II) to (IV). According to our results the adoption of any kind of IMF
program increases the probability of a subsequent default by 1.4 percentage points in a
sample with an overall default frequency of just 4.8 percent. SBA and EFF programs,
especially large ones, induce an even bigger surge in default probabilities by 1.7 and
2.2 percentage points, respectively. These results support the notion that moral hazard
and debt dilution effects are important byproducts of IMF programs. Since the largest
effects are found for lending programs that exceed a country’s quota one may argue that
these problems grow more severe with program size. Another explanation, however,
points to an increased risk of simultaneity bias as large programs are targeted to coun-
tries with deeper structural problems. We therefore do not consider them separately in
the remaining study and focus on all SBA and EFF interventions instead which also
excludes programs that qualify more as development assistance than as crisis prevention
lending.18
We next investigate whether our finding of a positive relationship between IMF interven-
tions and default probabilities merely reflects the self selection of especially vulnerable
debtors into IMF programs by means of the bivariate probit model. The parameter es-
timates of this specification are given in the third and fourth column of Table 4. Notice
that these results are not directly comparable to the marginal effects reported earlier in
this section. To allow for an assessment of the importance of endogeneity we therefore
18Results for the alternative IMF specifications are available upon request.
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also present results for a specification that restricts the correlation of the two distur-
bances in the equations (1) and (2) to zero (see columns (I) and (II)). This version of
the model is equivalent to an estimation of the two equations by the univariate probit
methods employed earlier in this paper.
 insert Table 4 here 
Considering first the determinants of program participation the estimation results of both
the univariate and bivariate specifications support the assumption that IMF resources
are targeted to and demanded by countries with weak fundamentals.19 Liquidity needs
in particular seem to be an important aspect that characterizes program countries as
the reserves to imports, the debt service to export and the short term to total debt ratio
all enter significantly and with the correct sign. This is also true for the GDP growth
rate and the UN voting variable. Here, a positive coefficient indicates a preferred access
to Fund resources for countries with closer political ties to the United States. Since the
UN voting variable turns out insignificant (p-value of 0.67) when included in the default
equation we regard it as a valid instrument.
Most importantly from the perspective of this study a comparison of the univariate
and bivariate regression results shows that our main conclusions are not altered when
we account for the simultaneity of the IMF variable. The coefficient on our program
indicator even increases from 0.347 to 0.748 from the first to the latter specification
although its statistical significance diminishes somewhat. This result does not necessarily
imply a stronger marginal effect of IMF programs which is given by the formula
Prob [Dit = 1|Iit = 1,xit, zit]− Prob [Dit = 1|Iit = 0,xit, zit] .20 (3)
Evaluating equation (3) at the means of covariates and taking the negative estimate of
ρ into account we obtain the result that IMF interventions increase the probability of
19Since the estimation results for the univariate default specification are discussed at length earlier in
this section we do not regard them separately here. Differences in significance levels are due to
a reduction in sample size brought about by the higher lag order employed in the IMF program
equation.
20The effect can be computed as
Φ2(x′itβˆ+γˆ Iit, z
′
itδˆ, ρˆ)
Φ(z′itδˆ)
− Φ2(x
′
itβˆ,−z′itδˆ,−ρˆ)
1−Φ(z′itδˆ)
with Φ2 and Φ denoting the
cumulative density function of the bivariate and standard normal distribution (Greene, 2008).
III–17
subsequent sovereign defaults by 1.44 percentage points. The magnitude of the effect is
thus comparable to those reported for the univariate specifications.
Interestingly, the estimated correlation coefficient ρˆ = −0.276 is not significantly differ-
ent from zero according to the usual Wald test. The hypothesis of no correlation between
the two error terms is also not rejected by the likelihood ratio or the lagrange multiplier
test. Here the test statistics λLR and LM take the values 1.274 and 0.182 respectively,
which are well below the critical values for any reasonable level of significance. Hence,
the positive association between the presence of IMF programs and subsequent sovereign
defaults documented throughout this study does not reflect a correlation in omitted fac-
tors which influence both program adoption and default decision. Instead, our evidence
strongly supports the idea that IMF interventions increase the likelihood of future debt
crises as predicted by the moral hazard, debt dilution, and default triggering theories of
IMF lending.
4.2. Explanations and Robustness Exercises
Our finding of a positive causal effect of past IMF programs on sovereign risk indicates
that, on balance, the negative aspects of program participation summarized in Subsec-
tion 2.1 outweigh their positive counterparts. Although an empirical separation of the
effect in terms of the different theoretical explanations is challenging we now try to shed
some light on the economic forces at work. Since our previous results on the bivariate
probit model imply that IMF programs are not correlated with unobserved determinants
of sovereign defaults we resort to the more efficient univariate estimation procedures in
this paragraph.
The results presented in Table 5 show that our conclusions do not rest on the specific
time horizon employed in the measurement of IMF programs. Countries are more prone
to sovereign debt crises if an IMF intervention took place in the previous one, two, three
or four years. These results are at odds with the idea that IMF lending prevents looming
liquidity crises from unfolding in the short run while induced moral hazard becomes the
dominant effect over a longer time horizon. Instead, the short run increase in default
probabilities may even be seen as supportive of the idea that insufficient IMF lending
programs trigger sovereign debt crises (Zettelmeyer, 2000). Finally it can be gauged from
column (I) that IMF programs are particulary often accompanied by sovereign defaults
in the year of their implementation. Since the case for reverse causality is obvious in
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this specification we do not allow for contemporaneous effects in the remainder of our
paper.
 insert Table 5 here 
One objection against our results is that the IMF coefficient in our regressions just picks
up a geographical clustering in both IMF programs and sovereign debt crises. We test
this hypothesis in two ways. First, we add regional dummies to our baseline specification.
As the estimates presented in column (I) of Table 6 show, all of the dummies turn
out statistically insignificant while the sign and magnitude of our coefficient do not
change. We are therefore confident that our finding of a positive effect of IMF programs
on sovereign default probabilities does not merely reflect unobserved heterogeneity at
the regional level. Second, we allow for random country specific effects in our default
equation. The results for this specification are displayed in column (II) of the same table.
Although the economic and statistical significance of the effect diminishes slightly, our
main conclusions on the effect of IMF programs on sovereign risk remain unaltered.
 insert Table 6 here 
Another possible explanation for our findings points to the problem of non-compliance
with IMF policy conditions. If IMF programs worked mainly through the influence con-
ditionality exerts on policy choices, we would expect a reduction in sovereign risk to be
limited to those countries that meet the conditions laid out in the lending agreement.
Furthermore, governments that fall short of their promises soon after the disbursement
of the first tranches of IMF credit are likely to be those with a large inclination to default
on their other obligations too. A failure to differentiate between different compliance
rates may therefore bias the coefficient on the IMF program variable substantially up-
wards. We address this problem by augmenting our estimation equation with a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a country was compliant with its IMF program in the
five preceding years.21 Column (III) of Table 6 shows the results. While theoretically
convincing, the distinction between compliers and non-compliers seems to be less im-
portant empirically. The presence of an IMF program per se increases the probability of
21Concretely, a country is coded as non-compliant when more than 25% of the credit amount agreed
under an IMF program remains undrawn at program expiration (Dreher and Walter, 2010). The
availability of the compliance variable limits our sample size in this specification.
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a sovereign debt crisis for both country groups alike. Overall the evidence presented so
far thus weakens the case for the importance of IMF conditionality while it is mostly in
line with the moral hazard, debt dilution, and default triggering views of IMF lending.
The last part of this section puts the implications of the catalytic finance hypothesis un-
der greater scrutiny. As emphasized above this theory implies that liquidity provisions
by the IMF are most likely to induce catalytic effects when the economic fundamentals
of the debtor country are neither too good nor too bad. Following Mody and Saravia
(2006) we integrate this hypothesis in our empirical framework by interacting the IMF
program indicator with dummy variables for a country’s relative position in the empiri-
cal distribution of other factors influencing sovereign risk. More concretely, we construct
three dummy variables for both the external debt to GDP and the debt service to ex-
ports ratio by using the first and second tertile of the respective distribution as threshold
values. Mirroring the time window employed in the measurement of IMF interventions
every country-year observation is grouped according to its mean value during the five
preceding years. Marginal effects for IMF programs conditional on a specific macroeco-
nomic environment are then computed as the difference in predicted default probabilities
induced by a change in the respective program dummy variable from zero to one. We
hold all other program dummies constant at zero for this calculation while the remaining
covariates are evaluated at their means.
 insert Table 7 here 
Columns (I) and (II) of Table 7 display the results of this exercise. The evidence is
broadly supportive to the catalytic finance theory except for one important qualifica-
tion. Although the marginal effects of the IMF variables are always the lowest for the
intermediate range of economic fundamentals, they never reach a significant negative
sign. Instead of setting the stage for a default risk reducing effect of IMF programs a
proper economic environment merely seems to limit the damage they otherwise cause.
Furthermore, statistically significant positive estimates indicate that IMF programs are
especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the Fund distributes its resources to coun-
tries whose economic fundamentals are already weak. Our evidence is therefore con-
sistent with the hypothesis that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these
circumstances.
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5. Conclusion
Although the IMF features prominently both in the history of sovereign debt crises and in
recent policy proposals aimed at the prevention of such crises, surprisingly little is known
on the effects of IMF program participation on the likelihood of subsequent defaults.
In light of the inconclusive findings in the theoretical literature this paper attempts to
investigate this issue empirically. Using univariate and bivariate probit specifications our
results indicate that the adoption of an IMF program increases sovereign risk over the
medium term. More concretely, we estimate that the probability of a sovereign default
increases by approximately 1.5 – 2 percentage points in the aftermath of IMF programs.
These findings cannot be contributed to a lack of compliance with conditionality but
seem to reflect the effects of IMF interventions per se. Financial markets’ cautious
reaction to Greece’s rescue package described in the introduction of this paper thus
seems legitimate in the light of these results.
Further analyses additionally show that IMF programs are especially detrimental to fiscal
solvency when Fund resources are targeted to countries with already weak fundamentals.
Overall, our evidence is therefore consistent with the idea that debtor moral hazard
is most likely to occur in these situations as predicted by the theoretical work on the
catalytic finance hypothesis. Other explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution
and the possibility of IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible. The separation
of the effects in terms of these different explanations surely constitutes an interesting
area for future research.
Regarding the policy implications of our findings, one important qualification has to be
kept in mind before concluding that debt crises would become less likely in a world with-
out IMF interventions. Since the pure existence of the IMF as a potential international
lender of last resort may deter short-run creditors from running it is possible that the
Fund has prevented several debt crises without being active. This possibility, however,
should not preclude the IMF from a thorough analysis of the question whether too many
resources have been devoted to countries which view IMF lending as a substitute for,
rather than a complement to policy reform.
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Table 1: Sovereign Debt Crises: Frequency Conditional on IMF Programs
Frequency (%)
Yes No χ2 a
New IMF program in 5.02 2.40 10.64∗∗∗
previous 5 years?
New Standby or Extended Fund 5.79 2.26 18.05∗∗∗
Facility Arrangements in previous 5 years?
New large Standby or Extended Fund 10.50 2.71 32.64∗∗∗
Facility Arrangements in previous 5 years?
a The null hypothesis of independence between the frequency of sovereign debt crises
and IMF programs is distributed as χ2(1). ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance levels of 1%,
5% , and 10%.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min Obs.
Default 0.05 0.21 1.00 0.00 1256
IMF program in previous 5 years 0.57 0.49 1.00 0.00 1256
SBA/EFF program in previous 5 years 0.47 0.50 1.00 0.00 1256
SBA/EFF 100 program in previous 5 years 0.13 0.33 1.00 0.00 1252
Compliant with IMF in previous 5 years 0.70 0.46 1.00 0.00 988
GDP growtht−1 0.04 0.05 0.27 -0.23 1256
Debt service/exportst−1 0.21 0.15 1.29 0.00 1256
Reserves/importst−1 0.37 0.34 2.79 0.00 1256
External debt/GDPt−1 0.49 0.31 3.36 0.03 1256
5-year US CMT ratet−1 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.03 1256
Parliamentary Democracy 0.22 0.42 1.00 0.00 1256
log(UN voting)t−6 -1.62 0.52 -0.58 -4.68 1233
Short term/total debtt−6 0.13 0.10 0.65 0.00 1223
All statistics refer to the baseline estimation sample, Table 3, Column (II).
III–28
Table 3: IMF Programs and Sovereign Debt Crises: Baseline Estimations
(marginal effects, evaluated at means of covariates)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Dependent variable: Default
IMF program in previous 5 years 0.014
(1.65∗)
SBA/EFF program in previous 5 years 0.017
(2.13∗∗)
SBA/EFF 100 program in previous 5 years 0.022
(2.33∗∗)
GDP growtht−1 -0.223 -0.207 -0.199 -0.222
(2.91∗∗∗) (2.71∗∗∗) (2.68∗∗∗) (2.94∗∗∗)
Debt service/exportst−1 0.109 0.102 0.093 0.091
(4.94∗∗∗) (4.67∗∗∗) (4.25∗∗∗) (4.06∗∗∗)
Reserves/importst−1 -0.044 -0.038 -0.036 -0.043
(1.65∗) (1.46) (1.42) (1.62)
External debt/GDPt−1 0.018 0.015 0.018 0.019
(1.84∗) (1.60) (1.93∗) (2.00∗∗)
5-year US CMT ratet−1 0.452 0.483 0.459 0.396
(3.08∗∗∗) (3.34∗∗∗) (3.24∗∗∗) (2.75∗∗∗)
Parliamentary Democracy -0.029 -0.028 -0.028 -0.030
(2.52∗∗) (2.45∗∗) (2.53∗∗) (2.58∗∗∗)
Observations 1,256 1,256 1,256 1,252
Defaults 60 60 60 60
Mc Fadden R2 0.174 0.179 0.184 0.186
Log likelihood -199.15 -197.87 -196.80 -196.09
The absolute values of robust (Huber/White) z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ∗∗∗,
∗∗ and ∗ denote significance levels of 1%, 5% , and 10%.
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Table 4: IMF Programs and Sovereign Debt Crises: Bivariate Probit Estimation
Probit Bivariate Probit
Variable Coef. Z-statistic Coef. Z-statistic
Dependent variable: Default
Constant −2.857 (7.74∗∗∗) −2.967 (8.59∗∗∗)
GDP growtht−1 -2.180 (1.29) -2.022 (1.06)
Debt service/exportst−1 1.730 (3.79
∗∗∗) 1.540 (2.59∗∗∗)
Reserves/importst−1 -0.570 (1.46) -0.541 (1.68
∗)
External debt/GDPt−1 0.350 (1.69
∗) 0.344 (1.39)
5-year US CMT ratet−1 9.319 (3.38∗∗∗) 9.001 (3.26∗∗∗)
Parliamentary Democracy -0.884 (2.81∗∗∗) -0.872 (2.41∗∗)
SBA/EFF program in previous 5 years 0.347 (2.11∗∗) 0.748 (1.79∗)
Dependent variable: SBA/EFF programa
Constant 0.771 (3.33∗∗∗) 0.744 (3.11∗∗∗)
GDP growtht−6 -5.716 (5.90∗∗∗) -5.689 (5.78∗∗∗)
Reserves/importst−6 -1.031 (5.16
∗∗∗) -1.056 (5.33∗∗∗)
log(UN voting)t−6 0.807 (6.49
∗∗∗) 0.792 (6.11∗∗∗)
Short term/total debtt−6 1.651 (3.81
∗∗∗) 1.744 (4.05∗∗∗)
Debt service/exportst−6 3.090 (7.41
∗∗∗) 3.103 (7.43∗∗∗)
ρ -0.276 (1.06)
Observations 1,024 1,024
Defaults 49 49
IMF programs 481 481
λLR
b 1.274
LM b 0.182
a Additional decade dummies used. b The likelihood ratio and lagrange multiplier test
statistics are distributed χ2(1). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels of 1%, 5% , and
10%.
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Table 5: IMF Programs and Sovereign Debt Crises: Alternative Time Horizons
(marginal effects, evaluated at means of covariates)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Dependent variable: Default
SBA/EFF program 0.029
in same year (3.45∗∗∗)
SBA/EFF program 0.021
in previous year (2.33∗∗)
SBA/EFF program 0.021
in previous 2 years (2.81∗∗∗)
SBA/EFF program 0.016
in previous 3 years (2.06∗∗)
SBA/EFF program 0.010
in previous 4 years (1.28)
GDP growtht−1 -0.181 -0.194 -0.181 -0.195 -0.206
(2.37∗∗) (2.53∗∗) (2.44∗∗) (2.60∗∗∗) (2.68∗∗∗)
Debt service/exportst−1 0.090 0.100 0.093 0.096 0.101
(4.28∗∗∗) (4.78∗∗∗) (4.44∗∗∗) (4.42∗∗∗) (4.45∗∗∗)
Reserves/importst−1 -0.031 -0.039 -0.038 -0.038 -0.040
(1.26) (1.54) (1.54) (1.51) (1.53)
External debt/GDPt−1 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.018
(2.03∗∗) (1.79∗) (1.79∗) (1.85∗) (1.86∗)
5-year US CMT ratet−1 0.429 0.430 0.428 0.444 0.454
(2.97∗∗∗) (3.00∗∗∗) (3.07∗∗∗) (3.09∗∗∗) (3.14∗∗∗)
Parliamentary Democracy -0.029 -0.028 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029
(2.66∗∗∗) (2.54∗∗) (2.63∗∗∗) (2.59∗∗∗) (2.55∗∗)
Observations 1,256 1,256 1,256 1,256 1,256
Defaults 60 60 60 60 60
Mc Fadden R2 0.197 0.186 0.191 0.183 0.177
Log likelihood -193.53 -196.25 -195.09 -196.96 -198.26
The absolute values of robust (Huber/White) z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ∗∗∗,
∗∗ and ∗ denote significance levels of 1%, 5% , and 10%.
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Table 6: IMF Programs and Sovereign Debt Crises: Robustness
(marginal effects, evaluated at means of covariates)
(I) (II) (III)
Dependent variable: Default
SBA/EFF program in previous 5 years 0.015 0.012 0.020
(1.99∗∗) (1.79∗) (1.74∗)
Compliant with IMF in previous 5 years 0.008
(0.66)
GDP growtht−1 -0.156 -0.152 -0.248
(2.28∗∗) (2.24∗∗) (2.34∗∗)
Debt service/exportst−1 0.077 0.078 0.133
(3.88∗∗∗) (2.98∗∗∗) (4.15∗∗∗)
Reserves/importst−1 -0.038 -0.034 -0.044
(1.63) (2.09∗∗) (1.29)
External debt/GDPt−1 0.021 0.015 0.025
(2.40∗∗) (1.49) (1.89∗)
5-year US CMT ratet−1 0.432 0.356 0.590
(3.47∗∗∗) (2.53∗∗) (2.97∗∗∗)
Parliamentary Democracy -0.021 -0.022 -0.036
(1.70∗) (1.93∗) (2.33∗∗)
Latin America & Caribbean 0.016
(1.45)
Middle East & North Africa -0.025
(1.62)
East Asia & Pacific -0.001
(0.10)
Sub Saharan Africa 0.010
(0.79)
Observations 1,256 1,256 988
Defaults 60 60 58
Method pooled re pooled
Mc Fadden R2 0.206 – 0.162
Log likelihood -191.43 -193.02 -194.95
The absolute values of robust (Huber/White) z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels of 1%, 5% , and 10%.
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Table 7: IMF Programs and Sovereign Debt Crises: Interaction Effects
(marginal effects, evaluated at means of covariates)
(I) (II)
Dependent variable: Default
SBA/EFF programm in previous 5 years,
low range of External debt / GDP (I) 0.010 0.025
or Debt service / exports (II) (1.35) (1.37)
medium range of External debt / GDP (I) -0.002 0.001
or Debt service / exports (II) (0.51) (0.10)
high range of External debt / GDP (I) 0.025 0.028
or Debt service / exports (II) (2.63∗∗∗) (2.46∗∗)
GDP growtht−1 -0.210 -0.192
(2.84∗∗∗) (2.33∗∗)
Debt service/exportst−1 0.096 0.080
(4.48∗∗∗) (3.23∗∗∗)
Reserves/importst−1 -0.037 -0.036
(1.51) (1.43)
External debt/GDPt−1 0.010 0.016
(1.05) (1.69∗)
5-year US CMT ratet−1 0.444 0.477
(3.13∗∗∗) (3.43∗∗∗)
Parliamentary Democracy -0.028 -0.033
(2.54∗∗) (2.75∗∗∗)
Observations 1,250 1,170
Defaults 60 58
Mc Fadden R2 0.190 0.194
Log likelihood -192.92 -186.04
The absolute values of robust (Huber/White) z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ denote significance levels of 1%, 5% , and 10%.
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Appendix A. Country Coverage
Argentina El Salvador Madagascar Romania
Benin Fiji Malaysia Russian Federation
Bolivia Georgia Mali Senegal
Botswana Ghana Mexico South Africa
Brazil Guatemala Mongolia Sri Lanka
Bulgaria India Morocco Thailand
Burkina Faso Indonesia Mozambique Tunisia
Cameroon Jamaica Nigeria Turkey
Chile Jordan Pakistan Ukraine
China Kazakhstan Panama Uruguay
Colombia Kenya Papua New Guinea Venezuela
Costa Rica Latvia Paraguay Vietnam
Dominican Republic Lebanon Peru
Ecuador Lithuania Philippines
Egypt, Arab Rep. Macedonia, FYR Poland
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Appendix B. Data Sources and Definitions
Name Source Definition
Dependent variable
Default Standard & Poor’s (2006,
2009)
Dummy variable coded as 1 in the first year
of a sovereign default.
IMF variables
IMF program Dreher (2006) - Extended
time covering from web site
IMF program agreed, dummy variable.
SBA/EFF pro-
gram
Dreher (2006) - Extended
time covering from web site
IMF Standby Arrangement or Extended
Fund Facility Arrangement agreed, dummy
variable.
SBA/EFF 100
program
IMF (2009) Change in total agreed SBA and EFF loans
exceeding 100 percent of quota, dummy
variable.
Compliant
with IMF
Dreher and Walter (2010) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
a country was compliant with its IMF pro-
gram. Non-compliance is identified as peri-
ods where at least 25% of the agreed credit
amount remained undrawn at program ex-
piration.
continued on next page
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Appendix B. - continued
Name Source Definition
Control variables
Debt service/
exports
World Bank (2010) Ratio of debt service on external debt to ex-
ports of goods and services
Reserves/
imports
World Bank (2010) Ratio of total reserves minus gold to imports
of goods and services
Democratic Polity IV (2009) Dummy indicating democratic regimes,
identified as country-year observations with
non-negativ POLITY score as in Kohlscheen
(2010).
Parliamentary Keefer (2009) Dummy signalizing a parliamentary form of
government as indicated by a value of 2 for
the system variable as in Kohlscheen (2010).
Parliamentary
Democracy
Polity IV (2009) and Keefer
(2009)
Dummy variable coded as 1 for parliamen-
tary democracies. The construction of this
variable relies on the definition of the Demo-
cratic and Parliamentary dummy variables
given above.
GDP growth World Bank (2010) Real GDP growth rate
5 year US CMT
rate
FRED (2010) Yield to maturity of US Treasury notes with
a constant maturity of 5 years
External
debt/GDP
World Bank (2010) Ratio of external debt stocks to GDP
Short term/
total debt
World Bank (2010) Ratio of short term to total external debt
UN voting Dreher and Sturm (2011) Fraction of votes a country cast together
with the United States in the UN General
Assembly
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Abstract
This paper examines the costs of recent sovereign defaults using synthetic
control methods, a novel econometric technique based on comparative case
studies. Evidence on the effects of debt crises is thus presented on a case-by-
case basis, uncovering large variations in country-specific experiences. Our
estimates of cumulated output losses, e.g., range between 8.5% and 23%
depending on the considered default episode. Further differences concern
the persistence and likely causes of these costs. In particular, our results are
consistent with the selective use of direct trade sanctions as punishment for
sovereign defaults.
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1. Introduction
International law offers little protection to creditors of sovereign borrowers who decide
to repudiate their debt. Nevertheless, sovereign defaults are relatively rare and govern-
ments are often reluctant to use this option even in situations when their debt burden
is clearly unsustainable. These two seemingly contradictory characteristics of sovereign
debt markets have been confirmed again during the recent, still unresolved crisis in
Greece. Economic theory offers a common explanation for both of them: defaults must
be a costly and thus unattractive choice for sovereign borrowers. This idea has prompted
a growing literature that attempts to quantify different dimensions of default costs. We
argue that most of these studies share a common shortcoming as they implicitly assume
that each sovereign faces identical costs in the event of default. This seems unrealistic,
given that past default episodes differed in many respects, perhaps most notably in the
way creditors were treated. The recently proposed voluntary restructuring of Greece’s
debt, e.g., was not preceded by any missed principal or interest payments. Argentina’s
government, by contrast, unilaterally suspended all debt service in 2001, subsequently
delayed the restructuring process and finally confronted its creditors with a take-it-or-
leave-it offer which implied an average haircut of more than 75%. Foreign governments
and investors are likely to take these differences in debtor behavior into account when
deciding on sanctions and future investments. We would thus expect to find different
economic costs for both events. Our major contribution to the literature is to provide
empirical evidence for this heterogeneity in default costs.
On the methodological side, we propose the application of a novel econometric tech-
nique based on comparative case studies which is ideally suited to investigate hetero-
geneous responses to rare events. This method, originally developed by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and refined by Abadie et al. (2010) builds on the idea that coun-
terfactual outcomes for a unit subject to some binary treatment can be estimated as
a weighted average of outcomes for similar units that have not received the treatment
under study. The weights are optimally chosen in a way that minimizes selection bias
and mitigates endogeneity as they ensure close affinity between the treated unit and its
synthetically created counterpart. The treatment effect can then be estimated as the
difference between actual and hypothetical outcomes. In macroeconomic applications
of this synthetic control estimator, units refer to countries and the list of already ana-
lyzed “treatments” comprises trade liberalizations (Nannicini and Billmeier, 2011), the
introduction of structural reforms (Campos and Kinoshita, 2010) and the decision to
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join a monetary union (Sanso-Navarro, 2011) or to follow a specific monetary strategy
(Lee, 2011). We add to this literature by defining a sovereign’s decision to default as
the relevant treatment and the associated economic costs as our outcome variables of
interest. Using this definition we then offer an in-depth analysis of five recent episodes
of sovereign debt crises1 investigating both costs in terms of GDP per capita and their
likely causes.
Our results support the general notion of costly sovereign defaults and our hypothesis
of heterogeneity in default costs. Country-specific estimates of cumulated output losses,
e.g., range between 8.5% and 23%. Further differences emerge in the medium run when
the default costs either turn out to be transitory or permanent. Taken together, these
two observations imply that the welfare consequences of a specific default decision might
differ markedly from those of the “average default”. In fact, achieving the most favorable
outcome after a default might be of similar importance to a sovereign as the decision to
enter or circumvent the default status in the first place.
The findings presented in this paper also point to heterogeneity in the relative impor-
tance of the different channels through which sovereign defaults might impair economic
activity. Neither of the two most popular explanations for default costs, resting either
on trade sanctions or on capital market exclusion fits all of the debt crises in our sample.
Evidence for a significant reduction in total exports, e.g., has only been found for one
of the five defaulting countries. This result does not rule out the possibility of bilat-
eral trade sanctions whose effects may not be detected in aggregate data. Our evidence
is indeed consistent with a selective use of these sanctions as we find two incidences
of a stronger than average reduction in bilateral trade with former creditor countries.
Support for a punishment by international capital markets in the form of reduced FDI
inflows is much weaker in comparison. Here, no significant effects are found for any
defaulting country in the sample.
Our work is related to several strands of the literature. On the empirical side we add
to the numerous studies that investigate different dimensions of default costs. These
contributions have already documented significant default costs in terms of forgone GDP
growth (Sturzenegger, 2004; Borensztein and Panizza, 2009; Furceri and Zdzienicka,
2012), reduced foreign trade (Rose, 2005; Borensztein and Panizza, 2010; Martinez and
1The list of analyzed events includes the default episodes of Pakistan (1998 - 1999), Ecuador (1999 -
2000), Argentina (2001), Uruguay (2003) and of the Dominican Republic (2005). See subsection 3.1
for a detailed discussion of our sample.
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Sandleris, 2011) and deterred inflows of private capital (Arteta and Hale, 2008; Fuentes
and Saravia, 2010).2 Common to all of these studies is the utilization of a panel regression
framework in which default costs are estimated by a single coefficient on a dummy
variable indicating sovereign defaults. The focus is thus on the average default costs
and not on the heterogeneous nature of the responses which is the subject of our paper.
However, the wide range of results obtained by studies with similar methodology but
different samples may be taken as indicative of varying default costs as noted by Furceri
and Zdzienicka (2012). According to their study, estimated effects of sovereign defaults
on GDP growth range between five and ten percentage points, depending on the data
set used.3
The theoretical literature on sovereign debt crises is also relevant for our research as it
highlights the mechanisms through which differences in default costs might arise. Unfor-
tunately, cost heterogeneity is seldom modeled explicitly. The seminal work of Grossman
and Van Huyck (1988) which differentiates between excusable and inexcusable default
is a rare exception. In their framework, only inexcusable defaults generate costs while
excusable defaults remain unpunished. Following this line of thought, one is tempted to
attribute heterogeneity in default costs to different debtor actions or external circum-
stances that influence whether a default is perceived as more or less excusable. This
consideration, however, is not completely consistent with the model, which implies that
punishment is not an equilibrium outcome. Another model that does not share this
feature is offered by Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005). Here, heterogeneity is introduced by
the presence of different types of governments whose nature is unknown to private in-
vestors. Sovereign defaults convey information to the private sector as they increase the
probability that the incumbent government is of the “bad” type and thus more likely
to default again in the nearby future. Incorporating this information investors con-
sequentially demand higher interests rates which depress production in the defaulting
economy. “Good” governments for which a default is optimal thus have an incentive to
signal their type, thereby reducing their default costs.4 Further, informal arguments for
heterogeneity could be made in the context of theories that rest on direct punishments.
The number and severity of trade sanctions imposed after a default, e.g., are likely to be
2See Panizza et al. (2009) for a survey of this literature.
3These differences in average effects, although large in economic terms, are not statistically significant.
This, however, does not rule out the existence of significant differences in the costs of individual
crisis episodes.
4In the model of Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) the signal takes the form of a delay in the default
decision. In practice, the adaption of creditor friendly policies during the restructuring process
might be viewed as an additional signal which is only chosen by benign governments.
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a function of debtor behavior. Differences within the group of affected creditors might
introduce additional variations in default costs as some lending countries might be more
inclined to sanction delinquent debtors than others.
Finally, several studies share our interest in heterogeneity but focus on the character-
istics rather than on the consequences of sovereign debt crises. Differences in investor
losses have been documented by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) and Cruces and
Trebesch (2011), among others. Wright (2011) and Trebesch (2011) also reveal large vari-
ations in the length of the debt restructuring process. Enderlein et al. (2011) classify
sovereign defaults according to a composite index of government behavior, uncovering
both, episodes of cooperative crises resolution and cases of highly aggressive government
policies. Each dimension of heterogeneity could introduce differences in default costs
according to the theories discussed above. First evidence for this idea is provided by
Trebesch (2010) and Cruces and Trebesch (2011). Focusing on punishment through in-
ternational capital markets, their results indicate that a harsher treatment of private
creditors increases default costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the synthetic
control estimator and offers a discussion of its relationship to alternative estimation
techniques. Section 3 describes the selected default episodes, the measures of default
costs and our choice of control variables. The results are presented in section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2. Methodology: The Synthetic Control Estimator
2.1. Basic Idea and Estimation
The synthetic control estimator first proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
recently refined by Abadie et al. (2010) has its roots in the comparative case study
approach to policy evaluation. This method is based on the idea that causal effects of
policy interventions or other events can be estimated by comparing over time outcomes
for one or few treated units with those of a control group. Implicit in this approach is
the assumption that the units in the control group constitute unbiased estimates of the
counterfactual, i.e. the outcome we would have observed in absence of the intervention.
To see this formally, let Defi,t = {0, 1} be a dummy variable indicating the treatment
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status of country i at time t. In the context of this study the “treatment” refers to
the occurrence of a sovereign default (Defi,t = 1). The outcome of interest, Yi,t, is an
indicator of economic activity that is related to the channels highlighted in the literature
on the costs of sovereign debt crises. The default indicator’s binary nature implies that
there are two potential outcomes for each country at each point of time which we denote
with Y defi,t if Defit = 1 and with Y nodefi,t otherwise. Observed outcomes can then be
expressed in terms of potential outcomes as
Yi,t = Y
nodef
i,t +
(
Y defi,t − Y nodefi,t
)
Defi,t,
= Y nodefi,t + αi,t Defi,t (1)
for i = 1, . . . , J + 1 and t = 1, . . . , T . The difference αi,t between potential outcomes
measures the costs of sovereign defaults for country i at time t. To simplify the exposition
we now assume that only one of the J+1 countries in the sample is exposed to a sovereign
debt crisis from time T0 (with 1 ≤ T0 ≤ T ) onwards. This country is indexed by i = 1:
Defi,t =
{
1 if i = 1 and t ≥ T0
0 else
We thus can estimate the default costs as
αˆ1,t = Yˆ
def
1,t − Yˆ nodef1,t = Y1,t − Yˆ nodef1,t for t ≥ T0 (2)
which requires an estimate of the counterfactual Y nodef1,t . In a traditional comparative
case study individual observed outcomes of the J countries that have not experienced
a crisis in the observation period – or simple averages of them – would be used. The
success of this strategy critically depends on the characteristics of the comparison unit
selected or generated from the donor pool5. A randomly chosen country may provide a
poor estimate since sovereign defaults typically occur in countries with a worse than av-
erage macroeconomic and political environment (see, e.g., Kohlscheen, 2010 or Celasun
5Throughout this study the term “donor pool” is used as synonym for the group of potential comparison
countries for which no sovereign default was observed in the sample period.
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and Harms, 2011). A selection bias will thus be introduced if these weak fundamen-
tals influence the future path of Y1,t even in the absence of default, which seems likely.
The work on statistical matching techniques suggests that this bias can be eliminated
by ensuring that those countries constituting the counterfactual match the relevant co-
variates as closely as possible. This poses a difficult problem as no single country or a
simple average of countries is likely to provide a satisfying fit in terms of all confounding
variables.
The synthetic control estimator improves on existing methods of generating comparison
units in comparative case studies by replacing subjective judgements of similarity with a
data-driven procedure that mitigates selection bias. The central idea is to use a weighted
average of members from the donor pool to create a “synthetic” country without a default
experience. The nonnegative weights collected in the vector W = (w2, . . . , wJ+1)′ with∑J+1
j=2 wj = 1 are chosen in a way to ensure that the hypothetical country resembles the
defaulting country as closely as possible in the period before the outbreak of the crisis.
Both pre-crises realizations of the main variable of interest (Yi,1, . . . , Yi,T0−1) and those of
other important covariates are used to assess the degree of similarity. Given the optimal
weights (w∗2, . . . , w∗J+1)′, the counterfactual outcome is then estimated as
Yˆ nodef1,t =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jYj,t for t ≥ T0 . (3)
To see how the estimator is obtained in practice, let Xi be a (r × 1) vector of ob-
served covariates that are not affected by the sovereign default. These variables can
be time-varying although this is not indicated by an additional index. Linear combi-
nations of pre-default realizations of the outcome variable of interest are denoted as
Y¯ Kmi =
∑T0−1
s=1 k
m
s Yi,s with the superscript Km referring to a specific vector of weights
Km = (k
m
1 , . . . , k
m
T0−1)
′. We use M of these linear combinations defined by the vectors
K1, . . . ,KM together with the variables in Xi to assess and optimize the degree of sim-
ilarity between the defaulting country and its hypothetical counterpart. In principle,
each pre-default value of Yi,t could constitute a distinct Y¯ Kmi .6 However, a smaller num-
ber of linear combinations – each of them measuring for example an average value of Yi,t
for a specific subperiod – is likely to be sufficient in most applications.
6This would imply M = T0 − 1 with Y¯Kmi = Yi,m for each m = 1, . . . , T0 − 1.
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The r+M = q relevant characteristics of the defaulting country are then arranged into
a single vector Z1 =
(
X ′1, Y¯
K1
1 , . . . , Y¯
KM
1
)′
with dimension (q × 1). Each column of the
(q × J) matrix Z0 contains the same variables for one of the J non-defaulting countries
in the donor pool. The optimal country weights collected in W ∗ then minimize the
distance
‖Z1 −Z0W ‖v =
√
(Z1 −Z0W )′ V (Z1 −Z0W ) (4)
subject to wj ≥ 0 (j = 2, . . . , J + 1) and
∑J+1
j=2 wj = 1. The optimal vector W
∗
thus depends on the weights of the different explanatory variables contained in the
positive definite diagonal matrix V . One can think of these weights as reflecting the
relative importance of the different determinants of future Y1,t. Following Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) we obtain the elements of V as those
weights that minimize the variable of interest’s root mean squared prediction error in
the pre-default period.
2.2. Relation to Alternative Estimation Techniques
Most of the empirical work on the costs of sovereign debt crises is conducted using fixed-
effects panel estimation techniques. Although the synthetic control estimator is much
more general, it can also be expressed in terms of a linear model that highlights the
similarities between both approaches. Consider the factor model
Yi,t = δt + λtµi + βtXi + αit Defi,t +i,t . (5)
Here, δt and λt represent unknown common factor loadings, µi is an unobserved country-
specific effect, βt is a (1 × r) vector of coefficients and i,t are random disturbances.
With time-invariant values for λt and under the additional assumption of a common
crisis effect for all countries (αit = αjt ∀ i, j = 1, . . . , J + 1) we get the usual fixed-effects
model employed for example by Borensztein and Panizza (2009). Abadie et al. (2010)
show that the synthetic control estimator is valid in the more general model of equation
(5) in the sense that the difference between α1t and αˆ1t will be close to zero if the
number of pre-default periods is large relative to the scale of random disturbances and
the optimal weights collected in W ∗ ensure
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Y1,t =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jYj,t for t = 0, . . . , T0 − 1 and
X1 =
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jXj .
In the realistic case of a close but non-perfect fit, the above statement will hold ap-
proximately. The synthetic control estimator can thus be seen as a generalization of
traditional panel methods that allows for heterogeneous treatment effects and time-
varying fixed effects. This last generalization will be non-trivial if there are important
determinants of economic activity that are (1) not readily observable, (2) correlated
with the occurrence of sovereign debt crises and (3) subject to changes over time which
have (4) a common component for all countries. Changes in the governments’ general
attitude towards the private sector may be one variable that fits into this description.
Allowing for a limited amount of time variability in unobserved country-specific charac-
teristics surely mitigates issues of endogeneity that have plagued past studies on the costs
of sovereign defaults. However, we should keep in mind that reverse causality cannot be
ruled out completely when interpreting our estimates which should thus be considered
as an upper bound for the true default costs. This problem is common to all studies in
the field since its solution would require the utilization of convincing instruments. These
variables that should be correlated with defaults but not with economic activity have
not yet been found and might even not exist (Borensztein and Panizza, 2009).7
Among the studies which use the fixed-effects estimator to assess the costs of sovereign
debt crises, the one by Panizza et al. (2009) is especially close to ours as it also focuses on
recent country-specific experiences. Their approach consists of estimating an equation
for the relevant indicator of economic activity,
Yi,t = δt + µi + i,t ,
followed by a visual inspection of the residuals for the defaulting countries in the years
around the occurrence of the debt crisis. Negative residuals following the default event
7Using internal instruments in a dynamic panel framework as recently done by Furceri and Zdzienicka
(2012) might be one promising way to address this issue.
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are then interpreted as reflecting the crisis’ costs. This approach shares with ours the
advantage of allowing for country-specific default costs. However, two problems stand
out that are not present in our approach: first, the neglect of covariates and second,
the lack of any method for assessing the statistical significance of the estimated effects.
Since we have already discussed how we account for observed determinants of economic
activity in our approach, we next turn to the discussion of statistical inference.
2.3. Aggregation and Inference
The major strength of the synthetic control estimator lies in its ability to provide
country-specific estimates of default costs. This contrasts with the estimation of av-
erage effects typically conducted in the literature on the consequences of sovereign debt
crises. We therefore also compute average effects to allow for a comparison between the
different approaches and to highlight the importance of country-specific heterogeneity.
Let G be the number of default episodes in the sample. Converting the data to event
time, we now denote by aˆ1,l,g the estimated individual default costs for defaulting coun-
try g (g = 1, . . . , G) l years after the outbreak of the debt crisis (l = 0, . . . , T −T0). The
average effect of a debt crisis on economic activity a¯l is then simply estimated as
ˆ¯al =
1
G
G∑
g=1
aˆ1,l,g . (6)
Statistical inference is assessed in the present framework by means of placebo studies
(Abadie et al., 2010). For a single default episode g this involves applying the synthetic
control estimator to all countries in the donor pool as if they had experienced a debt
crisis in l = 0. The defaulting country is returned to the pool of potential comparison
units for this exercise. For each l = 0, . . . , T − T0 this results in Jg estimated pseudo-
default costs aˆPLi,l,g with i = 2, . . . , Jg+1.8 We expect to find an average value of aˆPLi,l,g that
is close to zero since there is no common event for these countries. The accumulation
of random country-specific events, however, obviously leads to a growing dispersion of
placebo effects for increasing l. Our estimates of the true default costs aˆ1,l,g should not
look exceptional when compared to these placebo estimates if the null hypothesis of no
8The superscript g indicates that the number of comparison units might vary between the different
case studies. We will see in subsection 3.2 that this is indeed relevant in our application as more
countries become eligible to enter the donor pool for the latest default episodes.
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default costs were correct. The finding of abnormally negative effects for the defaulting
country can thus be interpreted as evidence for significant default costs.
Cavallo et al. (2010) generalize the idea of placebo studies by applying it to the evaluation
of average treatment effects. In the context of our study their approach leads to the
calculation of time specific p-values for the average default costs. This involves a three-
step procedure that consists of
1. Conducting for each sovereign default g all Jg placebo studies as outlined above.
2. Calculating for each l = 0, . . . , T − T0 every possible average placebo effect ˆ¯aPLl,s ,
s = 1, . . . , N . These are computed by selecting one of the Jg event-time specific
estimates of pseudo-default costs aˆPLi(g),l,g for each default study g which are then
averaged:9
ˆ¯aPLl,s =
1
G
G∑
g=1
aˆPLi(g),l,g .
The number of possible averages is given by N =
∏G
g=1 J
g.
3. Computing the p-value for each post-crisis period l as:
p-valuel = Pr
(
a¯Pll < ˆ¯al
)
=
∑N
s=1 1
[
ˆ¯aPLl,s < ˆ¯al
]
N
. (7)
The p-value thus measures the probability of observing a drop in average economic
activity larger than ˆ¯al under the null hypothesis of zero default costs.
9Here, the notation i(g) indicates that the index number of the chosen placebo studies need not be
the same for all G default episodes. In fact, averages are calculate for all possible combinations of
country-specific pseudo default costs.
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3. Data Issues
3.1. Case Study Selection
We investigate the costs of sovereign defaults for five emerging market economies that
suffered from debt crises during the past fourteen years. Our selection covers the spec-
tacular default of Argentina in 2001 that had not been resolved until 2005 as well as
the perhaps less well known default episodes of Pakistan (1998 - 1999), Ecuador (1999
- 2000), Uruguay (2003) and the Dominican Republic (2005). We do not include the
Russian (1998 - 2000), Ukrainian (1998 - 2000) or Moldovian (2002) debt crises since the
economic performance of these countries is heavily influenced by their transition from
centrally planned to market economies prior to default. The synthetic control estimator
is not well suited to deal with such additional events in the pre-treatment period that
are not shared with the majority of countries in the control group. The temporal clus-
tering of crises in the nineteen eighties and the consequential reduction in the number of
admissible comparison countries without a debt crisis also prevented us from considering
earlier default episodes.10 Our sample of defaults is thus a subset of the one analyzed by
Panizza et al. (2009), allowing a comparison of the results obtained by standard panel
and our synthetic control methods.
 insert Table 1 here 
Table 1 contains some key characteristics of the default events in our sample. Several
differences between theses episodes stand out. First, there is considerable variation in the
length of the restructuring process. While the defaults of Uruguay and the Dominican
Republic were resolved relatively smoothly within the year of default, a settlement with
the creditors was delayed for up to four years in the remaining cases. The length of
the default period may have important implications for the crises’ cost since sovereigns
typically can not tap debt markets until several years have elapsed after the settlement
(Gelos et al., 2011).
Second, defaulting countries also differ in terms of the harshness with which they con-
fronted their creditors. Uruguay, e.g., reached an agreement with its bondholders before
10We do not include more recent debt crises like the one of Ecuador (2008 - 2009) or the Seychelles
(2008 - 2010) either. Here, the reason is a lack of sufficient post-default data points.
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any payment was missed and imposed only a moderate haircut of 9.8 percent. This
benign stance is also reflected in the index of coerciveness developed by Enderlein et al.
(2011) where Uruguay obtained the lowest possible score.11 This contrasts most sharply
with the experience of Argentina which unilaterally declared a suspension of all debt
payments in 2001 and afterwards achieved a restructuring deal that left investors with
compensation worth less than 25 percent of their original claims. Again, this behavior
is also mirrored in the index of coerciveness where Argentina reached one of the highest
scores ever recorded. The three other debt crises range between these two polar cases
with the Dominican Republic acting relatively more creditor friendly than Pakistan and
Ecuador while in default. It seems obvious that these differences in debtor behavior
should have consequences for the costs of debt crises, especially when direct forms of
punishment, e.g. through trade sanctions, are involved. The finding that higher haircuts
increase both borrowing costs and the length of market exclusion documented by Cruces
and Trebesch (2011) can be seen as first evidence supporting this idea.
Finally, there is also cross-country variation in the governments’ fiscal balance before
the outbreak of a crisis. The initial fiscal position might matter since larger deficits prior
to the default increase the necessary adjustment effort when external funding dries up.
Since most of the empirical evidence now supports the view that fiscal consolidations are
contractionary (Pescatori et al., 2011), and especially so during financial crises (Hutchi-
son et al., 2010), we would expect to find larger output losses for high-deficit countries
like Pakistan, Uruguay and Argentina.
Given these differences and their likely implications, it seems questionable whether the
cost of debt crises can be adequately captured by a common crisis dummy in a panel
regression. The case study approach pursued in this study seems better suited to address
issues of country-specific heterogeneity.
To estimate the case specific costs of the five recent crises mentioned above, the synthetic
control estimator requires a control group of similar countries that have not been exposed
to a sovereign default. We consider all emerging market economies rated by Standard
& Poor’s as potential members of this donor pool.12 From these countries we discard
11Ranging from 1 (investor friendly) to 10 (completely uncooperative) this index provides a classification
of governments actions during sovereign debt disputes. We thank Christoph Trebesch for sharing
this data with us.
12We define those countries as emerging market economies that do not fall into the World Bank’s
OECD or non OECD high income classification. We further add the Central and Eastern European
transition economies since their graduation to developed country status took place after most of the
debt crises in our sample occurred. Major oil-exporting countries are not considered.
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those with a default event as defined by Standard & Poor’s in the case-study specific
pre- or post-treatment period. The relevant time window starts nine years before the
occurrence of the sovereign default under study and ends either in 2009 or up to seven
years after this event.13 To broaden the country base in the presence of the long-lasting
defaults of the nineteen eighties and nineteen nineties we also consider those countries
as eligible to enter the donor pool that had a pending default for more than five years at
the beginning of the event window. Since sovereign debt crises were relatively rare in the
last two decades, our criterion for exclusion leads to a growing number of comparison
countries for the more recent default episodes. Appendix A illustrates the changing
composition of the donor pool for our analysis of the effect of debt crises on GDP per
capita. Similar trends can be observed for our other indicators of default costs although
small differences are possible due to variations in data availability on our variables of
interest.
3.2. Dependent and Control Variables
Our choice of dependent variables reflects the two different objectives which we pursue
in this paper. We first want to provide country-specific estimates of the output losses
incurred during the default episodes. These are obtained by comparing the evolution
of the defaulting countries’ logarithmized GDP per capita (lngdp) with those of their
respective synthetically created counterparts.14 The difference between both values thus
approximates at each point in time the percentage output loss due to the crisis. Since
our estimation window stretches several years after the resolution of each crisis we can
also assess whether defaults are followed by rapid recoveries (Yeyati and Panizza, 2011)
or by persistently lower levels of GDP as documented for other financial crises (Cerra
and Saxena, 2008).
Second, we also try to shed some light on the relative importance of the different channels
through which sovereign defaults might impair economic activity. Here, we analyze two
channels that have received much attention in the literature, one operating through
13The length of the pre-default period reflects a compromise between the time-series and cross-sectional
dimension of our sample. An increase in the length of the matching period reduces the number of
comparison units in the donor pool as fewer countries meet the no-default criterion. Our results,
however, are robust to alternative time windows.
14 The analysis of GDP levels instead of growth rates is common in macroeconomic applications of
the synthetic control estimator, see e.g. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) or Nannicini and Billmeier
(2011).
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a decline in trade (Rose, 2005; Martinez and Sandleris, 2011) and the other through
a reduction in private capital flows (Fuentes and Saravia, 2010). More precisely, we
focus on the effect of debt crises on the defaulting countries’ exports and FDI inflows.
Government sanctions or a reassessment of credit and expropriation risk by the private
sector could provide the link between sovereign defaults and economic activity in either
case.
We employ two different approaches to investigate the importance of the outlined chan-
nels. For both exports and FDI flows we use aggregate variables (lnexports and lnfdi),
standardized in the same way as the GDP series since these measures should be the most
important ones from the defaulting country’s point of view. However, since losses due to
the default are typically not shared equally among creditors of all countries coordinated
sanctions also seem unlikely. Isolated actions by important creditor governments may be
a more plausible outcome that does not show up in aggregate data. One way to deal with
this problem in the present framework would be to analyze the fraction of total exports
(FDI inflows) that is directed to (originates from) the affected creditor countries. Since
information on the origins of private creditors is not available we have to resort to data
on affected official creditors for these exercises. This data is available for those three
countries in our sample (the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Pakistan) that also rene-
gotiated official debt through the Paris Club during their default period.15 We further
restrict our attention to the effects of sovereign defaults on export shares (rel_exports).
A similar analysis was precluded for FDI flows as too many of the relevant data points
are missing in standard bilateral FDI databases like the OECD’s “International Direct
Investment Statistics Yearbook”.
Our choice of control variables has been guided by the related literature. Specifically, we
follow Nannicini and Billmeier (2011) and consider the population growth rate (n), the
physical investment share (s) and the average years of secondary schooling (av2school)
as important determinants of GDP per capita. We further control for the political regime
by including the popular Polity 2 variable (polity2 ) from the Polity IV database since
political institutions might matter for both, the probability and the effects of financial
crises (Cavallo and Cavallo, 2010).
In our export specification we try to control for the effect of changing commodity prices
that might have exerted a positive influence on export performance during some of
15The same data has also been used in related studies by Rose (2005), Fuentes and Saravia (2010) and
Martinez and Sandleris (2011).
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the recent debt crises (Panizza et al., 2009). We attempt to achieve this by adding
two measures of commodity dependence to our set of control variables, assuming that
countries with similar export shares of agricultural (agr) and fossil products (fossils)
also react similar to changing prices. Following the large literature on the gravity model
of international trade we further include a measure of geographical distances. We choose
the log of the average distance between the defaulting country and its creditors (lndist)
when analyzing the effect of debt crises on the fraction of total exports directed to these
countries. In our study of total exports per capita this variable is replaced by a measure
of latitude (latitude) as an aggregate indicator of a country’s geographical position.
Finally, we follow Naude and Krugell (2007) and include a measure of ethnic fractional-
ization (ethnic) as an indicator for social cohesion and conflict in addition to the already
described proxies of human capital (av2school) and geography (latitude) in our FDI
specification. We further add the numbers of mobile cellular subscriptions (mobiles)
and telephone lines (telephones) to our matching criteria. Both variables approximate
the physical capital stock as another important determinant of expected returns on FDI.
Appendix B contains detailed information on the construction and the data sources for
all included dependent and explanatory variables.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Sovereign Defaults and Overall Economic Development
We start our empirical investigation by analyzing the effect of debt crises on GDP per
capita. Our set of predictor variables for future economic activity consists of pre-default
averages of the control variables discussed in subsection 3.2 augmented with some linear
combinations of the dependent variable. For the exogenous variables, average values
are calculated over an eight year window that starts nine years before the occurrence
of a sovereign default. The year that precedes the default event is thus excluded from
the matching period and serves as intervention date T0. This timing assumption sug-
gested by Abadie et al. (2010) allows us to control for the costs introduced by the
anticipation of the crisis. For the dependent variable, we use the last two values of the
pre-intervention period (T0 − 1 and T0 − 2) together with two subperiod averages (cal-
culated over [T0 − 3, T0 − 5] and [T0 − 6, T0 − 8]) as additional matching criteria for the
synthetic control estimator.
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Table 2 shows the results of the optimization procedure.16 A comparison of the predictor
variables for the defaulting countries to those of their synthetically created counterparts
depicts a quite reasonable in-sample fit for all five countries. For those measures based on
the lagged dependent variable, differences are especially small and typically in the range
of one to two percent. However, the achieved degree of similarity is also satisfying when
judged by the other control variables, in particular when the large degree of heterogeneity
in the donor pool is considered.17 Examining the dependent variable’s root mean squared
prediction error (RMSPE) further supports our impression of the goodness of fit although
the results are somewhat weaker for Ecuador and Uruguay than for the other three
countries.
 insert Table 2 here 
The last rows in Table 2 list those countries from the donor pool that constitute the es-
timated counterfactual.18 The choice of comparison units without a sufficient individual
degree of similarity to the treated unit poses the risk of introducing an interpolation bias
(Abadie et al., 2010) that might have been not completely absent in past macroeconomic
applications of the synthetic control estimator. A glance at the countries which are cho-
sen by the optimization routine mitigates these concerns in the present study. Most
control countries are either characterized by geographical proximity to the respective
defaulting country (e.g. countries from Latin America account for 60 % of synthetic Ar-
gentina’s country weights, India is the second most important contributor to Pakistan’s
control group) or seem at least similarly exposed to the risk of sovereign debt crises.
A visual impression of the degree of similarity between the actual and synthetic de-
faulting countries prior and after the default can be gauged from Figure 1. Here, solid
lines depict the actual time paths of the logarithmized GDP per capita series for the
five crises countries. Maybe with the exception of Ecuador, these are at first closely
tracked by the dashed lines corresponding to the outcome of the same variable for the
synthetically created comparison countries. As it is required for admissible estimates of
the counterfactual outcomes, the achieved degree of synchronization seems high even at
business cycle frequencies during the pre-crises periods. Actual and synthetic outcomes
16All optimizations are conducted in STATA using the synth routine developed by Abadie et al. (2010).
17In the case of Argentina (2001) country-specific values in the donor pool ranged between −0.4 and
2.66 for the population growth rate, between 12.96 and 41.91 for the investment share, between 0.73
and 4.25 years for schooling variable and between −6.75 and 10 for the polity score.
18Only the five most important countries with an individual weight of a least one percent are shown.
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diverge after the end of the matching period. In each of the five cases, actual GDP
per capital drops below its estimated counterfactual in the year preceding the default
(indicated by the first vertical line) and stays there in the default year (second vertical
line).
 insert Figure 1 here 
Closer inspection of the individual graphs in Figure 1 also reveals some striking differ-
ences between the five default episodes. First, there are large variations in the level
of default costs. The maximum difference between actual and counterfactual GDP per
capita ranges between 8.5% (Dominican Republic) and 23.1% (Pakistan). While seem-
ingly large, the size of these estimates are in line with those obtained by Panizza et al.
(2009) using the alternative techniques described in subsection 2.2.19 Second, differences
can be observed regarding the time path of default costs. In three of the five cases the
bulk of the costs was incurred in the year prior to the default. Only Argentina and
Ecuador suffered more in the default year than in the period of looming debt crises.
These differences may be due to the fact that both countries defaulted relatively late
in the year – in the fourth and third quarter respectively – as stressed by Yeyati and
Panizza (2011). However, it also seems possible that these experiences at least partly
reflect the harsh treatment of creditors by the Argentinian and Ecuadorian governments.
A related observation is that only the Dominican Republic and Uruguay, the two coun-
tries that were ranked the most creditor friendly in Table 1, were able to recuperate
the output loss completely in the years after the crisis. Output losses seem more or less
permanent in the remaining three countries although they also experienced periods of
strong growth in GDP per capita starting several years after the default. These devel-
opments, however, also show up in the estimated counterfactuals suggesting that they
are not related to possibly benign effects of the crises, brought about e.g., through a
reduction of the debt burden.
 insert Figure 2 here 
Figure 2 serves two purposes. It facilitates the assessment of the magnitude of the default
costs by displaying the difference between the actual and the estimated counterfactual
19See Figure 7 of Panizza et al. (2009) which shows the estimated default costs in terms of GDP
growth rates. Adding up their period-specific estimates leads to results that are directly comparable
to ours.
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outcome for the dependent variable (thick black lines). Even more importantly, it offers
a way to check whether these differences are statistically significant. As explained in
subsection 2.3 this is done by means of placebo studies whose results are displayed in grey.
Each line represents the estimated pseudo-default costs for one of the countries in the
donor pool that had not experienced a sovereign default in the sample period. Following
Abadie et al. (2010) only results for those placebo studies with a pre-intervention fit
similar to the one obtained for the defaulting country are shown. More precisely, we
exclude all countries that had a mean square prediction error (MSPE) of more than five
times the MSPE of the respective defaulting country. This procedure is based on the
reasoning that countries which could not be synthetically replicated during the matching
period are also likely to suffer from the same problems out of sample. Placebo costs
calculated from these studies are therefore not well suited to evaluate the likelihood
that a given decline in economic activity occurs randomly in one of the better fitted
defaulting countries.
Looking at the results presented in Figure 2 we can infer that the development of GDP
per capita is indeed unusual after the outbreak of a sovereign debt crisis. Significant
effects are always found in the default year when the estimated default costs are at the
lower boundary of the range spanned by the placebo studies. Statistical significance
diminishes when later dates are considered although strong effects are still found for
Pakistan even eight years after the default. This has to be expected given that the effect
of the debt crisis levels out or is even reversed while the dispersion of placebo effects
naturally increases with the time elapsed since the end of the matching period.
 insert Figure 3 here 
Figure 3 translates the country-specific experiences into the average effects typically
reported in the literature. As discussed in subsection 2.3 this requires a conversion of
calendar into event time since the five defaults occurred in different years. The values on
the horizontal axis in both graphs therefore refer to the number of years that have passed
since the default year (eyears). Point estimates of the average default costs are depicted
by the solid line in the left panel. According to these estimates, GDP per capita drops
by 10.6% on average one year prior to a sovereign default relative to the counterfactual
situation without a debt crisis. The difference between hypothetical and actual average
GDP per capita continues to grow for two additional years when it reaches a maximum
value of 14.1%. The “typical” debt crisis is then followed by a slow V-shaped recovery.
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However, even seven years after the default average GDP per capita still falls short of
its counterfactual level.
The right panel of Figure 3 tells us that the null hypothesis of zero average default costs
can be rejected at conventional levels for most of the years. The reduction in GDP per
capita relative to the estimated counterfactual is significant at the one percent level in
the four years around the default (from eyear = -1 to 2), at the five percent level in the
third, and at the ten percent level in the fourth, fifth and seventh year after the default.20
Our evidence is therefore in line with previous studies which mostly document sizeable
and statistically significant average default costs (see, e.g., Borensztein and Panizza
(2009) or Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012)). The focus on average effects, however, might
be misleading as it masks the country-specific heterogeneity which is apparently present
in our sample. To highlight this point once more, we plot the individually estimated
country-specific default costs along with their average in the left graph. The documented
deviations from the average default costs are clearly not of second-order importance from
the perspective of a policy maker dealing with an emerging sovereign debt crisis.
4.2. Sovereign Defaults and Exports
The documented contemporaneous decline in international trade has been repeatedly
put forward as an explanation for the poor economic performance of many countries
suffering from a sovereign debt crisis (Rose, 2005; Martinez and Sandleris, 2011). We
therefore investigate whether this channel also operated in our sample of recent de-
faults by applying the synthetic control estimator to the exports per capita series as
our preferred measure of foreign trade. Following Martinez and Sandleris (2011) we also
contribute to the discussion on the importance of direct sanctions as explanation for the
changes in trade patterns observed in the aftermath of sovereign debt crises. As these are
more likely to be imposed by creditor countries, we conjecture that their bilateral trade
with the defaulting country is more strongly affected than its trade with other countries.
Hence, we also analyze the fraction of total exports that is directed to creditor countries.
We discuss the results for each of the two specifications in turn.
20The increase in statistical significance of the estimated average effect in the seventh year is partly due
to the fact that Uruguay and the Dominican Republic – the two countries with the fastest recovery
– drop out of the calculation as they defaulted relatively late in the sample period.
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Table 3 shows the optimal country weights and the resulting fit in the pre-default pe-
riod for the exports per capita specification. It is evident from the first three rows that
the relevant exogenous variables have not been as closely matched as those influenc-
ing GDP per capita discussed earlier. This can be partly explained by the weighting
scheme employed by the synthetic control estimator which tolerates larger deviations for
matching variables with relative low predictive power for the dependent variable prior
to the default event.21 This effect is intended as it is accompanied by an improved fit for
variables that are likely to be strong predictors of future exports per capita. Another
possible explanation points to the high degree of export specialization documented for
Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay. Their large export shares of commodity related prod-
ucts could not be reproduced by convex combinations of the non-defaulting countries.
An imperfect matching of these variables is therefore technically inevitable.
 insert Table 3 here 
Notwithstanding these caveats, the country weights chosen by the optimization routine
and displayed in the last rows of Table 3 still seem reasonable in terms of geographic and
economic proximity. For all five countries, pre-default realizations of the dependent vari-
able are also closely matched by their synthetically created counterparts although the
weakest fit is again obtained for Uruguay when measured by the RMSPE. This impres-
sion is confirmed by Figure 4 which shows for each country the difference between the
log of actual and hypothetical exports per capita (thick black line). Only small fluctua-
tions around zero can be observed prior to the years preceding the default events. This
pattern changes with the outbreak of the debt crises after which exports per capita per-
sistently fall short of their estimated counterfactual values in four of the five economies.
The only exception is Uruguay whose estimated counterfactual is dominated by the poor
performance of Jamaica, its most important constituent. However, heterogeneity in the
country-specific reactions is evident even among the four countries for which the point
estimates indicate that the effect of sovereign defaults on international trade is negative.
Four years after the default the percentage deviation from the estimated counterfactual
level of exports per capita ranges from 5% for Ecuador to close to 50% for Argentina.
 insert Figure 4 here 
21Technically this corresponds to smaller weights of these variables in the weighting matrix V .
IV–22
Figure 4 also shows the output from the placebo studies for each of the five crises. The
negative effects found for Ecuador, Pakistan and, depending on the considered year, also
those for the Dominican Republic, turn out to be insignificant according to these results.
Only Argentina’s underperformance relative to its estimated counterfactual consistently
appears exceptional when compared to the set of outcomes for countries not affected by
a sovereign debt crisis. This result is noteworthy as it contrasts with those of Panizza
et al. (2009) who find a strong increase in Argentina’s exports starting shortly after the
default.22 Their approach, which only controls for a common time trend and country-
specific effects probably confuses the commodity driven regional export boom with the
effect of Argentina’s debt crisis. The synthetic control estimator is much better suited to
capture these confounding effects. Indeed, our results indicate that Argentina’s export
performance would have been even better in the absence of its default in 2001.
Considered together, our five case studies suggest that the average effect of sovereign
defaults on foreign trade, depicted in Figure 5, is quite small. In the default year, average
exports per capita are 6.6 percent below their estimated counterfactual level. This value
increases to 14.9 percent in the third year after the default after which the gap between
actual and hypothetical export per capita narrows. Only the effects in the year before
and two years after the default are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Our
estimates of the trade related default costs are thus far below those reported in the
literature. Martinez and Sandleris (2011), e.g., find an average impact of sovereign debt
crises on trade of -6.5% in each of the first five years after the default which corresponds to
an aggregate negative effect of more than 30 percent in our framework. When comparing
these findings one has to consider that our results on average effects are quite sensitive to
outliers as the sample of default events is admittedly small. Excluding Uruguay, whose
post-default experience has clearly been exceptional, would lead to estimated average
effects of similar magnitude to those in the literature.23
 insert Figure 5 here 
We next turn to the question whether the developments in aggregate trade patterns
around the default events considered so far mask cases of bilateral punishment by creditor
countries, e.g. through trade sanctions. If this were the case, we would expect the
22This can be inferred from Figure 6 on page 37 of their publication.
23Without Uruguay, the estimated average effect of sovereign debt crises on exports per capita is 28.6%
five years after the default with a p-value of 0.06.
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fraction of total exports directed to creditor countries to decline after a sovereign default.
Table 4 documents the in-sample properties for a specification that uses this indicator
as dependent variable. The export fractions prior to the default have been reproduced
almost perfectly for each of the three countries in our sample.24 In the case of the
Dominican Republic, whose creditors have also been responsible for 90% of its exports,
this could only be achieved by selecting a single country, Mexico, as comparison unit.
The weights are more evenly distributed for Ecuador and Pakistan where the largest
weights have again been assigned to countries from the same region. The good fit of our
distance variable also reflects this geographic proximity.
 insert Table 4 here 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict our estimates of the individual and average effects of
debt crises on our dependent variable. Again, no common pattern emerges for all three
countries. Instead, the individual country experiences comprise (1) a persistent decline
in the fraction of exports directed to creditor countries (Dominican Republic), (2) a
temporary negative effect on export shares (Ecuador), and (3) the absence of any effect
(Pakistan). Both the transitory and the persistent effect are found to be significant, as
only 1 out of the 14 (36) placebo experiments generated negative trajectories of larger
absolute size than those found for Ecuador (the Dominican Republic). The heterogeneity
could have been expected given that the three countries not only differ in their own
actions during the debt crises, but also defaulted on different groups of creditors. It is
easy to imagine that some countries are more inclined to sanction delinquent debtors
than others, thereby making different experiences after debt crises even more likely.
 insert Figure 6 here 
When these considerations are ignored in favor of an emphasis on average effects, one
finds a significant decline in the fraction of exports directed to creditor countries in
the first four years following a sovereign default. The maximum decline of 9.7 percent-
age points is observed two years after the default with export market shares trending
24As discussed in subsection 3.2, our sample of default events shrinks since data on affected creditor
countries is only available for those three countries which also rescheduled their debt through the
Paris Club.
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back towards their pre-crisis levels afterwards.25 Overall, our results are consistent with
the idea that direct trade sanctions are at least used selectively to punish defaulting
sovereigns. This contrasts with the findings of Martinez and Sandleris (2011). Relying
on estimated average effects, they do not report any evidence in favor for the sanctioning
hypothesis.
 insert Figure 7 here 
4.3. Sovereign Defaults and Foreign Direct Investment
Dating back to Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) capital market exclusion is perhaps the most
common form of punishment considered in the theoretical literature on sovereign debt
and default. Financial autarky after a default is associated with two different types
of economic costs as it implies both, forgone benefits from intertemporal consumption
smoothing and a shortfall of funds needed to finance foreign inputs to domestic pro-
duction. Naturally, these costs are more severe if the private sector is also cut off from
international capital markets after a sovereign default. Mendoza and Yue (2011) show
that key features of emerging market business cycles, among them the sharp reduction
in GDP observed during sovereign debt crises, can be replicated in a general equilibrium
model under these assumptions. In the following, we analyze whether a punishment
through international capital markets has been present during recent episodes of debt
crises. We follow Fuentes and Saravia (2010) and focus on the reaction of foreign direct
investment as it is presumably the most beneficial type of capital inflows (Stiglitz, 2000).
Inspection of Table 5 reveals that the defaulting countries’ net FDI inflows per capita
series have been much more difficult to replicate by the synthetic control estimator
than our other indicators of default costs. The fit is especially poor for Argentina, the
Dominican Republic and Uruguay for which the in-sample RMSPE exceeds 10 percent.
We therefore focus our discussion on the experiences of Ecuador and Pakistan which
have been fit reasonably well, both in terms of the dependent and control variables.
 insert Table 5 here 
25The strength of the average recovery might be overstated as the jump in the export ratio in the fifth
year after the default predominantly reflects the fact that Uruguay drops out of the calculation.
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It can be inferred from Figure 8 that we do not find a significant reduction in FDI
per capita for either of the two countries during the first few years after the default.26
While predicted and actual FDI per capita virtually coincide in the case of Pakistan even
after the default we merely observe a decreased post-default fit for Ecuador without a
clear tendency towards lower than expected FDI inflows.27 Given this general pattern,
it seems unlikely that the significant negative effect found for Ecuador in 2006 can be
attributed to its default in 1999. It seems more plausible that the unpredicted reduction
in FDI inflows reflects an increase in political risk caused by Ecuador’s 2006 presidential
election which saw the victory of Rafael Correa who actively campaigned for a new debt
restructuring (Hatchondo et al., 2009).
 insert Figure 8 here 
Unsurprisingly, the individual experiences are also reflected in the estimated average
effects. Although strictly negative, the point estimates shown in Figure 9 are never
statistically significant during the first 6 years after a sovereign default. This contrasts
with the results of Fuentes and Saravia (2010) who find a significant negative impact
of sovereign defaults on FDI inflows that is largely driven by a decline in funds from
creditor countries directly affected by the default. This last finding might well explain
the differences to our results as a lack of data availability on bilateral FDI flows precludes
us from investigating host country-specific reactions to sovereign debt crises in a way
similar to our analysis of export shares in subsection 4.2.
 insert Figure 9 here 
26We do, however, find a consistently negative and mostly significant effect for Argentina. We do not
stress this result as it might well be produced by pure chance given the weak model fit prior to the
default.
27Obviously, the effect is also always insignificant for Pakistan. Note that the excellent fit of Pakistan’s
FDI per capita series in the pre-intervention period would lead to the exclusion of all placebo
studies if the usual hurdle rate (5 times the defaulting countries’ MSPE) were applied. We therefore
use an alternative criterion for exclusion based on the average MSPE measured for Argentina, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Uruguay in their respective pre-intervention periods.
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5. Conclusion
Information on the costs of sovereign defaults is clearly valuable from a policy perspec-
tive, especially during a time when looming debt crises threaten a growing number of
developed economies. Previous attempts to address this issue have already documented
a sizable negative impact of defaults on GDP growth, foreign trade and access to capital
markets. We contribute to this literature by offering country-specific estimates of de-
fault costs using a novel econometric technique based on comparative case studies. The
key advantage of this approach, its flexibility in dealing with heterogeneity, has proved
especially useful in the present application, as our results reveal considerable variation in
the costs of crises which has not been documented in the literature so far. Our estimates
of cumulated output losses, e.g., range between 8.5% and 23% depending on the con-
sidered default episode. Further differences emerge in the medium run when the default
costs either turn out transitory or permanent. This heterogeneity might reflect a varying
degree of punishment by trading partners and investors who also seem to differentiate
between default events.
In light of the large variation in the characteristics of the considered default episodes,
heterogeneity in default costs comes as no surprise. Differences in the necessary fiscal
adjustment effort and in the details of the restructuring process are among the possi-
ble explanations. A logical next step would be to investigate this issue more formally.
Extending the sample of estimated default costs and analyzing their determinants econo-
metrically thus seems a promising avenue for future research.
IV–27
References
Abadie, A., Diamond, A. and Hainmueller, J. (2010). Synthetic control methods
for comparative case studies: estimating the effect of California’s tobacco control
program. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105 (490), 493–505.
— and Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The economic costs of conflict: a case study of the
Basque country. The American Economic Review, 93 (1), 113–132.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg,
R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth, 8 (2), 155–194.
Alfaro, L. and Kanczuk, F. (2005). Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: a quanti-
tative approach. Journal of International Economics, 65 (2), 297–314.
Arteta, C. and Hale, G. (2008). Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector.
Journal of International Economics, 74 (1), 53–69.
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J.-W. (2010). A new data set of educational attainment in
the world, 1950–2010. NBER Working Paper 15902, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Borensztein, E. and Panizza, U. (2009). The costs of sovereign default. IMF Staff
Papers, 56 (4), 683–741.
— and— (2010). Do sovereign defaults hurt exporters? Open Economies Review, 21 (3),
393–412.
Campos, N. F. and Kinoshita, Y. (2010). Structural reforms, financial liberalization,
and foreign direct investment. IMF Staff Papers, 57 (2), 326–365.
Cavallo, A. F. and Cavallo, E. A. (2010). Are crises good for long-term growth?
The role of political institutions. Journal of Macroeconomics, 32 (3), 838–857.
Cavallo, E. A., Galiani, S., Noy, I. and Pantano, J. (2010). Catastrophic natural
disasters and economic growth. IDB Working Paper 124, Inter-American Development
Bank.
Celasun, O. and Harms, P. (2011). Boon or burden? The effect of private sector debt
on the risk of sovereign default in developing countries. Economic Inquiry, 49 (1), 70–
88.
IV–28
Centre d’études prospectives et d’informations internationales (2011).
dist_cepii database. http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
Cerra, V. and Saxena, S. C. (2008). Growth dynamics: the myth of economic re-
covery. The American Economic Review, 98 (1), 439–457.
Cruces, J. and Trebesch, C. (2011). Sovereign defaults: the price of haircuts. CESifo
Working Paper 3604, CESifo Group Munich.
Eaton, J. and Gersovitz, M. (1981). Debt with potential repudiation: theoretical
and empirical analysis. The Review of Economic Studies, 48 (2), 289–309.
Enderlein, H., Trebesch, C. and von Daniels, L. (2011). Sovereign debt disputes.
Journal of International Money and Finance, forthcoming.
Fuentes, M. and Saravia, D. (2010). Sovereign defaulters: do international capital
markets punish them? Journal of Development Economics, 91 (2), 336–347.
Furceri, D. and Zdzienicka, A. (2012). How costly are debt crises? Journal of
International Money and Finance, 31 (4), 726––742.
Gelos, R. G., Sahay, R. and Sandleris, G. (2011). Sovereign borrowing by develop-
ing countries: what determines market access? Journal of International Economics,
83 (2), 243–254.
Grossman, H. I. and Van Huyck, J. B. (1988). Sovereign debt as a contingent
claim: excusable default, repudiation, and reputation. The American Economic Re-
view, 78 (5), 1088–1097.
Hatchondo, J. C., Martinez, L. and Sapriza, H. (2009). Heterogeneous borrowers
in quantitative models of sovereign default. International Economic Review, 50 (4),
1129–1151.
Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2011). Penn World Table version 7.0.
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php, Center for International
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.
Hutchison, M. M., Noy, I. and Wang, L. (2010). Fiscal and monetary policies
and the cost of sudden stops. Journal of International Money and Finance, 29 (6),
973–987.
IV–29
International Monetary Fund (2011a). Direction of Trade Statistics. Source:
Thomson Reuters Datastream.
International Monetary Fund (2011b). World Economic Outlook database. http:
//www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28.
Kohlscheen, E. (2010). Sovereign risk: constitutions rule. Oxford Economic Papers,
62 (1), 62–85.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1999). The
quality of government. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 (1), 222–279.
Lee, W.-S. (2011). Comparative case studies of the effects of inflation targeting in
emerging economies. Oxford Economic Papers, 63 (2), 375–397.
Martinez, J. V. and Sandleris, G. (2011). Is it punishment? Sovereign defaults and
the decline in trade. Journal of International Money and Finance, 30 (6), 909–930.
Mendoza, E. and Yue, V. (2011). A general equilibrium model of sovereign default
and business cycles. Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Nannicini, T. and Billmeier, A. (2011). Economies in transition: how important
is trade openness for growth? Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 73 (3),
287–314.
Naude, W. A. and Krugell, W. F. (2007). Investigating geography and institu-
tions as determinants of foreign direct investment in Africa using panel data. Applied
Economics, 39 (10), 1223–1233.
Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F. and Zettelmeyer, J. (2009). The economics and
law of sovereign debt and default. Journal of Economic Literature, 47 (3), 651–98.
Pescatori, A., Leigh, D. and Guajardo, J. (2011). Expansionary austerity: new
international evidence. IMF Working Paper 11/158, International Monetary Fund.
Polity IV (2009). Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2009. http:
//www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
Rose, A. (2005). One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international
trade. Journal of Development Economics, 77 (1), 189–206.
IV–30
Sanso-Navarro, M. (2011). The effects on American foreign direct investment in the
United Kingdom from not adopting the euro. Journal of Common Market Studies,
49 (2), 463–483.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). Capital market liberalization, economic growth, and instability.
World Development, 28 (6), 1075–1086.
Sturzenegger, F. (2004). Tools for the analysis of debt problems. Journal of Recon-
structing Finance, 1 (1), 201–223.
— and Zettelmeyer, J. (2006). Debt defaults and lessons from a decade of crises.
Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.
— and — (2008). Haircuts: estimating investor losses in sovereign debt restructurings,
1998-2005. Journal of International Money and Finance, 27 (5), 780–805.
Trebesch, C. (2010). Inexcusable sovereign default. Working paper, Free University
Berlin, Germany.
— (2011). Debt restructuring delays: measurement and stylized facts. In R. Kolb (ed.),
Sovereign Debt: From Safety to Default, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 169–177.
World Bank (2011). World Development Indicators and Global Devel-
opment Finance database. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators.
Wright, M. L. J. (2011). Restructuring sovereign debts with private sector creditors:
theory and practice. In C. A. P. Braga and G. A. Vincelette (eds.), Sovereign Debt
and the Financial Crisis: Will This Time Be Different?, World Bank, pp. 295–315.
Yeyati, E. L. and Panizza, U. (2011). The elusive costs of sovereign defaults. Journal
of Development Economics, 94 (1), 95–105.
IV–31
Table 1: Characteristics of Selected Sovereign Defaults
Country Default Type of Haircut Index of Deficit
period restructuring (%)a Coercivenessb (%)c
Pakistan 1998 - 1999 Pre- & postdefault 13.1 4.5 5.9
Ecuador 1999 - 2000 Postdefault 38.3 5.5 3.3
Argentina 2001 - 2005 Postdefault 76.8 7.2 4.3
Uruguay 2003 Predefault 9.8 1.0 4.6
Dom. Rep. 2005 Pre- & postdefault 5.6 1.0 2.9
Notes: a Average for bank and bond debt, weighted with the amount of exchanged
debt. b Average over default period. c Average deficit in the three years prior to default.
Sources: Panizza et al. (2009) and Cruces and Trebesch (2011) for default periods,
Cruces and Trebesch (2011) for the haircuts and Enderlein et al. (2011) for the index
of coerciveness. Data on fiscal deficits is from Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) and
IMF (2011a).
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Table 2: Synthetic Control Estimator of GDP per Capita: Pre-Default Fit and Country Weights
Argentina (2001) DomRep (2005) Ecuador (1999) Pakistan (1998) Uruguay (2003)
Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth
Dependent variable: lngdp
n 1.29 1.21 1.63 1.45 2.01 2.29 2.51 2.26 0.53 1.07
s 21.71 21.59 21.42 24.93 25.88 22.79 21.64 21.11 17.50 21.07
av2school 2.06 2.20 2.07 2.28 2.17 2.16 1.30 1.64 2.22 2.18
polity2 7.13 7.18 8.00 7.34 8.88 8.86 8.00 7.70 10.00 8.11
lngdp(T0 − 6,T0 − 8) 9.03 9.02 8.75 8.76 8.50 8.48 7.56 7.56 9.00 8.99
lngdp(T0 − 3, T0 − 5) 9.11 9.09 8.88 8.88 8.54 8.51 7.59 7.59 9.07 9.06
lngdp(T0 − 2) 9.18 9.14 8.94 8.91 8.54 8.52 7.63 7.62 9.06 9.07
lngdp(T0 − 1) 9.14 9.13 8.89 8.92 8.56 8.57 7.62 7.64 9.02 9.05
RMSPE 0.016 0.019 0.024 0.011 0.023
Control groupa MEX(0.29) MEX(0.65) CRI(0.54) PHL (0.70) TUR(0.36)
CZE(0.29) IND(0.18) PHL(0.21) IND (0.20) CZE(0.27)
COL(0.27) BWA(0.17) BWA(0.14) PNG (0.08) JAM(0.25)
TUR(0.10) MNG(0.07) BWA (0.03) PNG(0.11)
BRA(0.04) THA(0.02)
Notes: a Only the five most important countries with an individual weight of at least one percent are shown.
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Table 3: Synthetic Control Estimator of Exports per Capita: Pre-Default Fit and Country Weights
Argentina (2001) DomRep (2005) Ecuador (1999) Pakistan (1998) Uruguay (2003)
Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth
Dependent variable: lnexports
latitude 0.38 0.38 0.21 0.16 0.02 0.09 0.33 0.27 0.37 0.17
agr 55.25 28.51 18.49 13.33 54.17 33.30 18.76 16.59 58.87 32.71
fossiles 12.33 20.35 4.64 6.87 39.64 38.91 1.33 34.41 1.62 5.09
lnexports(t-6, t-8) 6.00 6.00 6.30 6.30 5.65 5.64 3.81 3.81 6.60 6.60
lnexports(t-3, t-5) 6.44 6.44 6.35 6.36 5.86 5.88 3.98 3.97 6.68 6.68
lnexports(t-2) 6.55 6.50 6.31 6.32 6.07 6.06 4.06 4.07 6.61 6.61
lnexports(t-1) 6.42 6.46 6.36 6.41 6.12 6.10 4.13 4.12 6.50 6.52
RMSPE 0.037 0.034 0.025 0.039 0.078
Control groupa CHL (0.26) PHL(0.46) COL(0.35) EGY(0.67) JAM (0.67)
BRA (0.25) JAM(0.36) PER(0.33) IND(0.33) CRI (0.29)
LTU (0.25) MEX(0.06) PNG(0.13) GTM (0.03)
HUN (0.13) MYS(0.11) SUR (0.01)
LBN (0.12) CHL(0.06)
Notes: a Only the five most important countries with an individual weight of at least one percent are shown.
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Table 4: Synthetic Control Estimator of Relative Exports: Pre-Default Fit
and Country Weights
DomRep (2005) Ecuador (1999) Pakistan (1998)
Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth
Dependent variable: rel_exports
agr 20.39 6.09 54.17 27.41 18.76 32.31
fossiles 5.76 10.15 39.64 39.59 1.33 3.65
lndist 8.95 9.02 9.17 9.12 8.74 9.06
rel_exports(t-6, t-8) 89.02 87.06 63.53 63.48 59.17 59.17
rel_exports(t-3, t-5) 90.00 88.59 61.18 60.68 59.23 59.42
rel_exports(t-2) 88.57 88.79 57.55 58.35 58.23 57.60
rel_exports(t-1) 86.95 88.33 57.84 57.78 56.77 58.11
RMSPE 1.472 0.769 1.100
Control groupa MEX (1.00) CHL(0.45) THA (0.44)
EGY(0.19) CHN (0.27)
MEX(0.19) SLV (0.24)
PER(0.09) LKA (0.03)
FJI(0.04) FJI (0.02)
Notes: a Only the five most important countries with an individual weight of at least
one percent are shown.
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Table 5: Synthetic Control Estimator of Net FDI Inflows per Capita: Pre-Default Fit and Country Weights
Argentina (2001) DomRep (2005) Ecuador (1999) Pakistan (1998) Uruguay (2003)
Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth Treat Synth
Dependent variable: lnfdi
av2school 2.06 2.72 2.07 1.90 2.14 2.06 1.30 1.11 2.22 1.86
latitude 0.38 0.28 0.21 0.35 0.02 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.37 0.37
ethnic 0.26 0.25 0.43 0.43 0.66 0.48 0.71 0.43 0.25 0.27
mobiles 3.47 3.35 9.18 18.26 0.28 0.40 0.02 0.06 6.18 8.27
telephones 16.23 12.79 9.37 20.26 5.80 4.11 1.26 1.50 23.86 23.23
lnfdi(t-6, t-8) 5.78 5.75 4.43 4.57 5.40 5.42 5.34 5.33 4.49 4.45
lnfdi(t-3, t-5) 6.02 6.07 5.22 5.16 5.52 5.51 5.35 5.34 4.58 4.65
lnfdi(t-2) 6.01 6.11 4.99 5.01 5.52 5.54 5.36 5.35 4.84 4.70
lnfdi(t-1) 6.75 6.46 4.71 4.86 5.59 5.58 5.37 5.36 4.90 4.93
RMSPE 0.151 0.179 0.024 0.002 0.114
Control groupa CHL(0.78) CZE (0.26) LKA (0.55) IND (0.91) TUR(0.51)
PNG(0.10) PNG (0.26) PER (0.19) THA (0.04) CRI(0.29)
THA(0.08) ZAF (0.25) COL (0.11) TUR (0.02) POL(0.11)
MYS(0.05) BGR (0.23) FJI (0.09) PER (0.02) CZE(0.09)
HUN (0.05) COL (0.01)
Notes: a Only the five most important countries with an individual weight of at least one percent are shown.
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Figure 1: Evolution of GDP per capita: defaulting vs. synthetic economies
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Figure 2: Country-specific costs of sovereign defaults in terms of GDP per capita
Notes: Solid line: results for defaulting country; grey lines: placebo studies.
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Figure 3: Average costs of sovereign defaults in terms of GDP per capita
Notes: Costs in year eyear after the default.
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Figure 4: Country-specific costs of sovereign defaults in terms of total exports per capita
Notes: Solid line: results for defaulting country; grey lines: placebo studies.
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Figure 5: Average costs of sovereign defaults in terms of total exports per capita
Notes: Costs in year eyear after the default.
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Figure 6: Country-specific costs of sovereign defaults in terms of relative exports
Notes: Solid line: results for defaulting country; grey lines: placebo studies.
IV–39
−
20
−
15
−
10
−
5
0
5
tre
at
 −
 c
on
tro
l
−2 0 2 4 6 8
eyear
avevalue Ecu
Pak Dom
average vs. country effects
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
pv
al
ue
−2 0 2 4 6 8
eyear
significance levels (average effect)
Figure 7: Average costs of sovereign defaults in terms of relative exports
Notes: Costs in year eyear after the default.
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Figure 8: Country-specific costs of sovereign defaults: FDI inflows per capita
Notes: Solid line: results for defaulting country; grey lines: placebo studies.
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Figure 9: Average costs of sovereign defaults: FDI inflows per capita
Notes: Costs in year eyear after the default.
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Appendix A. Country Coverage
in all samples:
Botswana (BWA) Brazil (BRA) Chile (CHL)
China (CHN) Colombia (COL) Egypt (EGY)
El Salvador (SLV) Fiji (FJI) Hungary (HUN)
India (IND) Malaysia (MYS) Mexico (MEX)
Mongolia (MNG) Papua N. Guinea (PNG) Peru (PER)
Philippines (PHL) Poland (POL) Romania (ROM)
Slovak Republic (SVK) Sri Lanka (LKA) Thailand (THA)
Tunisia (TUN) Turkey (TUR)
added for Ecuador:
Costa Rica (CRI) Czech Republic (CZE) Estonia (EST)
Guatemala (GTM)
added for Argentina:
Cameroon (CMR) Morocco (MAR) Vietnam (VNM)
added for Uruguay:
Jamaica (JAM) Jordan (JOR) Lithuania (LTU)
Panama (PAN) South Africa (ZAF)
added for the Dominican Republic:
Bolivia (BOL) Bulgaria (BGR)
Notes: Country list refers to the analysis of default costs in terms of GDP per capita,
see subsection 4.1 for details.
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Appendix B. Data Sources and Definitions
Name Source Definition
Dependent variables
lngdp Heston et al. (2011) Natural logarithm of PPP converted GDP per
capita (2005 dollars)
lnexports IMF (2011b) and Hes-
ton et al. (2011)
Natural logarithm of the ratio of total exports to
population
rel_exports
IMF (2011b) Fraction of exports destined for Paris Club creditor
countries
lnfdi World Bank (2011) Natural logarithm of foreign direct investment (net
inflows + |lowest sample value (if negative)|) per
capita
Control variables for lngdp
n World Bank (2011) Population growth (annual %)
s Heston et al. (2011) Investment share of PPP converted GDP per
Capita (2005 dollars)
av2school Barro and Lee (2010) Average years of secondary schooling
polity2 Polity IV (2009) Combined policy score ranging from - 10 (strongly
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic)
Additional control variables for lnexports
latitude La Porta et al. (1999) Rescaled absolute value of the latitude of each
country’s capital, ranging between 0 and 1
agr World Bank (2011) Sum of food and agricultural raw materials exports
relative to total merchandize exports
fossils World Bank (2011) Sum of fuel, ores and metals exports relative to
total merchandize exports
Additional control variables for rel_exports
lndist CEPII (2011) Natural logarithm of the average physical distance
to Paris Club creditor countries
Additional control variables for lnfdi
ethnic Alesina et al. (2003) Estimated probability that two randomly meeting
citizens belong to the same ethnic group
mobiles World Bank (2011) Number of mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100
people)
telephones World Bank (2011) Number of telephone lines (per 100 people)
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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates whether donor countries punish sovereign
defaults by reducing foreign aid flows. Our findings reject the hypothesis for-
mulated in the theoretical literature that a default leads to a loss of foreign
aid for the defaulting country. Creditor countries directly affected by the
default do not reduce their aid disbursements. Hence, foreign aid is not used
as a punishment instrument. Neither can it therefore serve as an enforce-
ment mechanism for international debt contracts. Furthermore, other donors
even raise the amount of development assistance allocated to the delinquent
country by about 15% on average. Overall the amount of foreign aid given
to the defaulting country increases by 6.4%.
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1. Introduction
In contrast to private debt markets cross-border lending to sovereign entities is not
enforced by any international bankruptcy law. If a private firm does not pay its liabilities,
creditors have a legal claim to the firm’s assets. In case of sovereign debt, creditors have
no such tool to recoup the defaulted amount.1 Nevertheless, we observe high quantities
of sovereign debt in many countries which are generally repaid. This raises the question
why this is the case. The answer is that there must be some mechanisms that make a
default costly for the debtor country and thus deter sovereign defaults. In the following
we investigate the existence of one specific type of default costs: a reduction in aid flows.
The literature on sovereign debt differentiates between two categories of default costs.
First, a default causes a loss of reputation which in turn leads to rising borrowing costs
or even to capital market exclusion. The second category covers direct sanctions. These
may trigger, e.g., reductions in international trade after a default. The decline in aid
flows as an additional sanctioning mechanism has been recently discussed by Asiedu
and Villamil (2002). They argue that a defaulting country does not only suffer from a
reduction in FDI inflows, but also from a loss of foreign aid. This raises the costs of a
default and therefore makes it a less attractive option. Hence, foreign aid would reduce
country risk and promote capital inflows to the debtor country. Following the theoretical
argumentation of Asiedu and Villamil (2002), Asiedu et al. (2009) empirically investigate
how foreign aid changes the sensitivity of FDI to country risk.2 They show that foreign
aid can in fact mitigate the adverse effect of sovereign risk on FDI. However, up to now,
no study examines whether foreign aid is really used as a punishment instrument against
defaulting countries. Is a default actually followed by a decline in foreign aid given to
the defaulting country? The goal of this paper is to answer this question by relating aid
flows to default events.
The existence of the transmission channel proposed by Asiedu and Villamil (2002) and
Asiedu et al. (2009) is based on the assumption that foreign aid is granted because of
strategic motives and is used for punishment in case of a default. To be specific, the
1It should be noted that the term default covers any change in the original debt contract leading to a
loss of value for the creditor, e.g. debt rescheduling.
2In contrast to Asiedu and Villamil (2002), who assume that countries lose FDI and aid in case of
a default, Asiedu et al. (2009) argue that a country loses both when expropriation occurs. Apart
from this semantic difference, their model is identical. Furthermore, the empirical analysis does
not distinguish between expropriation and default risk as it rests on a composite risk indicator that
covers both concepts.
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government of the donor country directs foreign aid to the debtor country to enforce debt
repayment and to ensure FDI made by domestic firms. The idea that foreign aid is not
solely given because of altruistic motives but is also determined by strategic and political
considerations is not new. In their seminal work Alesina and Dollar (2000) highlight the
importance of colonial past and political alliances as explanatory variables for foreign
aid. They find that strategically important countries and former colonies receive much
more foreign aid than comparable countries without one of these attributes; e.g. the
U.S. gives the biggest part of its total foreign aid to Egypt and Israel and France directs
most of its aid to former colonies. Using foreign aid to generate incentives for countries
to pay their debt would be a further strategic motive.
If aid is used to punish a defaulting country we would expect to find a significant decrease
in aid flows coming from creditor countries that are affected by the default. From the
theoretical point of view, the reactions of other donor countries are not clear. To capture
this heterogeneity we use data on debt rescheduled at the Paris Club and on bilateral aid
flows from the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate. The information offered
by the Paris Club show which countries restructured their debt and which creditor
countries were affected in each case. Using bilateral data on aid flows and default events
allows us to identify a differentiated default effect on affected and non-affected creditors.
Our findings indicate that foreign aid flows are not reduced after a default. This result
holds not only for the aggregate amount of foreign aid received by the delinquent country
but also for the amount granted by aggrieved creditor countries. On the contrary, our
estimation results indicate a positive effect of a default on the aggregate amount of
foreign aid received by the defaulting country. This finding reflects significantly increased
aid flows given by non affected creditor countries. One intuitive explanation may be
that governments of donor countries focus on foreign aid determinants other than the
possibility to punish the default, e.g. the receiving country’s needs. This might be
especially important in times of a default since the economic situation of the debtor
tends to be worse for the foreseeable future.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the related litera-
ture concerning default costs and the linkage between aid and sovereign debt. In section
3 we take a closer look at the bilateral data on foreign aid flows and default events
that are used in this paper. The econometric methodology is described in section 4 and
section 5 presents the results of our empirical estimation. Section 6 concludes.
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2. Related Literature
In this section we will review the existing literature dealing with default costs.3 After
that we will take a brief look at the literature that links foreign aid to sovereign debt.
Referring to the two categories of default costs, reputational costs and sanctions, four
reasons for the repayment of international debt are typically mentioned in the litera-
ture. First, Alesina and Tabellini (1989) argue that delinquent countries may simply
have their overseas assets seized by foreign creditors. This would be a direct sanction for
countries that renege on their debt. However, the feasibility of this enforcement mecha-
nism is limited, e.g. because of sovereign immunity. Second, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
emphasize the importance of a borrower’s repayment reputation when the country wants
to issue further sovereign debt.4 They suggest that a default impairs this reputation and
leads to an exclusion from international capital markets. To the extend this embargo is
permanent the defaulting country loses its ability to smooth consumption over time.5
The argument that the threat of capital market exclusion as a result of a bad repu-
tation can effectively deter sovereign default is criticized for several reasons.6 On the
one hand, Kletzer (1994) mentions that a permanent exclusion from capital markets
lacks commitment if both, creditors and donors, can benefit from interacting on capital
markets after a default. On the other hand, Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) point out that
a defaulting country may still be able to smooth consumption even without access to
foreign borrowing, e.g. by drawing on accumulated buffer-stock savings. Both argu-
ments indicate that there has to be at least a third type of default costs. Bulow and
Rogoff (1989a) and Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) mention reductions in international
trade as consequences of defaults. Theoretically, reduction in trade could occur because
creditor countries impose trade sanctions to discourage future defaults or because the
defaulting country loses access to trade credit, which is needed to finance international
trade.
3See Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for a detailed literature review on repayment incentives.
4For further work concerning reputation and sovereign debt see, e.g. Kletzer (1984) and Grossman
and Van Huyck (1988).
5Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) implicitly assume that international debt is the only way to achieve
consumption smoothing.
6Cole and Kehoe (1998) build a general model of reputation in which the government loses its trust-
worthiness and overall reputation in case of a default. A default therefore affects more than the
ability to borrow again after a default. The model of Cole and Kehoe (1998) thereby can support
large amounts of sovereign debt.
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Finally, countries that renege on their debt may also lose the benefits of development
assistance as the international community withdraws foreign aid. This fourth type of
default costs has been recently discussed by Asiedu and Villamil (2002). The key as-
sumption in their theoretical model is that a country that repudiates its foreign debt
will lose access to FDI and aid.
Several empirical studies investigate the different types of default costs outlined above.
Typically, they use bilateral data to distinguish between the reaction of countries directly
affected by the default and of those countries that are not. This differentiation is highly
important as the aggregate effect of a default may mask the punishment imposed by
creditor countries. The necessary information is obtained from the Paris Club which
provides data on the debtor countries that restructured their debt as well as information
about the affected creditors.
Fuentes and Saravia (2010) use bilateral data on FDI flows and sovereign debt rene-
gotiation to analyze weather a default leads to capital market exclusion in terms of a
decline in FDI inflows. The data on FDI flows identifies the source as well as the recip-
ient country. They find a significant decline of FDI inflows coming from the defaulter’s
creditor countries. FDI inflows from countries not affected by the default rise but the
aggregate effect on FDI remains negative. Overall, FDI inflows of a country that renege
on its debt fall by about 0.05 percentage points of its GDP. These results indicate that
countries whose debt claims have not been settled impose a penalty on the defaulter in
form of a reduction in FDI.
Without looking at the theoretical question why trade could be reduced in case of a
default Rose (2005) and Martinez and Sandleris (2011) empirically investigate the re-
lationship between international trade and sovereign default. Using bilateral data on
trade and default events Rose (2005) analyzes trade between country pairs. His findings
indicate that a default leads on average to an 8% decline in trade between the defaulting
country and its creditors. This effect persists for about 15 years. Furthermore, Rose
(2005) does not find strong evidence for trade diversion. Hence, trade reduction from
creditor countries is not compensated by a rise in trade with other countries. A de-
fault therefore leads to an overall decline in trade for the delinquent country. Martinez
and Sandleris (2011) even argue that trade reduction also occurs between the defaulting
country and non-creditor countries.
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Until now, no empirical analyses investigates if a default leads to a decline of foreign
aid allocated to the delinquent country. Even though the empirical analysis of Asiedu
et al. (2009) examines how foreign aid affects the relationship between FDI and country
risk the assumption that a default is followed by a loss of foreign aid is not empirically
studied. One first step to evaluate the relationship between the allocation of aid and
sovereign defaults is made by Powell and Bird (2010). They analyze if a debt relief leads
to an in- or decrease of aggregate foreign aid transferred to the corresponding country.
In their empirical analysis Powell and Bird (2010) focus on countries in Sub Saharan
Africa (SSA). They find a significant increase in aggregate aid transfers after a country
received a debt relief.
At first glance, one could think of debt reliefs to be nothing else than defaults. Creditor
countries might know that their debt claims will not be served and therefore decide for
a voluntary debt relief. The findings of Powell and Bird (2010) would then indicate
the absence of punishment in form of aid reduction after a default. However, this
interpretation might be misleading. First, donor countries may not judge debt reliefs for
SSA countries as a default but as a kind of aid for extremely poor and highly indebted
countries. We therefore try to shift the focus to the relationship between foreign aid
and real defaults by taking a look at a boarder set of countries and different default
indicators. Second, Powell and Bird (2010) only analyze aggregate aid flows. Unilateral
punishment by creditor countries might therefore remain undetected. To capture this
we use bilateral data as it is common in the literature on defaults and trade or FDI. Our
empirical approach is therefore related to Rose (2005) and Fuentes and Saravia (2010).
3. Data and Hypotheses
Empirical studies on the determinants of foreign aid allocation typically draw upon bilat-
eral data from the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate. This comprehensive
data base offers information on committed and actually disbursed aid flows for a large
number of donors and recipients. Unfortunately, the raw data on official development
assistance (ODA) is ill-suited for our analysis of the relationship between foreign aid
and sovereign defaults. The reason is that our key explanatory variables, the default
variables, affect standard indicators of foreign aid via an accounting relationship. To see
this point, notice that our definition of sovereign defaults refers to the renegotiation of
official external debt through the Paris Club. Each default event thus reflects either a
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postponement or an outright reduction of a country’s debt service obligations owed to
other sovereigns. The outcome of the renegotiation process, however, is also recorded in
the OECD database as new aid payments from the affected creditors to the delinquent
debtor country. This increases measured ODA although the debtor country does not
receive additional financial support. The transaction enters either as a new ODA loan
(subheading “rescheduled debt”) in the case of a mere rescheduling or as a debt forgive-
ness grant. While this treatment might be sensible from an accounting point of view,
it also introduces a spurious positive correlation between sovereign defaults and foreign
aid.7 As a consequence, the results from a regression of ODA on indicators of sovereign
defaults would be biased against finding evidence for punishment. To address this issue
we resort to the concept of “gross aid transfers” (GAT ) proposed by Roodman (2011).
His measure of foreign aid builds upon the official OECD statistics on actually disbursed
aid but excludes all transactions that are directly related to debt renegotiations:
GAT = Gross ODA− debt forgiveness grants− rescheduled debt.
Information on gross aid transfers is available on a bilateral basis, covering 34 different
international donors and 190 recipients of foreign aid.8 Even though the panel is un-
balanced, data on some donor-recipient pairs cover the entire period from 1960-2009.
Inspection of the data set further reveals that the distinction between GAT and ODA
is economically important. Take US bilateral aid to the Dominican Republic as an ex-
ample. After the latter country renegotiated its debt through the Paris Club in 2004
and 2005 US official development assistance in 2006 still added-up to 52.75 millions,
measured in 2008 US $. However, more than 17 % of this sum (9.02 mill. US $) are
due to the direct effects of debt forgiveness and rescheduling. Similar large discrepancies
can be found for other years and country pairs. Measuring aid appropriately is thus
clearly essential from the perspective of our study. In the following, we therefore use
the logarithm of real GAT scaled by the recipient’s population (Aid) as our dependent
variable.
7The accounting rule introduces additional problems concerning the treatment of canceled loans that
were originally meant for non-development purposes like military spending. See Roodman (2011)
for an extensive discussion of this point.
8It is also possible to calculate a measure of net aid transfers that subtracts debt service on ODA
loans from the GAT statistics. While the new statistic might be an even better approximation
of the recipient’s benefit from foreign aid (Roodman, 2011) it has the drawback of being partly
determined by past aid disbursement. Since our focus is on current policy choices, we follow Dollar
and Levin (2006) and opt for a measure of gross aid flows.
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We follow Rose (2005), Fuentes and Saravia (2010) and Martinez and Sandleris (2011)
in using information from the Paris Club to construct different indicators of sovereign
defaults. The Paris Club’s website is the most comprehensive data source on sovereign
defaults in terms of coverage and detail. It comprises more than 400 debt restructurings
that took place between 1956 and 2011. For each restructuring deal, the dataset contains
information on the amount of debt rescheduled and on the type of treatment which
specifies its degree of concessionality. Most important for the purpose of this study,
it lists not only the defaulting sovereign but also the affected creditor countries. This
allows us to test two variants of the hypothesis that aid withdrawal is actually used as
punishment for sovereign defaults.
A strong version of the punishment hypothesis states that international donors as a
group sanction defaults by reducing foreign aid to delinquent sovereign debtors. The
collective withdrawal of foreign aid thus represents an additional cost to the affected
country that may influence its decision to default in the first place. Hence, foreign aid
would serve as an enforcement mechanism as modeled by Asiedu and Villamil (2002)
and Asiedu et al. (2009). We test this hypothesis by adding a default indicator (Default)
to an otherwise standard set of foreign aid determinants. This variable takes the value 1
whenever an aid recipient restructured its debt through the Paris Club. The variable’s
coefficient should take a negative value according to the hypothesis. As another test we
also include the size of the Paris Club deal (Amount) in some specifications. Assuming
that larger defaults are viewed as particularly inexcusable and thus deserve even more
punishment, we expect to find a negative coefficient on this variable as well.
The second, weaker version of the same hypothesis allows for heterogeneous responses of
donor countries. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that coordination among donors
is too weak to ensure collective sanctioning. A reduction in aid disbursements might thus
only be observed for those creditor countries to which the recipient defaulted. Whether
foreign aid functions as an enforcement mechanism for international debt contracts then
depends on the strength of this reaction and on the behavior of the remaining donors.
Their response is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, limited coordination might
still induce those donors to cut their aid flows as well, perhaps by a smaller amount. On
the other hand, aid granted to defaulting countries might even increase out of altruistic
motives. The reason is that sovereign defaults typically coincide with periods of eco-
nomic hardship which renders the crisis-stricken countries more needy. In either case,
allowing for a differentiated reaction of donor countries depending on their role in the
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debt restructuring is empirically important. We do this by including a bilateral default
dummy (Bilateral Default) as an additional regressor. This second default dummy indi-
cates whether an aid recipient defaulted on the debt owed to a specific donor in a given
year. While we do not have any priors regarding the reaction of the remaining donors,
the idea of punishment implies that aid flows from the defaulter’s creditor countries
should decline after a sovereign default.
Our analysis includes a large set of control variables that might influence the alloca-
tion of foreign aid. We follow Hoeﬄer and Outram (2011) in considering variables that
measure the recipient’s need and merit as well as indicators of strategic motives. The
need of a specific recipient is approximated by its income per capita (GDP pc) and by
the amount of aid it receives from other donors (Other Aid pc). Poorer countries are
expected to receive relatively more aid while the relationship between aid from different
donors could either be complementary or substitutive. The merit of aid recipients is
captured by three different indicators. The first, the growth rate of the recipient’s GDP
per capita (Growth), serves as a proxy for beneficial economic policies and should thus
be positively related to aid inflows. The two remaining variables are an indicator of
human rights violations (Human Rights) and the polity2 index of democracy (Democ-
racy). We expect that democracies which honor human rights (low value of Human
Rights) attract relatively more aid compared to dictatorships with a history of human
rights abuses. Strategic concerns of the donor countries are proxied by two variables:
bilateral trade (Trade) and voting allegiance in the UN General Assembly (UN Friend).
Donors are likely to favor countries that are either important trading partner or close
political allies. We thus expect to find a positive relationship between both variables and
foreign aid disbursements. Random effects specifications further contain an indicator of
the donor’s and recipient’s colonial past (Colony) as another time-invariant measure of
political allegiances. Finally, we also include the logarithm of the recipient’s population
(Population) as an additional regressor. This variable does not fit into any of the three
categories mentioned so far. Rather, it is meant to capture the stylized fact that small
countries tend to attract disproportionately large amounts of foreign aid in per capita
terms. Appendix A contains further information on the construction of all included
variables along with their data sources.
Due to limited data availability on the UN voting variable and on some other regres-
sors our final sample comprises 1309 different donor-recipient pairs with annual data
from 1970 to 2008. The reduction in the number of observations on aid flows mainly
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reflects our focus on the G7 donors: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. These countries accounted for roughly two-thirds of
all bilateral aid disbursements throughout our sample period. Table 1 reports some
descriptive statistics on our dependent and explanatory variables for this final sample.
Notably, the fifth column of this table shows that the minimum value of our aid variable
is negative. Negative gross aid transfers will occur if recipients return unspent, previ-
ously granted aid to the respective donor. With only 57 observations, these cases are
quite rare. They mask, however, another important feature of the data as 5,306 of the
36,512 observations on gross aid transfers take the value zero. We address this issue in
the next section.
 insert Table 1 here 
4. The Econometric Framework
The empirical analysis of bilateral foreign aid flows involves at least two key specification
choices. The first choice concerns the appropriate use of the data’s panel structure. Most
earlier studies reduce the dimensionality of the data, which typically covers annual aid
flows from multiple donors to a large number of recipients, by resorting to donor-specific
estimations.9 Alternatively, information from multiple donors could be pooled. Focusing
on the average donor in this way drastically increases sample size but possibly neglects
heterogeneity in individual donor behavior. These differences can be captured by dyad-
specific fixed effects if they are limited to time-constant characteristics of the donor-
recipient pair. Past colonial ties between countries or the USA’s special relationship to
Israel and other strategically important countries in the Middle East region are examples
that fit into this category. We follow Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), Chong and Gradstein
(2008) and Claessens et al. (2009) and use the latter approach. We do, however, check
whether our findings are sensitive to this choice and also report results from donor-
specific regressions.
The second important choice involves the specification of the dependent variables’ data
generating process. The chosen model should address the fact that bilateral aid flows –
though generally nonnegative – are equal to zero for a substantial number of observations.
9The seminal work of Alesina and Dollar (2000) offers one prominent example for this approach.
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Three different estimation strategies have been proposed in the literature that fulfill this
requirement. Each of them has specific strengths and shortcomings:
1. Two part model. Two part models differentiate between a participation (whether
aid is supplied or not) and an amount decision (aid flows given that aid is positive).
The model’s most critical assumption states that both decisions are independent
after controlling for observed explanatory variables. In this case, the parameters
of interest can be estimated from separate binary and linear models. In our appli-
cation, the two estimation equations are
ln (Aidijt) = θt + dijtβ + xijtγ + cij + uijt and (1)
Aid∗ijt = zijtη + ζij + aijt; Aidijt > 0
[
Aid∗ijt > 0
]
, (2)
where index i and j refer, respectively, to the donor and recipient country and
Aidijt is our indicator of bilateral aid flows in year t. Vector dijt contains our
main variables of interest that describe the default status of countries i and j.
Equation 1 further includes a vector of control variables xijt and a time varying
constant θt. The participation decision also depends on the covariates in zijt
which contains at least one variable that is not already included in dijt or xijt.10
Furthermore, both equations include unobserved country-pair specific effects (cij
and ζij) and an idiosyncratic error term (uijt and aijt). Most studies only report
results for equation 1 which is estimated on the subsample of positive observations
using standard panel techniques.
2. Selection model. Estimation of a selection model is appropriate if the conditional
independence assumption of the two part model is not met. This would be the
case if the unobserved effects or the idiosyncratic error terms of equations 1 and 2
were correlated. Estimates from the two part model would be inconsistent in either
case. One approach that does consistently estimate the parameters of the amount
equation in a panel context is Wooldridge’s (1995) variant of Heckman’s two-step
estimator. Details on this approach, which rests on quite restrictive assumptions,
can be found in Appendix B.
3. Tobit model. The Tobit model resorts to a latent variable specification to account
for corner solutions of the dependent variable. In our application, the latent vari-
10This assumption is not essential for the two part model. The related selection model, however, might
be only poorly identified without this assumption.
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able can be thought of as a donor’s desired amount of aid for a particular recipient.
If this amount is negative, no aid is distributed. Otherwise, y∗ijt determines the
amount actually disbursed. Again assuming that aid is lognormally distributed we
get the model
y∗ijt = θt + dijtβ + xijtγ + cij + uijt with (3)
ln (Aidijt) = yijt =
{
y∗ijt, if y∗ijt ≥ min (yijt)
−, if y∗ijt < min (yijt)
}
.
The major drawback of the tobit model for panel data is that it only allows for a
random effects specification of the unobserved effects cij. This requires the strong
assumption that all observable covariates are uncorrelated with the cij.
Given their different limitations, we draw on all of the three approaches in our study.
This procedure allows us to investigate whether our results are robust or just the reflec-
tion of a more or less arbitrary specification choice. However, following the majority of
existing studies, we use the simple two part model as starting point for our analysis. A
final problem common to all three approaches is that our regressors are not necessarily
strictly exogenous. For some variables, even contemporaneous exogeneity seems ques-
tionable. Following Hoeﬄer and Outram (2011) we therefore include lagged instead of
current realizations of most control variables in our regression. This procedure should at
least mitigate concerns of endogeneity.11 We do not lag the “UN Friend” and “Other Aid”
variable which are clearly endogenous. Their coefficients should thus not be interpreted
causally. Potential endogeneity of the default indicators as our main variables of interest
is addressed separately in subsection 5.2.
11The fixed effects estimator, which is predominantly used in this paper, is still inconsistent in the
presence of regressors that satisfy contemporaneous but not strict exogeneity. This inconsistency
shrinks to zero at the rate 1/T . Given that our sample period spans 39 years this problem should
be negligible.
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5. Empirical Evidence on Punishment through Aid
Withdrawal
5.1. Baseline Results
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating equation 1 on the subsample of observa-
tions with positive bilateral aid flows. The classic fixed effects estimator is used for this
exercise, as it seems likely that unobserved characteristics of the donor-recipient relation-
ship correlate with our variables of interest. To account for potentially heteroscedastic
and autocorrelated error terms we further employ cluster-robust standard errors. Table 2
shows the results. Column (1) starts with the estimates from a baseline specification
that does not include any indicator of sovereign debt crises. The results are generally in
line with our priors and with previous findings in the literature. G7 donors allocate for-
eign aid towards countries that are relatively poor but fast growing. Herding also seems
to be an important characteristic of donor behavior as the coefficient on the variable
measuring donations from other countries is positive and highly significant. This effect,
however, may also reflect that some recipients are considered needy in dimensions not
well captured by our other control variables and thus receive more aid from all donors.
Regarding our political variables, we find only mixed evidence in favor of the hypothesis
that a recipient’s merit is an important determinant of aid inflows. While human right
abuses tend to be sanctioned, democracies are not rewarded with significant additional
financial support. At the same time, the significantly positive coefficient on the trade
variable indicates that strategic concerns affect the allocation of foreign aid. The finding
of a positive relationship between voting behavior in the UN and foreign aid disburse-
ments would further support this line of argument. The coefficient on the “UN friend”
variable, however, has the correct sign but is not statistically significant. Finally, we
also find evidence for a small country bias meaning that less populated countries receive
relatively more aid in per capita terms.12
 insert Table 2 here 
12Robustness exercises show that this effect is still present when only recipients with a population above
a certain minimum threshold (e.g. 1,000,000) are included. Hence, the effect at least partly reflects
that large countries like China receive relatively less foreign aid. In accordance with the literature,
we nevertheless stick to the term “small country bias” although it might be a misnomer.
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The lower part of Table 2 contains results from the Robust Hausman test and different
measures of the model’s fit. The robust and the standard Hausman test share the same
null hypothesis, namely that the regressors and the unobserved effects are uncorrelated.
The random effects model is consistent under this assumption. It is, however, not
necessarily fully efficient since both the unobserved effects and the error terms may fail
to meet the usual i.i.d. assumption. A violation of this assumption, which is used for
inference in the standard Hausman test, is likely in our application.13 We therefore use
the robust version of this test which is based on an artificial random effects regression that
also includes the demeaned variables as additional regressors (Arellano, 1993). Under the
null hypothesis, the coefficients on these transformed fixed effects regressors should be
zero. Inference can be based on clustered standard errors which are robust to violations
of the i.i.d. assumptions. The results from the test strongly reject the random effects
model.14 Confirming our priors, the fixed effects model is thus the preferred one. Turning
next to the three different R2 measures, the model’s explanatory power seems modest
at first glance. Other studies in the field like Berthélemy (2006) or Hoeﬄer and Outram
(2011) routinely report R2s of more than 50%. This difference, however, can be explained
by the fact that our measures focus on the explanatory power of the observed variables
and ignore the contribution of the fixed effects. Adding their contribution yields a
comparable R2 of 0.74.
The remaining three columns of Table 2 are devoted to our main research question. They
report results from specifications that add our two different default indicators, either
separately or jointly, to the standard set of control variables. Again, all regressions also
include country-pair specific fixed effects. This specification is generally supported by
the Robust Hausman test.
We start with a test of the strong version of the punishment hypothesis which states that
donors sanction sovereign defaulters collectively. The absolute amount of aid received
by these countries should thus decrease. Our results – displayed in column (2) – clearly
reject this hypothesis. The coefficient on the common default dummy is positive and
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, the effect is also significant
in economic terms. Overall, donors increase aid disbursement to delinquent borrowers
by 6.4 % on average. These results are at odds with Asiedu and Villamil’s (2002) idea
that foreign aid may function as an enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt. On the
13Large differences between clustered and normal standard errors obtained for the random effects model
support this notion.
14Results from standard Hausman tests (not shown) point to the same conclusion.
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contrary, the documented surge in aid flows in the aftermath of debt restructurings even
increases the attractiveness of sovereign defaults. An explanation for this finding might
be that donors contemporaneously react to other objectives that dominate the strategic
motive for punishment. Altruistic motives, e.g., may play a role as a sovereign default
may be seen as an indicator for a persistent economic crises that renders the already
poor country even more needy.
Another possibility is that only those countries that are directly affected by a default
resort to sanctions. A common default dummy would fail to capture this behavior if it
is counteracted by increased aid disbursements from the remaining donors. The speci-
fications in column (3) and (4) test this weak variant of the punishment hypothesis by
including a bilateral default dummy. Again, we do not find any evidence for sanctioning.
The coefficient on the bilateral default dummy variable – when considered in isolation
as in column (3) – is insignificant and positive. Thus, even directly affected donors fail
to sanction their former debtor by reducing foreign aid. This conclusion is supported by
the results in column (4). Here, the inclusion of both default variables explicitly allows
for heterogenous responses from affected and not affected creditor countries. The find-
ing of a large positive coefficient on the common default dummy confirms our previous
notion that the increase in foreign aid documented in column (2) predominantly reflects
additional aid disbursements from the latter group of donors. Their support increases
by roughly 15 percent after a sovereign default. Less is known about the reaction of for-
mer creditors. The negative effect on the bilateral default dummy indicates that these
donors tend to give less aid after a default than their peers. However, this effect is not
statistically significant. Furthermore, the overall effect of a default on bilateral aid dis-
bursements would still be positive for the countries that are involved in a renegotiation,
even if the coefficient were significant.
The results presented so far strongly reject both the weak and the strong version of the
punishment hypothesis. One possible explanation for this finding could be that our bi-
nary default indicators fail to differentiate between different default events. This would
bias our estimates if reactions to a default differed depending, e.g., on some character-
istics of the restructuring deal like the size of the haircut. Existing empirical work by
Trebesch (2010), Cruces and Trebesch (2011) and Jorra (2011) support this idea. A het-
erogenous reaction in terms of sanctioning could also be justified theoretically. Grossman
and Van Huyck (1988), e.g., differentiate between excusable and inexcusable defaults.
In their model, only the latter events are punished. We try to capture this distinction
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by including the size of the Paris Club deal as an additional variable. The underlying
hypothesis is that larger defaults are considered less excusable and are thus punished
harder (Fuentes and Saravia, 2010). The first two columns of Table 3 contain the results.
Again, these are not supportive for the sanctioning hypothesis. The additional variable
enters with a coefficient that is correctly signed but insignificant. Moreover, none of
the two coefficients on our binary default indicators is affected by the inclusion of the
previously omitted variable. The insignificance of the “amount” variable does not merely
reflect problems of multicollinearity. It is also present in specifications that include only
one of the two other default variables (column 2).
 insert Table 3 here 
The last two columns of Table 3 investigate whether a default has harmful longer-term
consequences for a recipient of foreign aid. In principal, defaults could have a lagged
effect on aid disbursement as a result of a lengthy budgeting process which impairs its
instantaneous reallocation. So far, evidence for such time lags has been documented
for trade (Rose, 2005) and FDI related default costs (Fuentes and Saravia, 2010). To
analyze this issue, we add two lagged default indicators to our baseline specification.
These take the value one whenever a recipient defaulted at least once during a specified
five year period (t−1 to t−6 and t−6 to t−10) on the debt owed to a particular donor.
They are thus meant to capture the delayed response of former creditor countries that
were directly affected by a specific default decision.
According to our results, sovereign defaults indeed have a delayed effect on the aid alloca-
tion decision. Its sign, however, is inconsistent with the idea of long-term punishment.
On the contrary, directly affected donor countries only seem to lag their peers in in-
creasing foreign aid disbursements to defaulting sovereigns. Interestingly, the coefficient
on the dummy variable for a bilateral default during the most recent 5 year period is
similar in absolute magnitude to the negative coefficient on the bilateral contempora-
neous dummy which is now significant. A possible interpretation of this finding is that
aggrieved creditors hesitate to reward a default by raising aid instantaneously. In the
medium term, however, they also react to the increased need of the recipient. Column
(4) of Table 3 further shows that this effect is restricted to the first five post-default
years. Renegotiations that took place in any year between t−6 and t−10 do not trigger
additional aid flows.
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5.2. Addressing Corner Solutions and Endogeneity
This section investigates whether the sound rejection of the punishment hypothesis
throughout all previously discussed regressions is related to our specification choice.
We start with an analysis of the two alternative models for corner solution outcomes.
As discussed in section 4, these are the tobit and selection model. Table 4 displays results
from both models. For comparison purposes, column (1) further contains the findings
from a random effects specification of the two part model. Such a comparison could
be especially valuable for the tobit results which are also estimated from a specification
that includes random effects.15
 insert Table 4 here 
Column (2) displays the results for the tobit model. We report marginal effects of our
default variables on foreign aid disbursement, conditional on observing positive aid flows.
These are calculated as the average of the marginal effects obtained for the subsample
of observations where aid was actually disbursed.16 The results should thus be directly
comparable to those reported for the two part and selection models. The finding of a
positive and significant marginal effect of defaults on aid from not directly affected donors
can therefore be directly interpreted as further evidence against the strong variant of
the punishment hypothesis. Confirming our previous findings, the reaction from donors
that participated in a renegotiation tends to be more muted, although the difference
is not statistically significant. Surprisingly, this changes when bootstrapped clustered
instead of the usual standard errors are considered.17 However, these results, reported
in column (3), still do not support any variant of the punishment hypothesis. Rather,
they imply that even aggrieved creditors increase their support to defaulting sovereigns
by nearly 10 percent on average.
We next turn to Wooldridge’s (1995) selection model for panel data. Although it is not
necessarily required for identification we include two additional variables in the partici-
pation equation to improve the precision of our estimates. Following Koch et al. (2009)
15As discussed above, this specification choice is necessary as no consistent fixed effect estimator exists
for the tobit model.
16Our calculation also takes the binary nature of the default variables into account. In both cases, the
reported results thus measure the effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1.
17This unexpected finding of smaller clustered than normal standard errors is limited to the default
variables. Standard errors for the remaining marginal effects rise markedly when switching from
column (2) to column (3).
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we reason that joint religion affects the decision to supply aid to a particular recipient.
At the same time, we assume that the additional variable can be excluded from the
allocation equation. Borrowing from the related literature on the gravity model of in-
ternational trade, we further include a common language dummy as another additional
regressor in the participation equation (Helpman et al., 2008). The final column of Ta-
ble 4 contains the results. Again, our main conclusions remain unaltered, although many
terms containing the inverse Mills ratio turn out statistically significant (not shown). The
effect of selection bias thus seems at least economically negligible. In this respect, our
results complement previous findings in the literature, documented, e.g., by Berthélemy
and Tichit (2004) and Berthélemy (2006). We therefore resort to the simple two part
model for the remainder of this paper.
The second part of this section deals with another source of biases arising from en-
dogeneity. Problems of this kind are indeed likely to occur in our application as the
relationship between sovereign defaults and foreign aid flows is potentially bidirectional.
At least two different explanations for a causal link between aid disbursement and the
probability of debt crises come to mind. The first explanation is related to the classical
source of simultaneity bias that plagues all studies on the consequences of sovereign de-
faults. It states that a reduction in foreign assistance – or, more generally, in economic
activity – causes debt crises as it impairs both, a sovereign’s ability and willingness to
serve its debt. In accordance with the punishment hypothesis, this theory thus predicts
a negative correlation between aid flows and sovereign defaults. Since our results show
the opposite, the case for the empirical relevance of punishment is even weaker in light
of this argument. The second, alternative explanation is more troublesome for our con-
clusions as it implies that our coefficient estimates are biased upwards. It draws on the
large literature on the economic effects of foreign aid. Studies in this field repeatedly
document that aid has negative unintended side effects. Djankov et al. (2008), e.g., find
a significant negative effect of aid on the quality of political institutions. Other studies
summarized in McGillivray et al. (2006) document that even the effect of foreign aid
on growth can be negative in some circumstances. Both effects might in turn increase
sovereign risk and introduce a positive correlation between foreign aid and defaults. A
careful examination of the importance of endogeneity is thus necessary since it is a priori
unclear which of the two effects dominates.
Unfortunately, controlling for endogeneity turns out rather difficult empirically. The
reason is a lack of variables which predict sovereign defaults but do not influence foreign
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aid disbursements. Similar problems have plagued previous econometric studies of de-
fault costs. Typically, it remains unclear whether the finally chosen variables in an IV
approach are suitable, weak or even invalid instruments. Reviewing these past attempts
Borensztein and Panizza (2009) even conclude that convincing instruments might sim-
ply not exist. These limitations in mind, we resort to three variables that have been
repeatedly used for this purpose. Following Rose (2005) and Martinez and Sandleris
(2011) our instrumental variables are the budget deficit (in percent of GDP), the CPI
inflation rate and the ratio of the current account surplus/deficit to GDP. The results
from both two-stage least-squares (2SLS) and GMM estimation techniques are shown in
Table 5.
 insert Table 5 here 
Encouragingly, the results from both specifications are quite similar and generally in
line with our previous findings. All coefficients of our default dummies are positive
but statistically insignificant. Hence, we still do not find any evidence for punishment
through a reduction in foreign aid. Furthermore and despite our initial objections, none
of the reported diagnostic tests indicates misspecification. All four specifications easily
pass the Kleibergen and Paap’s (2006) underidentification test.18 Testing for the likely
consequences of weak instruments following the procedure of Stock and Yogo (2005)
further reveals only a moderate potential bias. Finally, Hansen’s J statistic does not
reject the hypothesis that our instruments are valid. Although this test might fail to
detect all incidences of instrument invalidity, it seems very unlikely that controlling for
any remaining bias would switch the sign of the default effect. In light of the robustness
of our results we are thus confident that the hypothesis that sovereign defaulters are
punished through a reduction in foreign aid is empirically irrelevant.
18This is not true for our standard specification that includes both default indicators simultaneously.
The specification is underidentified since both deficit variables are highly correlated while the predic-
tive power of the inflation rate is very limited. This leaves us with only one effective instrument for
two endogenous variables. We therefore do not report these results although they do not contradict
our general conclusions.
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5.3. Further Robustness Exercises
All results previously discussed rest implicitly on three assumptions that are not neces-
sarily met. So far, we have assumed that Paris Club renegotiation dates correctly identify
sovereign defaults, that the relationship between aid disbursements and defaults has not
been subject to structural change, and that this relationship is the same for all donor
countries. This section investigates whether our results are robust to relaxing these
assumptions.
A concern with the Paris Club data is that it does not distinguish between sovereign
defaults and incidences of debt relief. Both events are recorded in the data set as they
imply a change in the terms of the original debt contracts that favors debtors at the
expense of creditors. However, from an economic perspective defaults and debt reliefs
are clearly distinct. The first type of event is typically seen and modeled as a deliberate
policy choice of a debtor government. By contrast, the cancelation of loans through
a debt relief is often initiated by former creditor countries. Their active role in the
restructuring process does not square with the concept of punishment as envisioned by
Asiedu and Villamil (2002) and Asiedu et al. (2009). Including data on incidences of
debt relief might thus bias the results on the effects of sovereign defaults. This may even
lead to a false rejection of the punishment hypothesis. The problem will be especially
severe if donor countries view a debt relief as a complement rather than a substitute to
foreign aid (Powell and Bird, 2010).
We attempt to address this issue by employing Paris Club information on the “type
of treatment” to identify those renegotiations that might be better described as debt
relief. Restructurings that took place under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative constitute a first candidate group. A broader definition of debt relief also
includes other highly concessional Paris Club deals that were negotiated under “Cologne”
or “Naples” terms.19 A final categorization treats every restructuring of countries that
are eligible for the HIPC initiative as debt relief. For each of these three definitions
we reestimate the amount equation 1 excluding all incidences of debt relief. Table 6
contains the results which are in line with our previous findings. Sovereign defaulters
attract significantly more, not less, aid in per capita terms according to the results that
rest on either of the two broader default definitions (columns (1) to (4)). As before, this
19This definition includes renegotiations under “Toronto” and “London” terms as well as those under
“Lyon” terms which were, respectively, the predecessors of “Cologne” and “Naples” treatments.
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mainly reflects increased aid disbursement from countries that were not affected by the
default. This effect vanishes in the specifications (5) and (6) which exclude all HIPC
observations from the sample. Here, the reactions of both donor groups are statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Still, we do not find any evidence for negative effects of
sovereign defaults on aid inflows. Hence, both variants of the punishment hypothesis
are rejected across all specifications and default definitions.
 insert Table 6 here 
We next analyze whether the impact of sovereign defaults on foreign aid flows has
changed over time. In principle, such structural change seems plausible given that our
sample period covers four decades and includes, e.g., the end of the Cold War. This event
in particular might have affected the costs and benefits of punishments after a sovereign
default. An aid withdrawal probably has never been a realistic option during the Cold
War period, especially not when the allegiance of a strategically important country was
at stake. Following this line of argument we would thus expect to find a more negative
effect of defaults on aid starting in the 1990s. However, since previous research has
documented an increased importance of altruistic motives of aid disbursements for the
same period (Claessens et al., 2009), the opposite reaction also seems possible.
In light of the theoretical arguments, we tackle the issue of structural change by rees-
timating the simple log-linear model of positive aid disbursements separately for each
decade. Table 7 shows the results. These are generally quite similar to each other and to
the results that have been obtained for the complete sample period. This might either
reflect that the two arguments for structural change are empirically irrelevant or that the
opposing effects cancel each other out. The most noticeable change concerns the coeffi-
cient on the common default dummy which is now insignificant in all specifications. For
the 1970s and 1980s this predominantly reflects the increase in standard errors brought
about by the reduced sample size. In addition to this, the point estimates also decrease
in the last two decades. Here, the negative coefficient of the bilateral default dummy
is even larger in absolute size indicating that aid from directly affected donors might
decrease after a default. This effect, however, is economically negligible and far from
being statistically significant. The results thus still do not provide any evidence in favor
of the punishment hypotheses.
 insert Table 7 here 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In a final step we investigate the importance of donor-specific heterogeneity that will
result if individual donors are differently inclined to use foreign aid as a disciplining
device. To detect these deviations from the average behavior we resort to donor-specific
estimations of the amount equation 1. The upper part of Table 8 contains the regression
output for a specification that includes both default dummies. At first glance, the
deviations from our earlier results seem substantial as the coefficients on our two variables
of interest repeatedly change signs from specification (1) to (7). However, nearly all of
these differences can be attributed to a differentiated reaction to defaults which do
not affect the respective donor country. By contrast, the effect of a bilateral default,
measured by the sum of the two default coefficients, is nearly identical for all donors and
close to zero. This again contradicts the idea that aggrieved creditor countries punish
sovereign defaults by withdrawing foreign aid.
 insert Table 8 here 
One possible explanation for the puzzling variation in the donors’ reaction to a recipient’s
default on debt owed to a third country is that these effects might be only poorly
identified. This conjecture is supported by the high degree of multicollinearity between
the two default indicators. In most samples, both variables take identical values for
roughly 98 per cent of the observations. We therefore rerun the donor-specific regressions,
each time including only one of the two dummy variables. The lower part of Table 8
shows the results for the specifications that add only the common default dummy to
the standard set of control variables.20 According to these estimates, no single donor
country punishes sovereign defaults by reducing aid disbursements significantly. Japan
even increases its development assistance to crisis stricken countries. Recipient countries
thus do not receive less foreign aid after a default implying that aid can not work as
an enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt. Furthermore, a F-test fails to reject the
hypothesis that all default coefficients are jointly equal to zero, justifying our earlier
focus on the pooled data set.
20Similar results can be obtained by including only the bilateral default dummy. These results are
available from the authors upon request.
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6. Conclusion
Looking at the long history of sovereign debt shows that defaults occur rather rarely.
Countries typically pay their debt even if no international bankruptcy laws force them
to do so. In the literature, this is explained by the existence of several kinds of default
costs, e.g. exclusion from capital markets or trade sanctions. We focus on one specific
reason for debt repayment, a possible decline in foreign aid allocated to the delinquent
country in the aftermath of a default. The withdrawal of foreign aid would make a
default more costly for the concerned country and hence function as an enforcement
mechanism for sovereign debt. This type of default costs is theoretically analyzed by
Asiedu and Villamil (2002). Based on the assumption that a country loses access to
foreign aid and FDI in case of a default their model shows a decline in default risk for a
country that receives positive aid inflows. However, to the best of our knowledge, we are
the first who empirically investigate the validity of the underlying assumption, namely
that a default leads to a reduction in foreign aid directed to the defaulting country.
We use bilateral data on foreign aid flows and debt renegotiations that identify the source
and recipient countries of aid as well as the debtor and creditor countries involved in
the debt restructuring process. We can therefore differentiate between the reaction of
creditor countries directly affected by the default and of countries that are not affected.
Investigating only the aggregate effect of default events on aid could mask a punishment
imposed by the the first group of donors.
Our results indicate that a default does not lead to a loss of foreign aid received by
defaulting countries. On the contrary, it even raises the aggregate amount of foreign aid
directed to these countries by about 6.4% on average. This effect is mainly driven by the
reaction of those donor countries that are not directly affected by the default. Foreign
aid given by these countries rises significantly by about 15% on average. Nevertheless,
creditor countries that suffer directly from the default also tend to give more aid and
not less after the default. This increase is statistically insignificant and much smaller
than the increase coming from the remaining donors. However, it is far from being
significantly negative. These findings contradict the hypotheses of Asiedu and Villamil
(2002) who assume that creditor countries punish a default by reducing the amount of
foreign aid given to the defaulting country. Our findings are robust to different empirical
model specifications and several robustness checks. Overall, foreign aid therefore seems
not to work as an enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt repayment.
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Our findings raise questions regarding the interpretation of the results of Asiedu et al.
(2009). Their study indicates that foreign aid mitigates the adverse effect of country risk
on FDI. Our empirical results show that this effect is not caused by the threat of losing
access to foreign aid in case of a default. Providing another theoretical explanation for
this effect is surely an important area for future research.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Aid 36512 9.310 113.853 -11.826 15381.240
Default 51051 0.053 0.223 0.000 1.000
Bilateral Default 51051 0.041 0.198 0.000 1.000
Amount 51051 0.006 0.048 0.000 1.619
ln GDP pc 39725 8.067 1.172 4.767 11.722
ln Other Aid pc 36291 3.120 1.544 -8.504 9.680
Growth 39200 0.038 0.083 -1.101 0.827
Human Rights 29918 2.551 1.125 1.000 5.000
Democracy 33236 -0.989 6.977 -10.000 10.000
ln Trade 39737 -5.147 2.481 -16.784 1.687
UN Friend 38278 0.376 0.174 0.000 0.940
ln Population 44772 8.219 2.062 2.485 14.091
Colony 50232 0.099 0.298 0.000 1.000
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Table 2: Aid and Sovereign Defaults: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Gross Aid per capita
Default 0.064** 0.147**
(2.37) (2.42)
Bilateral Default 0.037 -0.106
(1.29) (-1.60)
ln GDP pc (t-1) -0.188* -0.190* -0.189* -0.188*
(-1.71) (-1.73) (-1.72) (-1.71)
ln Other Aid pc 0.455*** 0.451*** 0.453*** 0.451***
(10.95) (10.83) (10.89) (10.84)
Growth (t-1) 0.303** 0.307** 0.305** 0.308**
(2.47) (2.50) (2.48) (2.51)
Human Rights (t-1) -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066***
(-3.02) (-3.01) (-3.02) (-3.01)
Democracy (t-1) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.72) (0.71) (0.71) (0.72)
ln Trade (t-1) 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(4.06) (4.10) (4.08) (4.10)
UN Friend 0.279 0.275 0.277 0.274
(1.53) (1.50) (1.52) (1.50)
ln Population -0.615** -0.633** -0.625** -0.629**
(-2.24) (-2.30) (-2.27) (-2.29)
Constant 5.837** 6.016** 5.936** 5.968**
(2.06) (2.13) (2.10) (2.11)
Dyad Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Hausmana 182.542*** 192.956*** 203.574*** 204.606***
N 22086 22086 22086 22086
R2 overall 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158
R2 within 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136
R2 between 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143
Note: a The robust Hausman statistic is distributed as χ2(N) where N denotes the
number of explanatory variables.
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Table 3: Aid and Sovereign Defaults: Default Size & Reputation Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Gross Aid per capita
Default 0.159** 0.081*** 0.150** 0.151**
(2.55) (2.58) (2.47) (2.48)
Bilateral Default -0.102 -0.122* -0.119*
(-1.55) (-1.88) (-1.82)
Amount -0.147 -0.162
(-1.07) (-1.18)
Default between 0.108*** 0.100***
t-1 and t-5 (2.71) (2.64)
Default between 0.041
t-6 and t-10 (0.99)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyad Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Hausmana 212.487*** 200.918*** 201.234*** 200.839***
N 22086 22086 22086 22086
R2 overall 0.158 0.158 0.157 0.157
R2 within 0.136 0.136 0.137 0.137
R2 between 0.143 0.143 0.142 0.142
Notes: a The robust Hausman statistic is distributed as χ2(N) where N denotes the
number of explanatory variables. Additional control variables included, but not reported.
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Table 4: Aid and Sovereign Defaults: Tobit and Selection Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linear, RE Tobit, RE Tobit, RE Selection
Dependent variable: Gross Aid per capita
Default 0.142** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.157**
(2.35) (2.70) (2.79) (2.09)
Bilateral Default -0.097 -0.143 -0.143* -0.151*
(-1.48) (-1.46) (-1.68) (-1.86)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyad Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors Clustered Standard Clustered
(Boot)
Clustered
(Boot)
N 22086 24051 24051 18285
Notes: Additional control variables included, but not reported. Selection equation in-
cludes Joint Religion and Common Language as additional variables.
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Table 5: Aid and Sovereign Defaults: Endogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM
Default 0.318 0.385
(0.48) (0.59)
Bilateral Default 0.348 0.451
(0.44) (0.58)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyad Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5639 5639 5639 5639
Underid. Test 39.15*** 39.15*** 39.01*** 39.01***
Weak Id. Test 10.59+ 10.59+ 9.90+ 9.90+
Hansen J statistic 3.06 3.06 3.07 3.07
Notes: + denotes maximum bias due to weak instruments ≤ 10% of the bias of OLS
according to critical values calculated by Stock and Yogo (2005). Budget Deficit, Current
Account and Inflation are used as instruments. Additional control variables included,
but not reported.
Table 6: Aid and Sovereign Defaults: Different Default Definitions
No HIPC No HIPC, Cologne No HIPC
Terms or Naples Terms Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Gross Aid per capita
Default 0.066** 0.144** 0.071** 0.123* 0.038 0.108
(2.37) (2.23) (2.41) (1.79) (0.93) (1.14)
Bilateral Default -0.099 -0.065 -0.082
(-1.41) (-0.88) (-0.84)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyad Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 21933 21933 21679 21679 15489 15489
R2 overall 0.160 0.159 0.162 0.162 0.169 0.169
R2 within 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.131 0.131
R2 between 0.145 0.145 0.147 0.147 0.156 0.156
Note: Additional control variables included, but not reported.
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Table 7: Aid and Sovereign Defaults: Different Decades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
70s 80s 90s 00s
Dependent variable: Gross Aid per capita
Default 0.120 0.139 0.034 0.002
(0.17) (1.19) (0.54) (0.03)
Bilateral Default -0.090 -0.089 -0.038 -0.020
(-0.13) (-0.72) (-0.52) (-0.24)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyad Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1211 5922 7741 7212
R2 overall 0.078 0.191 0.117 0.045
R2 within 0.028 0.077 0.133 0.040
R2 between 0.088 0.176 0.099 0.029
Note: Additional control variables included, but not reported.
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Table 8: Aid and Sovereign Defaults: Donor Specific Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CAN DEU FRA GBR ITA JPN USA
Dependent variable: Gross Aid per capita
a) Both default dummies
Default 0.074 -0.104* 0.251*** -0.056 0.515*** 0.276** -0.042
(1.03) (-1.74) (2.75) (-0.33) (3.46) (1.99) (-0.41)
Bilateral Default -0.104 0.149** -0.264** 0.148 -0.509*** -0.208 0.125
(-1.16) (2.09) (-2.60) (0.86) (-3.04) (-1.30) (1.07)
b) Only unilateral default dummy
Default 0.016 0.020 -0.001 0.065 0.088 0.131* 0.058
(0.35) (0.43) (-0.03) (0.93) (1.00) (1.81) (0.96)
Specifications a) and b):
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyad Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3019 3442 3313 3025 2923 3351 3013
Note: Additional control variables included, but not reported.
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Appendix A. Data Sources and Definitions
Name Source Definition
Dependent variable
Aid Roodman (2011) and
Heston et al. (2011)
Gross aid transfers (GAT) over recipient’s
population with GAT = Gross ODA −
debt forgiveness grants− rescheduled debt.
Default variables
Default Rose (2005) and Paris
Club (2011)
Default indicator. 1 whenever an aid recip-
ient restructured its debt through the Paris
Club.
Bilateral Default Rose (2005) and Paris
Club (2011)
Bilateral default indicator. 1 whenever an
aid recipient defaulted on the debt owed to
a specific donor.
Amount Rose (2005), Paris
Club (2011) and
World Bank (2011)
Amount of rescheduled debt over recipient’s
GDP (both variables in current US$).
continued on next page
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Appendix A. - continued
Name Source Definition
Control variables
ln GDP pc Heston et al. (2011) Natural logarithm of the recipient’s PPP
converted GDP per capita.
ln Other Aid pc Roodman (2011) and
Heston et al. (2011)
Natural logarithm of Aid (see def. above)
disbursed by other G7 donors.
Growth Heston et al. (2011) Growth rate of the recipient’s GDP per
capita.
Human Rights Cornett et al. (2011) Index of human rights violations based on
US State Department human rights reports.
Ranging from 1 -5 with higher values indi-
cating more human insecurity.
Democracy Polity IV (2009) Policy score ranging from - 10 (strongly au-
tocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic)
ln Trade IMF (2011a) and
World Bank (2011)
Natural logarithm of bilateral trade mea-
sured in percent of the donor’s GDP.
UN Friend Dreher and Sturm
(2012)
Voting inline with donor in the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. Definition accoding to Keg-
ley and Hook (1991)
ln Population Heston et al. (2011) Natural logarithm of the recipient’s popula-
tion.
Colony CEPII (2011) Dummy for common colonial past. 1 for
pairs that were ever in a colonial relation-
ship.
Additional variables for IV and selection models
Joint Religion Helpman et al. (2008) Index for common religion. Higher values
indicate more similar country pairs.
Common Language CEPII (2011) Dummy for common language. 1 if donor
and recipient share the same official lan-
guage
Budget Deficit World Bank (2011) Recipient’s budget deficit (cash) in percent
of GDP
Current Account World Bank (2011) Recipient’s current account balance in per-
cent of GDP
Inflation World Bank (2011) Recipient’s CPI inflation rate
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Appendix B. A Selection Model for Panel Data
The starting point for Wooldridge’s (1995) selection model for panel data are equations
2 and 1, repeated here for convenience:
ln (Aidijt) = θt + dijtβ + xijtγ + cij + uijt and (1)
Aid∗ijt = zijtη + ζij + aijt; Aidijt > 0
[
Aid∗ijt > 0
]
. (2)
As in every fixed effects model, ζij might be correlated with zijt. Furthermore, aijt is
independent of zijt with E(aijt) = 0 and (ζij, aijt) is jointly normally distributed. Aid
flows are positive (Aidijt > 0) and ln (Aidijt) is defined if Aid∗ijt > 0. The correlation
between the unobservables in the participation (ζij + aijt) and allocation equation (cij +
uijt) then introduces the selection problem. Wooldridge’s (1995) solution for this problem
rests on four assumptions:
1. The correlation between ζij and zijt can be described by the equation
ζij = τ0 + z¯ijτ1 + cij,
where z¯ij denotes the time average of zijt.21 Equation 2 therefore simplifies to
Aid∗ijt = τ0 + z¯ijτ1 + zijtη + cij + aijt. (4)
2. The new reduced form probit model has a random effects representation, i.e. νijt =
aijt + cij are independent of zij = (zij1, . . . , zijT ). Furthermore, νijt ∼ No(0, σ2t ).
3. The two error terms of the participation (νijt) and amount equation (uijt) are
jointly normal distributed:
E(uijt|zij , νijt) = E(uijt|νijt) = ρtνijt.
4. The conditional expectation of cij is given by
E(cij|zij , νijt) = z¯ijψ + φtνijt.
21Wooldridge (1995) actually proposes to use all leads and lags of the explanatory variables in this
equation. Replacing the non-contemporary values of these variables with their time averages has
been suggested by Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007) and Wooldridge (2010).
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These assumptions imply
E [ln (Aidijt) |zij ] = θt + dijtβ + xijtγ + z¯ijψ + κtνijt
with κt = φt + ρt. Conditioning on observations with positive aid flows we then get
E [ln (Aidijt) |zij , Aidijt > 0] = θt + dijtβ + xijtγ + z¯ijψ + κtλ (Hijt) (5)
where Hijt = τ0 + z¯ijτ1 + zijtη denotes the index value from the selection equation and
λ(·)=φ(·)/Φ(·) is the inverse Mills ratio.
We then estimate Equation 5 using a two step procedure:
1. Estimate Equation 4 using a pooled probit model and calculate the estimated
values λ
(
Hˆijt
)
.
2. Estimate Equation 5 with pooled OLS using the estimates for λ(·) obtained in
step 1. These are interacted with time dummies to account for the fact that their
influence is not restricted to be constant across time.
As suggested by Wooldridge (2010), bootstrapped standard errors are used to account
for cluster specific autocorrelation and the first sage estimation of λ(·).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Advanced economies have long been thought immune against the perils of volatile capital
flows and sovereign risk. The recent financial turmoil in peripheral European economies
shattered this belief. Learning the right lessons from the experiences of emerging market
economies which have repeatedly suffered from both sudden stops and sovereign debt
crises has thus become even more important.
The four papers of this thesis attempt to contribute to this task. Their results are
generally quite strong, partly going against conventional wisdom. For example, it is
shown that past swings in private capital inflows were predominantly driven by “pull
factors”, i.e domestic developments. “Push factors” which are often pictured as culprits
for boom-bust cycles were far less important by comparison. The conclusion that IMF
interventions increased rather than decreased the risk of a sovereign default in the past
might also come as a surprise.
The results of the two papers of this thesis that study the costs of sovereign defaults are
perhaps the least controversial. The finding of varying costs for different default episodes,
e.g., complements several theoretical studies that make this prediction. However, the
extent of this heterogeneity in default costs has not yet been empirically documented.
Finally, this thesis also rejects the hypothesis that donor countries punish defaults by
withdrawing foreign aid contradicting an important assumption of two recent papers.
The results are nevertheless well anchored in the economic literature as they support
the common notion that development assistance is not solely determined by strategic
concerns.
At the time of writing, whether and which of these results carry over to the recent
European experiences remain open questions. The crises-stricken countries exhibit a
much closer economic and financial proximity than any other group of countries. By
sharing a common currency with a group of more stable economies they also lack the
possibility to tailor monetary policy to their specific needs. These characteristics might
well render common shocks and even contagious crises more likely. Hence, the “euro
crisis” may turn out as one of the rare examples of synchronized retrenchments of capital
inflows.
With regard to the determinants and consequences of sovereign defaults, the restruc-
turing of Greece’s debt has enriched the sample of default events by a single new data
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point. In face of the prolonged recession in Greece it seems safe to predict that a thor-
ough analysis of this event will again confirm the notion that default decisions are costly.
Given its status as advanced economy and, accordingly, as a donor country loosing ac-
cess to foreign aid probably again did not contribute much to these costs. As the debt
restructuring occurred despite an earlier IMF intervention – supported by further rescue
funds from the European Union – Greece’s default also provides another example of an
unsuccessful rescue attempt. However, this obviously does not necessarily imply that
the relationship between the IMF program and the subsequent debt restructuring has
been causal. To make this claim, further analysis of the “euro crisis” is required that
also takes new IMF loans to other crisis countries like Ireland and Portugal into account
which have not yet been followed by a default.
Overall, the simultaneous crises in several European economies provide an ideal oppor-
tunity to test existing theories and reevaluate previous empirical findings. The theory
and empirics of capital flows and sovereign debt are thus likely to remain at the frontier
of economic research for some time to come.
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Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorgelegten und nachfolgend aufgelisteten Aufsätze selb-
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Markus Jorra, Giessen, den 15.5.2012
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